

DÆDALUS

JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES

How Others See
The United States


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Fall 1972: How Others See the United States

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
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How Others See the United States



DÆDALUS

Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences

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
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FALL 1972: HOW OTHERS SEE THE UNITED STATES

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Preface to the Issue “As Others See the United States”

For the greater part of its history, the United States enjoyed natural defenses; two large oceans provided protection against any potential aggressor. Those defenses served the nation well for over a hundred and fifty years, only being breached when a new technology created the unprecedented condition of universal vulnerability. Americans are only too aware of all that has changed for them over the last several decades. However, they are less prone to think of what has changed for all the others. For, if the United States has become more accessible to the rest of the world, and more vulnerable, so have other countries been obliged to enter into a new relationship with the United States. Given what Octavio Paz says in this issue, one is almost tempted to say that what Mexico has been compelled to live with from the beginning of its history is fast becoming a nearly universal phenomenon.

Such a perspective, needless to say, is not one that comes naturally to most Americans. Many will be surprised to learn from Octavio Paz that Mexicans have traditionally regarded the United States as “otherness,” as something “at once inseparable from us and yet radically and essentially foreign.” Mexico has never been able to avoid the influence of its neighbor to the north; fascinated by its power, but fearful of the uses to which that power might be put, Octavio Paz speaks of the United States as the shadow that falls on the whole continent. The United States is everything that Mexico is not, Paz explains, a country that cannot be avoided, even when it pays no heed to Mexico. The relationship that was once “special” to Mexico has now become almost universal. There is no way to avoid the United States; or, to put the matter more generously, less incentive to do so. The United States figures in the lives of other states in a way that few others figure in the life of America; there is no apparent method of redressing this imbalance. It means, among other things, that the United States is increasingly the object of an unprecedented international scrutiny, and that this scrutiny results in a continuing reappraisal of American purposes and methods.

This issue of *Dædalus*, then, has two large purposes: first, to suggest how the United States is viewed in the world today; second, to indicate why the perspective matters not only to the United States, but, more significantly, to those who are in some way subject to American influence. That influence takes many forms and is not best rendered by trade statistics or arms expenditures. Fifteen years ago, the late Clyde Kluckhohn, writing in *Dædalus*, expressed the hope that the United States might soon “become more patient, less determined to transform much of [the] world

into a replica of ourselves, less intrigued by the image of 'the American century.'" This, according to Raymond Aron, may in fact be happening today.

Looking at American foreign policy in the cool and dispassionate way that has become traditional for him, Aron tries to distinguish between changes in style or emphases and more basic changes. The latter have particular interest for him. Aron suggests that the United States, for the first time since 1947, is, in fact, trying in various ways to "disengage" itself. In Vietnam, for example, he sees the United States as attempting "to combine an honorable retreat. . . with a world diplomacy which lacks a crusading spirit, and has neither a monstrous enemy nor a virtuous ally." The United States is prepared for Europe to resolve its own problems and is ready to accept the solutions that are reached. There is no longer a "grand design" for the world. According to Aron, the United States acknowledges the existence of several subsystems in the world and is not disposed to challenge the limited autonomy of these subsystems. In short, the United States, like the Soviet Union, has accepted the fact that it will continue to rule, but neither country any longer expects to govern in the way that it once did. This new situation holds no terrors for Aron; in fact, he sees it as providing new opportunities, not the least being for Europe itself. If Europe fails to seize these opportunities, Aron writes, it will have only itself to blame.

This is a very different view from the one taken by Jagdish Bhagwati. He is not nearly so favorably impressed by the American willingness to withdraw, and not at all persuaded that this is, in fact, American policy. Bhagwati sees continued interventions by the United States, of a kind that fill him with gloom and foreboding. In recent years, he argues, America has shown a "distinct and dramatic disregard of basic human values." Seeing the Vietnam war in a very different light from Aron, he regards it as paradigmatic of the kind of policy that led the United States to support Pakistan in the war over Bangladesh and that causes the United States to give its approval to totalitarian regimes everywhere in the world. Bhagwati speaks of the new *Realpolitik* in American foreign policy and deplores the diminished interest in helping the developing countries. The idea of a five-power world does not appeal to him. What about the other nations? Where are they to situate themselves in this new international order? Bhagwati writes as one who feels that America has abandoned its earlier moral position. He asks for America to find itself again by devising policies that will win favor in a world that still looks to America for moral leadership.

Achille Albonetti sounds quite a different note of alarm. As one who has long favored closer trans-Atlantic ties, and who is aware of all the benefits that have come to Europe from the Marshall Plan and the defense arrangements of the early 1950's, he is distressed by what he claims is happening today. The American challenge to Europe, he argues, is not economic but

political; it is the growing political, military, and nuclear gap between the United States and Europe that gives Albonetti cause for concern. Like Bhagwati, he has major reservations about the new international order that seems to be establishing itself. The possibility of such an order being maintained by the three nuclear giants—the United States, the Soviet Union, and China—is not an acceptable solution. Albonetti questions whether either Europe or Japan will be willing to abide such an arrangement, and he argues for the necessity of both a Japanese and a European nuclear force. The American preference for bilateral talks is also worrisome; Albonetti asks whether this does not threaten the “Balkanization of Europe.”

Such concerns are very remote from those of either Octavio Paz or Annie Kriegel. Both are intensely interested in the United States, in part because that interest provides them with a new perspective on their own country. For Paz, the essence of American life is represented in its material abundance, traditions of self-criticism, and individualism. These qualities are central to the American experience; they define the United States in much the same way that other qualities define Mexico. Paz, in choosing to dwell on American attitudes toward sex and food, is able to explore the larger dimensions of American Puritanism. Paz argues that the Puritanism that “watches over tasteless food and has converted work into a way of salvation is at the root of the movements of criticism and self-criticism that have periodically affected North American society, forcing it to examine itself and to repent.” Because Paz believes that modernity is measured not by industrial progress but by a capacity for criticism and self-criticism, the United States becomes *the* modern society against which all others are obliged to measure themselves.

Annie Kriegel sees America as Europe’s child; parents are rarely able to regard their offspring dispassionately or objectively. The reality that Europeans discover in America is as much a function of their own needs—and of their own domestic political controversies—as it is a function of objective investigation. It is a mistake to imagine that Europeans study the United States in any very systematic manner. In France, for example, serious inquiry into America is rare; scholarship on the United States is largely barren. Europeans, Kriegel says, generally employ a Marxist or neo-Marxist conceptual frame to give structure to the few facts that they discover. It is uncommon for Europeans to evaluate correctly what is happening in the United States. Having misinterpreted the events of 1968, they are not likely to do substantially better with other complex issues. In the end, Europeans use America for their own intellectual and political purposes; they need America for both.

Omar Grine, writing from Algeria, and Celso Lafer, writing from Brazil, suggest another kind of influence that the United States exerts in the world today. American scholarship is so pervasive and the American mass media are so effective in spreading their message that a great part of the world

receives its interpretation of the United States essentially from American sources. That interpretation is sometimes refracted through foreign lenses, but it usually originates in American academic or journalistic literature.

Thus, for example, Omar Grine takes as a given what Americans have themselves said about their recent domestic difficulties. Sensing a crisis of confidence in the society, with the traditional elites no longer able to support institutions that have become obviously ineffectual, Grine gives a good deal of attention to the new counterelites. While they cannot be said to express ideas that are significantly new, they gain notoriety precisely because they insist on taking traditional ideas and values seriously. It is the counterelites, Grine says, who are insisting on the Constitution's promise of equality and the society's denial of it. The protests of the young and the blacks are considered the "reification of principles" that both were brought up to believe in, and that both are now anxious to incorporate into American public policy.

Celso Lafer, reflecting on contemporary violence, asks whether it does not stem from the crisis of legitimacy that has been so conspicuous and so universal in recent years. Even the vaunted pluralism, of which Americans were once so proud, no longer appears to be working. Bureaucratic government seems to mean the rule of nobody; the participation of ordinary citizens becomes increasingly difficult. Yet it is precisely in the United States that these problems are, in fact, being attacked. The great hope for their solution anywhere, Lafer says, lies in their first being resolved in the United States.

The "special relation" that for many years tied the United States to Great Britain gave men and women in both countries the sense of knowing each other. It is easy to believe, where no language barriers exist, and where a common cultural experience is thought to prevail, that the resemblance between the two countries is very substantial. Not the least of the merits of the articles by John Maddox on American science and by Michael Burrage on American professional and industrial organization and work habits are the questions they raise about such facile interpretations.

Clearly, John Maddox believes that American and British science are very different kinds of enterprises. While he has no interest in diminishing the achievements of American science and technology in recent decades, and is in fact concerned to demonstrate their extraordinary vitality and growth, he raises searching questions about the methods used by the government to foster and support scientific inquiry in the postwar period. Maddox is persuaded that the federal government still lacks what can properly be called a "science policy." Instead, he says, it has a "remarkably efficient mechanism for public and congressional wish-fulfillment or would-be fulfillment." The Manhattan Project—that remarkable war-time experiment that succeeded in marrying scientific, industrial, and military talent in pursuit of a single specific purpose—still casts its spell. The American

practice is to fix on a specific goal and then to appropriate money for that purpose. This, Maddox argues, is much too haphazard a way to proceed.

Michael Burrage, in considering the development of the professions and in writing about work relations more generally, explicitly compares British models with those that prevail in the United States. The British models were never suited to the American environment; they did not survive into the nineteenth century; some were modified or abandoned even in the colonial period. Group loyalties, characteristic of Britain, have not been common in America; on the other hand, bureaucratization has had an importance in the United States that it has never had in Britain. American professional and industrial practices demand rapid innovation, but they exact a heavy human toll. Burrage is not prepared to say that one system is superior to the other; only that they are significantly different.

This issue concludes with two letters written by urban planners, one from Athens and one from London. Each is the letter of an admirer, but neither C. A. Doxiadis nor Richard Llewelyn-Davies is uncritical of what he finds in the American city. To write about the American city is to write about American culture. It is for this reason that these seemingly modest missives contain messages that go beyond what is common in such informal and often impressionistic writing. Each deserves a careful reading.

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S.R.G.

RAYMOND ARON

Richard Nixon and the Future of American Foreign Policy

DOES PRESIDENT Nixon's foreign policy mark a break with that of his predecessors, Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson? Does it represent a turning point comparable to the North Atlantic Treaty, or, in the opposite sense, to the refusal by Congress to ratify the Treaty of Versailles? For the first time in twenty-five years, Americans and Europeans speak of "isolationism." Wrongly, without a doubt: history does not repeat itself, and the American republic, which has played an imperial role for a quarter of a century, cannot now retire into its shell. In the present international system, neither great nor small powers are in a position to avoid certain constraints; this, however, does not imply that they do not retain a certain degree of liberty.

At a moment when Richard Nixon, who was Vice President for eight years and then was narrowly defeated by John Kennedy, who emerged as a crusader in the cold war a generation ago and sat as Chou En Lai's interlocutor a few months ago, concludes his first term of office, what judgment is it possible to make on the present and future foreign policy of a state that no longer incorporates in its own destiny the fate of the West, but that remains the laboratory of a people profoundly uncertain of its own destiny?

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I

When Richard Nixon moved into the White House early in 1969, the legacy he inherited was weightier than that which Truman had transmitted to Eisenhower. Here and there, a certain common element existed: an unpopular war that was dragging on with no victory in sight. But the differences on both the local and on the global level were immense; the wars of Korea and Vietnam do in significant ways differ from each other.

In Korea, regular armies faced each other on more or less continuous fronts. The Panmunjon talks were dragging on because the Chinese were refusing to allow prisoners the choice of being repatriated on either Taiwan or on the mainland. American public opinion no longer supported the use of military power in so distant a theater of operations, in hostilities that were intermittent and that excluded the possibility of a clear-cut decision. The

old tradition—to finish as quickly as possible with the job of war, to return to a normal existence—imposed on the hero of the “crusade in Europe” a task and a duty: to achieve a cease-fire though peace was not in sight; to end the fighting though victory had not been achieved.

To attain the goal that circumstances, internal and external, recommended to him, President Eisenhower had a panoply of military and diplomatic weapons. He was in a position to threaten Peking with the use of nuclear arms. Stalin’s influence on the Chinese leadership favored, in the last analysis, the joining of negotiations: Stalin, to judge by what he had done all his life, wished to avoid the extension and escalation of a conflict between the United States and China. In the event of such a conflict, he would have been forced to choose between intervention, a policy fraught with great risks, and passivity, which was equivalent to an admission of weakness. In 1953, the superiority of the American economy was as overwhelming as the superiority of the American atomic arsenal. Two months after Eisenhower’s inauguration, Stalin passed from the scene; his successors hastened to end the Korean adventure and to adopt a new style.

The Vietnam war, even when justified by the argument that lines of demarcation were crossed, is, in two essentials, very different from the war in Korea. The Soviet delegates at the United Nations, during the summer of 1950, pleaded that all that was involved was a civil war; in fact, the invasion followed various unsuccessful attempts by the North to stir up guerrilla activity in the South. It was impossible to deny the legitimacy of the Seoul government or of the army that defended its existence. The North Koreans and the Soviets, while perhaps using words to vituperate the Seoul regime similar to those used today by the North Vietnamese to rail against the Saigon regime—speaking of the clique of Syngmann Rhee, the puppets, the accomplices of imperialism—in 1950 convinced only those who were ready to be convinced; today, the observer of good will asks himself whether such accusations are not in part justified. Even if, as I think, the population of the South as a whole does not wish to be “liberated” by the Vietcong or the North Vietnamese, it remains true that President Thieu does not embody, in the eyes of either the Vietnamese or of foreigners generally, the patriotism or nationalism that Syngmann Rhee was thought to represent. The Vietcong took over from the Vietminh who had fought against the French a war for independence. Syngmann Rhee, during the whole of his life, had fought the Japanese. Many of the generals of South Vietnam belonged at least indirectly to the French army. Anticommunism—a certain fear that the South has of the North—upholds and partially legitimizes the Saigon regime, but this does not give it the force sufficient to resist alone either the North Vietnamese divisions, the Soviet propaganda that is so pervasive in the world, or American defeatism.

The differences in the two wars are just as apparent in the military sphere as in the political. During the first phase, the partisans, recruited locally,

shook the Saigon regime and probably would have overthrown it had the United States in 1965 not sent an expeditionary force. North Vietnam responded with increased support of the Vietcong and an increased infiltration of certain units of the regular army. The American expeditionary force did not lose any major battle, but it did not win the war, the very conduct of which militated against the possibility of victory. To use the words of Clausewitz, the political end (*Zweck*) of the war that the United States fought was the preservation in Saigon of a non-Communist regime. What military objective could correspond to this political end?

The strategist will hesitate among several possible responses: to inflict such "punishment" on North Vietnam that the Hanoi leadership will renounce its support of the southern insurgents or find that it no longer has the means to help. The bombardments were intended to achieve these two objectives: the one material, the other moral. They did not achieve either of these purposes. To search and destroy guerrilla or regular units in the South was another possible response; probably a mistaken strategy, since the expeditionary force could never succeed in destroying all the enemy units, and, in the absence of total war, partial success meant nothing. According to a formula that is commonplace today, in a revolutionary war if the guerrilla forces do not lose, they win, while the regular army must win if it is not to be thought to have lost. It is possible to argue, of course, that the American intervention had as its principal military objective simply the reinforcement of Saigon's army and regime, and that this was the reason for its strategy. As seen from Washington, the political purpose of the war would be the survival of a non-Communist South Vietnam. Since a foreign expeditionary force could not be expected to stay indefinitely in place, the politico-military objective of the intervention would be the gaining of the time necessary for the creation of a Vietnamese order capable of resisting subversion and eventual attack by North Vietnam. There is no evidence that the United States had the means to attain this objective; in any case, it remains true that it did not aim for it, or at least did not do so except as a secondary goal until the beginning of 1969.

President Johnson, in putting an end to the bombing by agreeing to negotiate, made an irrevocable decision. His successor was compelled to find an issue that would unite a divided nation, restore peace to the universities, and give him a freedom of action to reduce materially and morally the costs of intervention in Vietnam. But how to end the war *honorably*? What did *honorably* mean? According to the American view, the North Vietnamese were fighting outside the boundaries of their territory, and the evacuation of American forces called, in turn, for the retreat of Hanoi's troops. Neither Ho Chi Minh nor the other Hanoi leaders subscribed to this argument. Moreover, the "rebels" did not foresee negotiating with the Saigon government, unless they were permitted to impose conditions which would assure their own supremacy and the disappearance of their enemies.

In Korea, the cease-fire guaranteed the Americans at least their minimum political end; the problem in Vietnam was how to pull out without agreeing to total defeat, even if defeat had a political and not a military character.

President Nixon might have negotiated with Hanoi the withdrawal of American troops, appearing to be unconcerned about the future of the Saigon regime. Or he might have accepted Hanoi's demands for a "coalition government." In fact, he refused so "shameful" a liquidation of America's responsibilities. He sought to win the war (or at least not lose it) while at the same time reconciling the American people to himself and to his mission.

Nixon inherited the Vietnam problem, which was not at all like that of Korea, at a time when the relationship between economic and military forces was being modified in favor of the Soviet Union, and when domestic inflation, attributable in large part to Vietnam, weakened the dollar and reduced from year to year the apparent surplus* in the balance of trade (which became finally unfavorable in 1971). In both the Western world and in the Soviet Union, Richard Nixon's arrival at the White House coincides with the coming of the hour of truth: Europeans (especially the Germans) and the Japanese were making immense economic strides, had caught up with the other industrialized nations, and were appearing in all markets, including those of the United States, as major competitors. The urgent task—which was to finish with Vietnam—was now joined by a poorly defined task of a longer-term nature: the restoration of an international system in which the United States would have an important, though not dominant, place, and which would not exclude the continued opposition of interests, even of more or less violent conflict; a system that would entail the establishment of an equilibrium of sorts and of more traditional relations among all the great powers, even the revolutionary ones.

The interpretation of Nixon's foreign policy presents exceptional difficulties because of the apparent contradiction between his refusal to lose the war in Vietnam and his determination to "normalize" relations with all the Communist states. Not everyone would admit to the two policies being contradictory: Henry Kissinger would surely have contended that acceptance of a humiliating defeat would have deprived the United States of the moral authority required if its retreat was not to be converted into a disaster. Those who accepted this premise argued that maneuvers of retreat call at one and the same time for a great deal of suppleness and moral force, and that Richard Nixon was condemned to undertake such a maneuver. The contradiction did not escape the attention either of the commentators or of the common man, for the President's spokesman would announce progress in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks at precisely the same time that television would show long lines of Vietnamese refugees and a formidable armada concentrated in the Gulf of Tonkin.

* I use the adjective *apparent* because the balance of trade had really been unfavorable for several years, if one takes into account purchases imposed by the *tied loans*.

II

Nixon's foreign policy differs from that of his predecessors to the extent that it represents, for the first time since 1947, an effort at disengagement. It is surprising by its style, its lightning strikes, and its spectacular initiatives. The question, however, is whether it represents in a meaningful sense a change in direction, a change in philosophy.

Let us take a look at a world map. Is there a Nixon foreign policy for Europe? Yes and no. Yes, in the sense that the time of grand designs is over, and that the President concedes to the Europeans with good grace their right to organize themselves in whatever way they think to be most desirable. De Gaulle's veto of the British entry into the Common Market in 1963 greatly irritated Kennedy; it was thought to be scandalous by many in the United States. Nixon chose not to declare himself as favoring or opposing British entry in 1971; while he surely favored Britain's entry, he abstained from applying pressure in London or in Paris. He observed the unfolding of Chancellor Brandt's *Ostpolitik* without opposing it, in spite of doubts and worries that he may have felt about these policies. In brief, the Nixon diplomacy, with respect to Western Europe, is characterized primarily by self-restraint, by a determination to use America's position as leader with great discretion.* On only one issue, nuclear armaments, does Nixon reserve for himself a monopoly on action and decision; in this, he follows the example of his predecessors.

Since 1969, Africa no longer figures on the front pages of daily newspapers. There is nothing to suggest that the President has the leisure to give the Black Continent the attention that other parts of the world seem to require. In the same way, it is impossible to pretend that the Nixon government has been at all innovative in its Latin American policies. The innovation, if it does exist, depends on a less active stance and on an increased tolerance of revolutionary regimes, even for those that appear to be biased in favor of communism. Washington, it seems, has mobilized neither the CIA nor its friends to challenge the Allende experiment in Chile or the nationalist generals who hold power in Peru. A detailed study would perhaps reveal something that a more general analysis is incapable of showing. In any case, it would appear that Nixon is prepared to leave to the State Department the conduct of American foreign policy in Africa and Latin America, and that his directives do not push the professionals to undertake large initiatives. The change from activism to restraint could be said to reveal how a policy of retreat is carried out.

Finally, Nixon seems to have continued the practice of his predecessors in concentrating his attention and action on a few critical hot points; innovation is apparent in style, method, and organization; also, in the effort to combine the liquidation of the Vietnam war with *Realpolitik* in relations

* It may be different in the trade and monetary field.

with the two great Communist powers, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China.

I do not propose to deal at length with what I have called "style, method, and organization." I shall, at a later point in this essay, deal with style as it touches the substance of Nixon's diplomacy. Otherwise, my concern is essentially with the role played by Henry Kissinger and his brain trust—in other words, with the substitution of an ad hoc organization, created by the President and staffed with men chosen by him and his principal foreign policy adviser, for the regular organizations and institutions provided for in the Constitution and placed under the control of Congress; in brief, with the sort of king's court that has been superimposed, where foreign policy is concerned, on both ministers and their ministries.

This innovation, it seems to me, is only the accentuation of a tendency that has been apparent since John Kennedy came to the White House. The President, an elected sovereign, has always had the prerogative of choosing his staff. At the time of the great economic crisis, Franklin D. Roosevelt brought a team of reform intellectuals to help him. During the war, Harry Hopkins played a role in foreign affairs more important than that of the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull. There is a tradition of the "President's secret" that in some ways compares to that of the "King's secret." The low prestige of the civil servant—in a country where the "spoils system" survives and where the President, on Inauguration Day, still appoints hundreds to posts—facilitates the creation of "parallel bureaucracies." This is not to say that the process is irreversible. Tomorrow, as yesterday, an Eisenhower may make a single person, a future John Foster Dulles, the Secretary of State and his principal "private counselor."

Henry A. Kissinger, surely, plays multiple roles today that his predecessors, McGeorge Bundy and W. W. Rostow, did not enjoy as a monopoly, and that in any case they did not hold simultaneously. Kissinger presents to the President daily facts about the world situation; he formulates options among which the President must choose; in time of crisis, he presides over the Special Action Group, and he regularly conducts the business of the National Security Council. Analyst of the real and the possible, he is required also to lead or initiate the actions of the military services, passing on the directives of the President, at least at moments of grave difficulty; finally, he undertakes secret missions, to Peking and Moscow, preparing for presidential conversations with Chou En Lai or Brezhnev, and he goes to Paris, to negotiate with the North Vietnamese. Can Kissinger himself maintain all these responsibilities for very long? Would he become Secretary of State were Nixon to be elected to a second term? There is really no need to reply to such questions. The apparatus charged with the conduct of American foreign policy changes according to who is in the White House. Just as the holder of the post occupied today by Kissinger presupposes a Nixon, so any other adviser presupposes a particular kind of man as President. Kissinger is in the

forefront today because he has established special ties with Richard Nixon, a man given to secrets and to solitude, whose personality demands this kind of special relation. Also, both have had to solve a problem which is perhaps insoluble: they are required to combine an honorable retreat from Vietnam with a world diplomacy which lacks a crusading spirit and has neither a monstrous enemy nor a virtuous ally.

The Vietnam war troubled the consciences of Americans at the same time that it exasperated those who thought themselves realists. Did the Saigon regime belong truly to the "free world"? Was the unloading on North Vietnam of four or five million tons of bombs morally justifiable? At the moment Nixon arrived at the White House, anticommunism, far from giving a political or ethical justification to the war, seemed exiled and disqualified by the war itself. Through a sort of mental confusion or mix-up, anti-communism became the principle of evil because it had led to evil, namely the Vietnam engagement. There remained only one argument: the United States, responsible for maintaining a stable world order, could not consent to a humiliation that would undermine the confidence of its allies and destroy the credibility of all its promises and engagements.

Nixon and Kissinger seem to have decided, at a very early date, that the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong were demanding the elimination of the only government capable of offering some resistance to the Vietcong's grasp on the country, that of General Thieu. Based on this analysis, Nixon's policy was driven into the corner of conducting the war in such a way as to achieve a political victory while negotiating a military retreat. If the Saigon government showed itself strong enough to survive, it would, along with the United States, have won the war in the true sense, for the government was itself the stake of the conflict. To make this strategy acceptable to American public opinion, Nixon had to promise a phased withdrawal of the American expeditionary forces and to give the South Vietnamese army the responsibility for ground combat. The formula for Vietnamization corresponds exactly to the one invented by Dulles after the Korean war. It is a cynical formula if it implies that the Vietnamese will now be free to kill one another for the benefit of the United States. It is an acceptable formula if it implies the transfer to the people themselves of the responsibility for their own defense. (Would the European judge the "Europeanization" of the defense of Western Europe as shameless or moral?)

From this strategy of political victory achieved through a reduced American military presence flow many of the successive crises in Cambodia and Laos. Whether the overthrow of Prince Sihanouk was provoked by the CIA's intrigues or by hostile Khmer groups, the event offered an opportunity to attack the Vietcong by penetrating those Cambodian zones which had served them as sanctuaries, as logistical bases, and as staging areas. Nixon did not resist the temptation: the violence of the reaction in the universities and in the country as a whole showed him the limits of his freedom. The

incursion of a South Vietnamese division into Laos was undertaken with the same intention: to give the Saigon regime and its army time to reinforce themselves and to slow the preparations of the North Vietnamese offensive which was not in fact unleashed until April 1972, more than four years after the Tet offensive. When the offensive began, President Nixon had few soldiers in Vietnam who were in a position to participate in ground combat. He had an armada in the Gulf of Tonkin; airplanes were stationed on Vietnamese soil and in Thailand; the American aircraft carriers alone made it possible for more than six hundred bombing raids to be carried out every day. At the hour of truth, was this enough?

At the start of the offensive, President Nixon was able to argue that he had achieved two results: the North Vietnamese operation had taken on the form of a conventional war; regular divisions from Hanoi were crossing the demilitarized zone, which was also the line of demarcation. This was not a popular revolt against “puppets,” but an invasion that was classical in every respect; legitimate, if the Hanoi leadership were given the right to impose its authority by force on the country as a whole; illegitimate aggression, if the Saigon government were considered just as legitimate as the governments of Seoul and Hanoi. The appearance of aggression which the North Vietnamese offensive assumed gave the President a certain freedom of action. The students were now substantially less turbulent (perhaps in part because they no longer faced the threat of military conscription). Moreover, the North Vietnamese decision to choose this particular moment to attack, between the American President’s trip to Peking and his planned trip to Moscow, while the evacuation of American troops was entering its final phase, seemed to substantial elements of American public opinion as a proof of North Vietnamese aggressiveness.

Was Nixon’s diplomacy, embarrassed by the interminable sequels to the Vietnamese engagement, inspired by a “grand design”? The concept I have employed—grand design—like that of the “great debate,” has no very definite meaning. European unification, the Atlantic community—those were the final products of a grand design. Did Nixon have a grand design of this type? No and yes: he hoped to tell his fellow citizens that the time of grand designs was over, and that while the future world order did not exclude the possibility of conflicts among the small powers, or competition among the great, the former would be limited and the latter would be minimal. The new world system would be organized somewhere between the excesses of the cold war and the utopia of peace, achieved through law and through the friendship of peoples. United States’ relations with Moscow and Peking bear testimony to this philosophy, which would appear to be common to both Nixon and Kissinger.

The trip to Peking symbolizes both the style and the substance of the Nixon policy. The desire to reestablish communications with Peking or, more precisely, to give to such communications a less clandestine character

than those typical of the Warsaw talks probably originated with Nixon early in 1969. On their side, the leaders of Red China, after the *coup d'arrêt* of the leftists following the devastation of the British embassy and after the battles on the Ussuri in 1969, may have wanted to play a more active role in the international community. Among the three kinds of international relations that a Communist country may lead simultaneously—State-to-State relations, party-to-party relations, or State or party relations with a people or with rebels—the Chinese leaders appeared to have placed the accent on State-to-State relations. The ideology that promised a world insurrection, with the countryside rising against the cities, disappeared, or at least no longer received official blessing under Lin Piao's signature. Moderation, always evident in the actions taken by the Peking leadership, began to exhibit itself also in Peking's words and diplomatic initiatives. In 1971, President Nixon announced officially that he would go to Peking and that his counselor, Henry Kissinger, had gone there secretly to arrange for his trip. The trip took place in March 1972.

Let us stop a moment to analyze "style" and "substance." Style: the announcement of the planned visit to Peking without America's allies in Asia having been consulted or informed in advance; the resumption of relations in a dramatic form, through the medium of a trip by the President himself, who was received for an hour by the new emperor of the Middle Kingdom, Mao Tse-tung, and spent hours negotiating with Chou En Lai, the regime's number-two man. Must one try to distinguish between the part of the politician and that of the statesman, between the candidate for a second term and the prophet of peace for a generation? To what end?

One cannot doubt that Nixon wished to produce a sensation, and he succeeded in doing so, irritating the Japanese in the process, more than was probably necessary. He lacked tact and a proper concern for "face," which are indispensable for a great power that has no intention of abandoning the Asiatic theater. It may well be that the Peking trip was, in the eyes of Asiatics, a humiliation—the United States had quarantined Red China, and an American President was now taking the initiative to reestablish ties and was asking to be invited to Peking. But once that is admitted, the journey was the most spectacular, if not the only, means of symbolizing for the whole world the beginnings of a new era. President Nixon could not or would not subvert a policy that had resulted in alliances or mutual security pacts between the United States and Taiwan, and between Japan and Taiwan. Chou En Lai, for his part, could not or would not pay any price for the United Nations seat to which his government, for twenty years the master of Mainland China, was entitled. Nixon and Chou En Lai were not in a position to conclude an accord which in substance was important. So long as the United States' government maintained diplomatic relations with Taiwan, direct and official ties with Peking were impossible. Chou En Lai,

for his part, had no chance of securing a guarantee against the eventual rearmament of Japan. Red China and the United States continued to belong, in the Asiatic subsystem, to opposing camps, though the alignment of powers, following on the rupture between Peking and Moscow, had lost all its rigidity.

To state the matter most simply, the balance sheet of the Peking "summit" can be summarized in these terms: Red China, having emerged from the Cultural Revolution, wished to assume its proper role in the international community. After the fighting on the Ussuri and the concentration of Soviet divisions on the Chinese frontiers, the Soviet Union appeared to be the main enemy, at least temporarily, since it allowed the menace of a preventive attack on China's nuclear installations or even an invasion to hang over China at precisely the moment that the United States was itself progressively withdrawing. Red China's leadership found it logical, given its interests, to consent to a Nixon visit, which offered partial protection against a Soviet attack, without conceding anything very substantial in return. In Southeast Asia, where China was on good terms with Pakistan and on bad terms with India, she had practiced a similarly realistic diplomacy, the ideological prophecies of Lin Piao notwithstanding.

For his part, Richard Nixon, facing an election in the fall, outflanked his Democratic adversaries on their left, was baptized a "fighter for peace," and revived the old sympathy of the American people for distant and fabulous China. At the same time, he gave the Soviet Union additional reason for dealing with him and the American people a lesson in both new and traditional diplomacy: new, because for twenty-five years the Chinese and the Americans had not spoken to each other except through ambassadorial intermediaries in intermittent Warsaw conversations; traditional, because according to historical practice, in Europe at least, communication between States implies nothing more than the acceptance of reality. To recognize a State is not to approve of its government or of that government's actions. Nixon, not wishing to break from one day to the next America's policy of nonrecognition, takes a first step—the only one that counts—along the road to recognition; he visits the capital of the State with which the United States does not maintain diplomatic relations.

The Peking trip was not intended to represent more than an additional stop on the road to Moscow. The negotiations with Peking were only intended as a beginning; the talks with Moscow were supposed to be the crowning achievement. With Chou En Lai, it was the meeting itself which was the essential thing. With Brezhnev, it was the agreements on the limitation of strategic arms or the technical and commercial exchanges intended to symbolize the end of the cold war, the end of confrontation, and the beginning of a new era.

The North Vietnamese offensive, launched between the two visits, and the crisis that followed in Washington and on the battlefield, overturned

the scenario that had been planned and organized by Nixon and Kissinger. Did the scenario depend on assumptions and conventions that the North Vietnamese attacks showed to be fragile? In the short run, were the Peking and Moscow talks, in Nixon's mind, intended to help bring about the end of the Vietnam war, a compromise solution, a cease-fire? It is impossible to affirm categorically that the President and his special assistant nourished such illusions. It is probable that they hoped for some help from Peking and from Moscow (if worse came to worse, from one *or* the other) to aid them in their plans. Whether or not this influence was exercised, it is quite impossible to tell. If it was exercised, it did not appear to shake the determination of the North Vietnamese.

Since 1960, all the Presidents of the United States—Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon—have tried to protect the direct relations between the two great powers against the dangers of local conflicts and the untoward interventions of small powers. The United States and the Soviet Union share a supreme interest: not to destroy each other. The two states, however, continue to strive for different objectives, and their world views and ultimate purposes remain distinct. Their concern is to enlarge the area of their common interests, to formalize and sanction implicit agreements, and to move from there to the institution of rules that are acceptable to both. The easing of tension at the summit would permit, under the best of circumstances, the suppression of local conflicts or at least the limitation of the risks of their being extended and escalated. The negotiations on strategic arms limitations (which led to the recent Moscow accords) continue the interminable negotiations for the ending of nuclear tests and for nonproliferation agreements which resulted, also, in treaties (a partial suspension of nuclear experiments provided for by the Moscow Treaty of 1963, and the nonproliferation treaty, signed but not yet ratified by the principal interested parties).

The conclusion of the SALT negotiations marks, in contradistinction to the two preceding treaties, a move forward. The partial suspension of nuclear tests and the nonproliferation treaty affect principally those states that do not belong to the nuclear club or are only secondary members (for example, China and France). The setting of the number of antimissile missile sites, or the number of offensive missiles, is not precisely a disarmament measure, but it does serve to slow down the armaments race, and it does impose certain limits on the armaments that the two superpowers agree to permit each other to have. To the extent that early judgment is possible, this first arms limitation treaty was made possible by the United States' acceptance of the principle of equality, by the American willingness to modify, to the benefit of the Soviet Union, the balance of nuclear (as well as classical) weapons. As such, it symbolizes the continuity of Nixon's foreign policy with that of his predecessors, while at the same time it enunciates a new fact, more or less camouflaged by the President's rhetoric: the rise of the Soviet Union, the weakening of America's resolve, the maintenance of

communications between the two superpowers, the maintenance, as well, of direct competition or of confrontation through allied intermediaries in several regions of the world.

III

If, in its main points, the preceding analysis is correct, what judgment can one make about the international system of the 1970's and on the place in it that the United States holds or will hold? The many interpretations that are offered arise because most observers take a rather simplified view of a system that has in fact become extraordinarily complex. This complexity has two principal causes: the breakdown of world unity into subsystems, the multiplicity of interstate or transnational relations, without these exceedingly diverse relations being able to determine each other.

Let us consider first the crises in the Near East and in the Indian sub-continent, which are both essentially military encounters. In 1967, Israel emerged victorious against her three neighbors, Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. The United States and the Soviet Union maintained communications during the Six-Day War, but denied each other the right to intervene directly. In 1971-1972, the eastern province of Pakistan, East Bengal, suffered a brutal repression after elections that gave a majority to the Awami League. The Indian government, on its borders, gave aid and support to the rebels who had undertaken a small-scale war. India had in the East a massive superiority over the Pakistani troops stationed there. The government of Yahya Khan, responsible for holding the free elections, and also for refusing to accept their results, could not send reinforcements to the eastern province, which was separated from West Pakistan by more than 2,000 kilometers of Indian territory. All it takes for Mrs. Gandhi to guarantee India against Chinese intervention is for her to sign a treaty with the Soviet Union. This enables her, in total security, to conquer or liberate the eastern province, which is at once transformed into Bangla Desh. Did Mrs. Gandhi violate the charter of the United Nations in crossing a frontier to bring aid to an oppressed people? Certainly. Would she have better served men to respect the charter, and then proceed to supply the rebels for months and years as so many other states have done during the last twenty-five years? One has the right to doubt this; I personally have no doubts whatever: no matter how serious was the open violation of rules that forbid the crossing of national boundaries, though the hypocrisy of help given rebels seems to me generally preferable to open invasion, I cannot, in this case, condemn the quick solution adopted by Mrs. Gandhi.

The solution produced a curious alignment, with pleas and charges that were even more curious. Red China has been in conflict with India since 1962 over imprecise boundaries in the Himalayas. (Specialists are divided on the respective merits of the Chinese and Indian claims.) As a consequence,

China maintains good relations with the military regime in Pakistan. Peking's representative in the United Nations, while never denying the claims or the injuries sustained by the Bengalis, argued that India had no right to intervene, and no right to dismember a sovereign state. The Soviet Union's representative argued for the right of self-determination of peoples; the American delegate pleaded for adherence to the United Nations Charter, implying that India's military action was preventing a political solution that was already being negotiated. Here again, as in the Near East, the recourse to regular armies was made possible by the isolation of the battlefield, the clear superiority of one of the local powers, and the fact that the external powers were forced to abstain because of their disagreements and their concern with not disturbing the larger international equilibrium.

These two subsystems present certain characteristics in common: they are relatively isolated; they permit the state that is locally strongest to engage its regular armies to defend itself, to attack, or to liquidate a conflict already occurring along its boundaries. The great powers exercise, certainly, an influence, but to constrain the actors would require them to have forces on the ground. The rule of diplomacy, according to which the small powers give in to the wishes of the great powers, no longer applies on the planetary level in today's international system. The method that I shall call that of "putting up a challenge" is one to which all states now tend to have recourse. Neither the Soviet Union nor the United States dares to issue a nuclear threat. To impose their will, they are required to have certain military equipment in place. When the Kremlin leaders received the anguished plea of Nasser, they sent pursuit squadrons and anti-aircraft missile batteries to protect the Egyptian territory against the in-depth raids of Israel's air force. Neither direct threats addressed to Israel nor indirect communications passing through Washington would probably have sufficed. The technique of "putting up a challenge" (which Hitler made use of during the first years of his adventure) all the small powers now have a tendency to use, in part at least because of the manifest repugnance of the great powers to unleash their own thunder.

The Vietnam crisis presents a very different situation because of the American military presence: in the beginning with advisers, then with an expeditionary corps, and, finally, since the withdrawal of the expeditionary force, with naval and air action. In this region, as in Korea twenty years earlier, hostilities resulted from the division of the country into two parts, one dedicated to Marxism-Leninism. The North Vietnamese regime was installed by the Vietminh, which had directed the war against French "colonialism"; the regime in South Vietnam counted among its members true nationalists, but also a number of generals or politicians who had fought on the French side during the first Indochina war. (In Korea, the government presided over by Syngmann Rhee had letters of nationalist credit no less impressive than any claimed by the leaders of North Korea.)

American leaders, beginning in 1954, moved by their almost instinctual anti-Communist reflexes, but also by the way the cold war was developing, with all the uncertainties that it brought in its train, undertook to help the non-Communist and anti-Communist Saigon government. Little by little, by their very engagement to help Saigon, the Americans discovered new reasons not to abandon it. The United States had the means to fight in Vietnam; neither the Soviet Union nor Red China, in spite of its geographic proximity, was in a position to support a large army in Vietnam. The United States is today paying the price for the riches that it alone was able to muster. Neither diplomacy nor bombings have been sufficient to guarantee the Americans their objective: a secure non-Communist regime in Saigon. Neither the Soviets nor Red China responded to the American effort with anything at all comparable; they simply gave aid to North Vietnam. The latter suffered heroically the storm of steel which fell on her territory. After the failure of the Tet offensive and the bombing halt, North Vietnam prepared carefully over a long period of time the offensive that was finally unleashed in April 1972. Once more, arms were called on to decide the issue. The policy of the President had been to reconcile the demands of public opinion with those of the war, and this had led to the withdrawal of ground forces, to the reinforcement of the South Vietnamese army, and to the maintenance of substantial American naval and air power. The South Vietnamese army had acquitted itself honorably in the tasks of pacification, but it suffered a local rout before Quang Tri, just when Nixon was about to leave for Moscow. Once again, as in the case of other local crises, it is the relation of local forces that proves to be decisive. As a final recourse, the President, hoping to avoid a disaster, issued a simultaneous challenge and appeal to the Kremlin. The mining of North Vietnamese harbors could not influence the battles in the short run; it could compel the Politburo to choose between a suspension, if only temporary, of the talks with Washington and an increased effort to persuade the North Vietnamese to abandon their hopes of total victory.

The policy followed by President Nixon, which is, on the one hand, not to lose the Vietnam war and, on the other, to establish a *modus vivendi* with the two great Communist powers, had led to a major crisis in early May 1972, but did not prevent the Moscow meeting. The Kremlin leaders had never considered their shipments of arms to North Vietnam to be contrary to the unwritten rules of the *modus vivendi*, given the fact that the United States had dispatched an expeditionary force and had made ample use of air power. Nixon, in announcing his decision to mine North Vietnamese ports, presented Brezhnev with three arguments, two explicit, the other implicit: each of the great powers ought to respect the interests of the other; the agreements that were on the point of being negotiated were far more important than the fate of Vietnam; a great power cannot lose face and ought not to inflict humiliation on the other. Brezhnev accepted the first two

arguments; would he wish or was he in a position to hear the last argument as well?

This question touched on the very nature of the international system, now extended to the limits of the globe. This system, in effect, covers oceans and continents; the subsystems communicate among themselves through subtle ties; the two great powers are able to intervene, through action or abstention, in the center of Europe, in the middle of Korea, on the Indian subcontinent, along the eighteenth parallel, in Chile, and in Cuba. It remains true that there are today but two great world powers. Only the United States and the Soviet Union control by themselves the complete panoply of arms; this tends to make for equilibrium on the nuclear level; the naval-air superiority of the United States is disappearing. The Soviet Union has provided itself over the last ten years with a modern navy, and it has troops available for quick interventions. The direct dialogue between Washington and Moscow responds therefore to force and logic: the only question that remains is whether, if they are agreed to avoid armed confrontation and are willing to exchange merchandise and credits, they can also, first, define the terms of a settlement in Vietnam and, second, impose it on the parties in question. The United States was not able to (or did not wish to) compel the Israelis to evacuate the occupied territories. Why should the Kremlin leaders have been more willing or more ready to pressure Hanoi than the Americans were in Jerusalem?

Let us sum up, in simple terms, the idea which emerges from the preceding analyses. The controversies over the bipolar or multipolar character of the world system suffers from a fundamental ambiguity. If one is comparing the volume of resources and the potential of states, then bipolarity subsists. If, however, we define power not in terms of material means, not even by will alone, but by the effective capacity to impose one's own decisions, then the story is a very different one. The dissolution of the world arena into subsystems, the "putting up of a challenge" to the great powers by the small, and the indifference of the small states to the threat of nuclear arms—all these facts, physical and moral, tend to make the *effective* power of the giants in every region of the world proportional to those forces that it is prepared to mobilize and put into place. There is no relation between the nuclear bar and the classical bar on the ladder of violence in a particular conflict. Ballistic missiles in their silos do not reduce other arms to silence; they have less influence on the course of events than the English fleet sitting at anchor may have had during the nineteenth century. Perhaps the influence of such forces has been less than the historians have believed: the Europeans did not meet in their earlier encounters armies comparable to those of North Vietnam. Nuclear arms paralyze the aggressive and military inclinations of the more industrialized nations; in doing so, they dissociate the planetary system into relatively separate subsystems. They do not permit either of the two great powers to dictate to their allies or their clients,

instructing them on how they must conduct themselves; nor do they compensate for the defeats suffered on the field of battle by what is an incontestable superiority in other regions or in other arms.

Just as the spatial subsystems communicate only imperfectly, so the different planes on which interstate, international, or transnational relations occur conserve a measure of autonomy. In this regard, the European relation seems to me to be characteristic. The representation of a bipolar international system was first formulated in the late 1940's when Stalin installed the Iron Curtain in the middle of the old Continent. The Soviet Union established governments in the East European countries that had close ties to Moscow; these were directed by men converted to Marxism-Leninism, a number having returned from foreign exile. In the West, the old nations, both the victorious and the vanquished, all ravaged or weakened, seemed to be easy prey for the conqueror, except for the fact that the Americans were there; they seemed to be the only ones capable of erecting a barrier against the ambitions of the tyrant or what at the time was called the new faith. There were many variations on the idea of the two great powers, the two blocs, the free world standing up against eastern despotism.

This representation, which conformed only approximately to the reality of Europe at the end of the 1940's, never reflected the whole of the world international system. The Soviet Union never exercised, outside Eastern Europe, an unconditional authority over those states which called themselves Marxist-Leninist. Red China, even between 1949 and 1953, when relations subsisted between Stalin and Mao Tse-tung, never accepted the status of satellite. The ideological kinship or affinity of regimes, which characterized the members of the two European blocs (the case of Portugal, in the Atlantic Alliance, being, of course, an exception) could not be found outside Europe. The states supported by the United States, in Asia, in the Near East, in Latin America, either share a non-Marxist-Leninist orientation or are not governed by a monolithic party claiming to be Marxist-Leninist, Soviet, or Chinese. Certain of them do not belong to the free world (assuming that the word has some meaning) in anything but a negative way: they reject the formula of a single-party and an ideology called Marxism-Leninism. There has never been a Soviet "camp" or "bloc" outside Europe, any more than there has been an "American bloc" or a "free world." What happened was that the United States, starting from the idea of damming up communism, gave itself as a prime objective, in a manner that was almost obsessive, the responsibility of preventing an accession to power of Communist parties, sometimes even of socialist or progressive parties, which, it was believed, would eventually pave the way for Marxist-Leninist parties.

The end or the abatement of bipolarity takes on a second meaning also. According to the first, the two great powers reveal themselves incapable of translating the superiority of their potential into effective action, and the

subsystems acquire a certain degree of autonomy. According to the second, the two superpowers do not maintain over their allies, protégés, or clients the authority they once had, and they no longer offer (assuming they ever did) two governmental models from which all states are expected to choose. Military solidarity, more or less strict, with one of the great powers, is no longer reflected, or is no longer reflected to the same degree, on the other levels of international, transnational, and indeed interstate relations.

Consider Europe itself in this respect. The "Soviet bloc" exists in the precise sense that the Kremlin leaders continue to set limits to the national autonomy or ideological heresy they are prepared to tolerate: Czechoslovakia, after Hungary, learned this. Within these limits, however, Hungary, in its economic management, and Rumania, in its diplomacy, enjoy a certain liberty. All the same, Rumania refused the discipline of integration that Comecon once thought to impose on her. The United States never exercised, in Western Europe, an authority comparable to what Stalin and the post-Stalin Kremlin sought to impose on Eastern Europe. The economic recovery of the West European countries, together with the Common Market, have progressively modified the relations among Great Britain, France, and West Germany, on the one hand, and with the United States, on the other.

Each of the West European countries has established bilateral relations with the greater number, if not all, of the East European nations. General de Gaulle, in particular, when traveling in Poland, recalled the old friendship that existed, and invited his hosts (vainly, however) to look outside their immediate environment, a discrete allusion to the socialist community to which Gomulka gave all his attention and fidelity. The same General de Gaulle traveled also in the Soviet Union, without realizing the contradiction between the accord he had reached with Moscow (to which he gave priority) and the call to autonomy that he so freely addressed to the Marxist-Leninist states.

Whether one speaks of diplomatic, cultural, or sports relations, it is obvious that there is no longer an Iron Curtain. There exist, however, two quite distinct worlds: the Soviet Union continues to dictate ideological conformity and forbids the coexistence of competing ideologies. National economic management and international economic integration operate according to fundamentally different methods on both sides of the old Continent. The exchange of goods between these two economic entities has progressed remarkably and can certainly continue to do so. The Soviet Union finds it in its interest to exchange primary goods or energy for factories or manufactured products, often of an advanced technology. The countries of the West think it is to their advantage to promote this commerce, with the hope that independence will help to consolidate the peace. The West German government also nourishes the hope of a penetration of ideas, particularly of democratic liberty, into East Germany. The leaders of East Ger-

many reply to this hope with what they call *Abgrenzung* (a policy of delimitation). So that the DDR may maintain itself in a Europe traversed by the massive movements of matériel and men, it is essential that the immaterial "borders" be hardened, for these are the frontiers that protect Communist Germany's spirit.

In this Europe, through which is being woven a network of bilateral relations between all European countries, both Eastern and Western, with commercial exchanges from country to country and perhaps in time between the two blocs, what place is still held by the United States? What role does it play today? What role may it play during the next ten years?

Richard Nixon's diplomacy, in Europe as well as in Asia, is today characterized by the formula that speaks of a "low profile." It is enough to compare the grand design of John F. Kennedy, the attitude adopted in 1961-1962 by the American President with regard to the British candidacy for the Common Market, and the ostentatious silence of the American leaders since 1969 to see the difference. I do not believe that the President or his advisers were very favorable to the *Ostpolitik*, the opening to the East, of Chancellor Brandt. They did not register their opinions, and, in the manner of French and British diplomacy, simply negotiated that section of the accords that dealt with the former capital of the Reich and that concerned the Four. In the same way, they neither upheld nor criticized the third British application for membership in the Common Market. In brief, Nixon's policy is to leave to Europe the responsibility for its own fate and for Europe to organize itself in whatever way it thinks most appropriate.

The "Nixon doctrine" for Asia (since this is the name given to it in the administration's reports to Congress) aims for a comparable objective: to permit the United States to withdraw, or at least to appear no longer at the front of the stage. But the persistence of the war in Indochina tends to confuse this doctrine with that of Vietnamization—the principle that Asians ought to battle fellow Asians—while in Europe, the "low profile" implies the perpetuation, indeed the consolidation, of peaceful coexistence. The contrast appears to me in reality to be considerably less important than a superficial examination might suggest.

Western Europe, in spite of its physical proximity to the community of socialist states, belongs to the Atlantic Community, whether one speaks of its economy or its ideology. The dollar is the West European transnational currency; almost all the American conglomerates have West European subsidiaries; the supply of energy depends on relations with the producer countries of the Middle East where American companies have invested billions of dollars. Western Europe is affected at every moment by the inflation, the fluctuations of the stock market, the interest rates in New York, by all that happens on the other side of the Atlantic. No decision taken by the planners or by the Politburo in Moscow exercises an influence at all comparable to what follows from changes in the American situation. There exists, even

now, a transnational economic society, symbolized by Eurodollars, which restrains, in fact, the sovereignty of states, and which limits the possibility of any one of them carrying out an independent policy having to do with credit or currency. The same idea may be expressed in the language of the Marxist-Leninists: Western Europe belongs to a world market, the capitalist market, Eastern Europe to another market, the socialist market; the relations between these two markets, or between the states belonging to these two markets, have a character that is normally limited or marginal when compared with the importance of the exchanges that take place internally in each of these markets.

The states of Western Europe—can they, do they, wish to establish more binding ties with the other half of the old Continent while remaining an integral part of the transnational Atlantic society? Surely. Can they, or do they wish to, have a Europe united “from the Atlantic to the Urals”? Certainly not. Politically, such a Europe, without the United States and with the Soviet Union, would result in what is today called the “Finlandization of Europe”; it would give the Kremlin leaders the right to oversee the internal affairs of European states, and would necessitate a submission, in time, to the demands of the Soviet Union. The Finnish government preserved a large measure of autonomy; the outsider admires the courage of the people and of those who govern the state. It does not remain any less true that the Finnish President makes a trip to Moscow almost once every year, and that certain films are withdrawn when they displease Soviet authorities. If the West Europeans found themselves in a situation comparable to that of the Finns, I doubt that they would show the same amount of courage in protecting a certain part of their liberty.

Economically, then, the exchanges with Eastern Europe are capable of completing and enriching the West, but they cannot serve to replace the exchanges within the Atlantic or capitalist market. Politically, a Western Europe detached from the United States, where the interest in maintaining a certain unity and a certain will no longer existed, would slide toward subordination. Soviet hegemony would be substituted for American protection, which had been first accepted with thanks, then supported with resignation, sometimes with bitterness. That the leaders of the West German government and the opposition agreed to debate the conditions of ratification of the Soviet-German treaty in the presence of the Soviet ambassador is truly remarkable; it illuminates with a crude light the road on which the Federal Republic, first, and then its European allies risk slipping.

Richard Nixon, in his stand against the Mansfield amendment and against the pressure of certain members of the Senate, affirms the necessity of an American military presence in Europe. The future depends on the outcome of the war in Vietnam, and also on the reaction to the discussions on trade and currency that are now engaging the Americans, the Europeans, and the Japanese. In effect, in the course of the last ten years, there has

been a profound change in the relation between the military force available to the United States and that available to the Soviet Union; this has been accompanied by an equally important change in the relative economic strength of the United States, on the one hand, and of Japan and Western Europe, on the other. Economic growth and the progress in productivity have been more rapid in Japan and Europe than they have been across the Atlantic. In August 1971, President Nixon was forced to suspend the convertibility of the dollar and to impose a 10 per cent surcharge on imports, so as to obtain the consent of Europe and Japan to a revaluation of their currencies, which involved a modification of the value of all their currencies with reference to gold, and of certain currencies with reference to the dollar. At once, the idea of an adaptation of the international system to the new relationship of forces penetrated the *conventional wisdom* and word of it spread from journal to journal, and from speech to speech.

Certainly, the disparity in GNP per head between the United States, on the one hand, and Japan and Western Europe, on the other, has narrowed. The Common Market, and especially the expanded one that will include Britain, has become the first commercial entity in the world (especially if we include in these statistics intracommunity exchanges). The prosperity of Western Europe constitutes, in a certain sense, the success of the foreign policy of the United States, since this is what America aimed for after the war: the restoration of the non-Communist half of the Old World. Is success transformed into defeat if external competition compromises American prosperity, or if the American economy gives signs of a decline, comparable to what the British economy showed when it preferred the high returns of external investments to investments at home?

Which of these two hypotheses comes closer to reality? I will try to answer in a very few words. To remain on the surface, the reasons for confidence are no less than those which point in the opposite direction. Whether the question involves science, techniques, innovations, or highly advanced industries, the United States on the whole remains in first place. When American manufactured products no longer compete well in third markets with the goods of Japan or Europe, in the fields in which the United States no longer has a sufficient superiority in terms of techniques or organization, there is no reason to be surprised: the gap between wages is simply greater than that of productivity. On the other hand, the revolt of a fraction of the youth, of the leading class, against the rigors of the technico-scientific civilization, accompanied by a disparagement of the demands of the imperial function, are circumstances that admit of many different interpretations. So, also, the search by large businesses for higher profits outside the United States, and, at the same time, for workers who will be less rebellious against the discipline of work, does not signify simply, as some would have it, the creation of an American industrial empire outside the United States, but the flight of American capital toward more favorable locations.

For the moment, President Nixon has proceeded to a necessary liquidation: he has violated the taboo of the American dollar being as good as gold; he has regained the freedom of the rate of exchange for American money. He has not, however, whatever may be said, put an end to the rule of the dollar-standard. In a sense, the crisis of August-September 1971 has established temporarily a pure dollar-standard system. In the medium run, I believe that the 1971 devaluation of the dollar will appear as the end of the postwar period. The world capitalist market will not accept a national currency as a transnational currency when the value of this currency undergoes more or less frequent variations and reflects the vicissitudes of an economy managed according to internal demands.

The break with the postwar period, without the structure of the new era showing itself entirely, is particularly obvious in Nixon's policy in Asia. This policy has had the merit of bringing about a resumption of communications with Red China and the admission of Peking into the United Nations; it has not yet been successful in achieving an honorable retreat from Vietnam and it insists on reaffirming its fidelity to old alliances, to alliances characteristic of a sea power which is tied to a belt of islands and peninsulas on the periphery of the continental land mass.

The form of the system or subsystem in Asia still remains indistinct for two reasons: hostilities continue in Southeast Asia; Japan, despite its great economic resources, holds itself momentarily outside the reach of great power politics largely as a consequence of the modesty of its armaments. Japan and Western Europe have in common this disparity between their economic resources, their military capacity, and their willingness to contemplate external action. They are both valid interlocutors of the United States in monetary and commercial negotiations. Japan would have fewer obstacles to surmount than Western Europe were it to decide to become a great power in every sense of the word. Does the United States wish for this kind of conversion? In his dialogue with Peking, Nixon declared the United States an ally of the empire of the rising sun—an empire sworn to peace and to the conquest of markets or one destined soon again to play the role of a first-rank military power? There is nothing to suggest that the Chinese and the Americans, assuming that they were to agree, would be in a position to impose their choice on Tokyo.

What answer can one give, in conclusion, to the question asked at the beginning: to what extent does President Nixon's foreign policy break with that of his predecessors? Its novelty lies, first and foremost, in the philosophy of interstate relations that inspires the policy and, secondly, in the situation itself, in the situation that the United States finds itself in with reference to both her rivals and her friends. In brief, a diplomacy which openly obeys the rules or customs of *Realpolitik* or of *power politics* gives itself as a prime objective the inauguration of a world system in which the United States would accept *one* partner-adversary on an equal footing

(the Soviet Union) and *several* partners, allies or adversaries, within the various subsystems.

Commentators have a tendency to emphasize the American conversion to realism, or the influence of Henry A. Kissinger, who came from Germany at the age of fifteen to pass on, some thirty years later, the teachings of Metternich and Bismarck to the heads of his adopted land. A picture of Epinal that simplifies, though it does not falsify history. The influence of the *éminence grise*, of the little German professor, would not be explainable if the two men, the President and his adviser, did not see the world through the same glasses. Again it is important not to exaggerate the differences between this administration and those that preceded it. Every President of the United States has practiced *Realpolitik* in the same way that Mr. Jourdain spoke in prose without being aware of it. When Roosevelt "bought" Soviet intervention against Japan through concessions to which the China of Chiang Kai-shek was compelled to agree, he acted in very much the same way as did the statesmen of Old Europe: he rediscovered spontaneously the impure practices that the Americans have never elaborated a theory to explain, but whose benefits they have never thought to ignore. On another side, Richard Nixon also dissembles, by the rhetoric that he uses, the actions that he takes. In Peking and Moscow, he, in his turn, presents himself as a pilgrim seeking peace.

It is even permissible, it seems to me, to argue that Nixon's predecessors, Kennedy and Johnson certainly, Eisenhower probably, hoped for a dialogue with Moscow, and had made moves to secure it. Why, then, has Nixon had the opportunity to go further than they were able to? Probably, one must reply very simply, because Nixon had the courage to go to Peking. For twenty years, from the time of the Chinese intervention in Korea up to the 1970-1971 Sino-American negotiations, the United States kept Red China out of the United Nations and communicated with her exclusively through the intermittent meetings in Warsaw (at the ambassadorial level). This American attitude had not prevented the rupture between the two great Communist powers; it may even have done something to provoke it (the Quemoy and Matsu crisis of 1958). This is not to deny to Nixon the "Machiavellian" merit of having violated the taboo of an untouchable China, of having favored the return of Peking into the international arena, and of having given to the Kremlin leaders an additional reason for wanting an understanding with Washington.

In Peking as well as in Washington, Nixon found interlocutors who were willing to speak a language of reason and reality. The cultural revolution belonged to the past. Chou En Lai had resumed his authority; Lin Piao had disappeared from power; the world revolution of the countryside against the city had rejoined other myths in the oblivion of history. In Moscow, Brezhnev and the other leaders resembled more the bureaucrats and the managerial class than they did the prophets. They had achieved a

virtual military equality with the United States; they were not unaware of their economic and technical inferiority. The Chinese, anxious for a guarantee against a preventive attack by the Soviets, and the Soviets, anxious to check the armaments race and to obtain American assistance, would not refuse the visit of the American President—visits that symbolized the new international system characterized by a plurality of dialogues, of subsystems, and of types of relations.

Why had the Russo-American condominium, about which Roosevelt had dreamed thirty years earlier, not come into being? Why the cold war instead of cooperation? Historians do not all give the same answer: the revisionists blame Truman and American diplomacy; the others blame Stalin and the ruthless way in which he imposed his rule on a hundred million Europeans. There is no need to choose between these two indictments; both of them are true. The Americans, after Yalta, neither prevented nor accepted the Sovietization of Eastern Europe and of a fragment of the German Reich. Spectacular episodes apart, the cold war in Europe had for its origin and for its significance this strange mixture of protest and tolerance—moral protest and tolerance in fact. Today, the ratification of the Soviet-German and German-Polish treaties consecrates the moral recognition by the last protester against the things that Stalin accomplished. The Nixon-Brezhnev dialogue does not entail the same risk of a misunderstanding as the Roosevelt-Stalin of thirty years ago. The Westerners do not even refuse the Soviets the right to intervene with their army in any of the East European Communist states.

Outside Europe, the two powers do not indulge in the illusion of a cloudless era of peace. *Pravda* and *Izvestia* avoided mention of the Vietnam war during the time of the President's visit. The Soviets have not promised and will never officially promise to cease their support of wars of national liberation or of peoples fighting against imperialism. For the rest, why should they renounce the opportunities for a policy of power at the very moment when, for the first time, they have the means to pursue such a policy? Certainly, in receiving credits, and in securing the benefits of American technology, they probably accomplish the old dream of Stalin and perhaps also of Lenin (after all, the Americans played an important part in the industrialization of the first Soviet five-year plans). But they now deal on an equal footing with an interlocutor who resembles them in a certain way. Nixon accepts also the dissociation between ideology, which has its internal uses, and relations between states; he even accepts that it is entirely normal for the superpowers to have rival interests. He neither hopes for nor awaits a world condominium, or a precise differentiation of zones of influence, or of bargaining at the summit, to decide crises or conflicts. One word expresses at the same time the meaning and the limits of the accord: restraint or self-restraint. Prudence and moderation remain the Aristotelian virtues of the sublunar world. The Soviet Union and the United States remain the two

superpowers, or, more precisely, the two world powers, the two super nuclear powers. The Two will not rule any more together than the United States ruled alone during the years of its supremacy.

In the Asian subsystems, as in the Near East, the Two have to take into account other actors. With respect to economic and monetary reorganization, Europe and Japan have become real interlocutors. Obviously, the present accords do not stop the game. In Europe, where, apparently, the delimitation of zones of influence is most clear-cut, ideological confrontation continues: the East Germans proclaim the watchword *Abgrenzung*; the West Europeans speak worriedly of "Finlandization." The two superpowers rule, but they do not govern. Or, more accurately, Moscow governs, but with difficulty, the countries of the *imperium* over which the Soviet army maintains unity. Elsewhere, it does not govern. North Vietnam and Israel do not permit themselves to be governed. The West Europeans whom President Nixon salutes as if they already constituted a center of influence in a system of five will have only themselves to blame if they permit themselves to be governed by either Washington or Moscow.

This article was translated from the French by Paul Michaud.

JAGDISH BHAGWATI

The United States in the Nixon Era: The End of Innocence

THE UNITED STATES under Richard Nixon is a strange puzzle. The distinct and dramatic disregard of basic human values which afflicts his administration's foreign and domestic policies and pronouncements contrasts ironically with the evidence of growing concern by a number of Americans with precisely the moral content and impact of their institutions and policies.

The administration's complex maneuvers in foreign affairs, fascinating in their often spectacular moves, as though chess were being played by poker rules, have only barely concealed an atrophy of moral sensibility in the key crises which the administration has faced. The Pakistani atrocities in Bangladesh, which constituted the second major holocaust of this century, paralleling in their ferocity the Nazi massacres, invited the condemnation of the civilized world. But they were met with total silence from the United States' administration, with its covert partial continuation of military aid and its calculated deception of domestic opinion. The transformation of the Vietnam war into a capital-intensive, airpower-based operation, resulting in the accelerated devastation of Vietnamese land and lives, was an effective way to continue the war in pursuit of the original political objectives of American intervention in this civil war. But it has violated the delicate sense of decency which obtains among those who know that civilized men wage wars with more constraints, and, in substituting the destruction of countless Vietnamese for far fewer American lives, it has prostituted the lofty purpose with which this misadventure began.

These dominant, discordant notes have been accompanied by a cacophany of other insensitivities: the persistent support of the Greek Colonels—installed with CIA support, if Andreas Papandrou is to be believed—in the teeth of the Council of Europe injunctions; the embrace, not exclusively through NATO, of the only surviving European colonial power in Lisbon; the complicity of the White House in letting through the Senate the resolution requiring violation of the United Nations embargo on import of Rhodesian chrome¹; the ease with which Governor Rockefeller, as a Nixon emissary to Latin America, posed with Duvalier

in Haiti, with the hated instruments of Latin America's worst tyranny, the Ton Ton Macoute, neatly providing a backdrop to this shameful spectacle. Indeed, one could go on citing such examples of distressing flirtations with, and support of, regimes whose antidemocratic postures with respect to their own populations are matched only by their anti-Communist declarations.

These postures in foreign policy have been accompanied by a "low-key" (and, at times, an essentially "decommitment") approach to obligations implicitly and explicitly assumed by earlier administrations toward Third World needs of aid and trade. The American aid program, once the most progressive in its intent and magnitude, is now at an all-time low. The United States is also the only one among the major Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development countries still not to have put into its legislative channels the 1970-approved scheme for granting preferential entry to the exports of the poor countries. The United States is also currently among the few major OECD countries dragging their feet on the "link proposal" to have the Special Drawing Rights scheme for the creation of international liquidity allied to an automatic aid-disbursing mechanism to obviate the annual legislative wrangles over aid bills across the world. The willingness of Mr. Hannah at the Agency for International Development to make encouraging noises on the link proposal, in concert with the other rich countries at the third UNCTAD meetings in Santiago in 1972, was effectively curbed by Mr. Volcker at the Treasury. This indifference to the needs of the Third World contrasts badly with the sense of urgency demonstrated in the poor countries and also in other rich countries, including Canada. It is also a distressing contrast to the moral commitment to world development that led to the acceleration of the aid program, the Peace Corps, the Alliance for Progress, and other such imaginative initiatives in the early 1960's. The values again are missing.

This collapse of concern with the basic moral purposes that have inspired the great presidents of the United States can be seen also in the domestic policies and postures of the Nixon administration. Witness, for example, the Presidential intervention in behalf of Lieutenant William Calley; the dragged feet on civil rights; the unsuccessful attempt at putting a mediocre one-time segregationist on the Supreme Court and the eventually successful nomination of a brilliant one-time segregationist instead; the style more than the substance in the indulgence of anti-busing sentiments; the scuttling of the day-care centers bill; the "inadvertently" calculated support of the anti-abortion movement in New York; the energetic use of intelligence agencies for surveillance of the antiwar activists to discourage dissent and the punitive "deterrent" trials of activists such as the Berrigan brothers on evidence more flimsy than was available in the scandal linking International Telephone and Telegraph to the Justice Department.

These policies contrast strikingly with an America which increasingly is groping existentially for a moral purpose. The younger generation is eager to reexamine institutions and issues; it is represented *not* by the Young Americans for Freedom or the Students for a Democratic Society, but by the vast numbers of young students who question and yet seek to acquire the knowledge to bend their society to a better purpose. This generation, with Consciousness 2½—Reich surely exaggerates—has breathed life and vitality into most of the great issues of the day: pollution, population, environment, the role of science in society, consumer protection, and women's liberation. The antiwar movement has also led to the phenomenon of civil disobedience, familiar in India but also in the United States from the early civil rights campaigns. Growing numbers of gifted and sensitive individuals have felt it impossible not to repudiate the administration's increasing resort to bombing and the resulting ecocide and devastation²; they have also had the courage to court retaliations from a tough administration. The strength of the antiwar movement must be judged in a particular light; in an affluent society, the opportunity cost of dissent is high; time lost in pursuing a cause is valuable in terms of income foregone. The history of this period will undoubtedly record the relentless efforts of these Americans, several hundreds of thousands, who have risked discomfort and distress in order to dissent in the pursuit of an American policy constrained by moral means and ends.

Which of these two contrasting phenomena is ephemeral? Does the Nixon era, even if prolonged by another term, represent a permanent shift in United States' attitudes, postures, and policies? Has moral purpose given way to *Realpolitik* and the age of innocence ended on an enduring basis? Or will the humanistic and moral purpose of the United States reassert itself?

To venture on a prediction, one must assess the *raison d'être* of the Nixon policies. These are rooted in the historic role of the United States in the postwar world, the changes wrought in it, and in the personalities and ambitions of President Nixon and his foreign policy mentor, Henry Kissinger.

The two decades since World War II witnessed the steady growth of the United States to dominant status. The war devastated, in varying degrees, its major prewar rivals among both the victors and the vanquished: Great Britain, France, Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the resulting economic preeminence of the United States was matched by the survival of a relatively intact military machine whose exclusive nuclear capability had been demonstrated spectacularly over Nagasaki and Hiroshima as the war was reaching its end.

The superpower status that the United States inherited from World War II happened to coincide also with a world view formed essen-

tially by two dramatic events, representing the loss of enormous territories to the Communist powers at a time when the monolithic character of communism was an axiom. The Soviet Union managed, at the end of the war and shortly thereafter, to establish hegemony over Eastern Europe; China was lost by 1949 to Mao's forces. These two events etched themselves indelibly into American public opinion. Policymakers proclaimed the notion of a Communist menace expanding around the world, threatening Europe and the countries south of China, reaching out eventually even to Latin America and the Middle East.

The experience of Munich and the recollection that the United States had *eventually* been obliged to enter two world wars despite strong intentions to keep out led to what now clearly appear to have been the two cardinal principles of American foreign policy through the postwar period: that aggression and expansionism have to be checked *quickly*; and that aggression, appeased *anywhere*, will grow and come home to where it hurts the United States.

These views implied that America must use its great power to halt Communist expansion *everywhere*; that the defense of the United States began *across* the oceans. The corollary—that this necessitated “containment” through a worldwide system of military alliances and the stationing of American troops overseas —was confirmed by the experience of the Korean war. That war, many felt, might have been avoided had the Communists not been led to believe that Korea was outside the American protective umbrella.³ The resulting spread of the United States’ military machine across the world was thus essentially “reactive.” But the fact that its scale and its unique, negatively-defined purpose (to halt communism) would bend it eventually, in countless situations, to dubious, at times offensive, methods and compromises never appears to have been perceived clearly by a nation which parallels even India in its self-righteousness.⁴ Only in recent years have the inevitable distortions and subterfuges inherent in the scale and nature of this spread of empire come to light: the emergence of the Central Intelligence Agency as an interventionist, “invisible” hand of government, given to occasional strangulation of disturbing elements around the world, from British Guiana to Laos; the violation of the 1954 Geneva accords on Indochina; the Bay of Pigs invasion; the arming of Pakistan ostensibly against the Communist giants to the north but in fact against neutral India—for how might the Patton tanks have been used except on the Indian plains of Punjab?—and all this, so that Pakistan could be gained as a military ally. These were the inevitable outcomes of the “reactive” approach, which, in its obsession with the Communist menace, stretched the American empire too wide, and, in consequence, its commitment to its own professed values too thin.

By the time of President Kennedy's Inauguration, these contradictions in American values and policies were still not clearly understood. The

magnificence of spirit and sense of high moral purpose that Kennedy combined with élan and eloquence are manifest in his Inaugural Address:

Let the word go forth from this time and place, to friend and foe alike, that the torch has been passed to a new generation of Americans—born in this century, tempered by war, disciplined by a hard and bitter peace, proud of our ancient heritage—and unwilling to witness or permit the slow undoing of those human rights to which this nation has always been committed, and to which we are committed today, at home and around the world.

Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and success of liberty . . .

Since this country was founded, each generation of Americans has been summoned to give testimony to its national loyalty. The graves of young Americans who answered the call to serve surround the globe.

Now the trumpet summons us again—not as a call to bear arms, though arms we need—not as a call to battle, though embattled we are—but a call to bear the burden of a long twilight struggle, year in and year out, “rejoicing in hope, patient in tribulation”—a struggle against the common enemies of man: tyranny, poverty, disease, and war itself.⁵

There is no trace of hesitation in these passionate passages, no sense of the latent and emergent contradictions which, through the Johnson administration, were to call into question for sensitive Americans the entire foreign policy of their country.

By the time of the Johnson administration, the rhetoric remained—indeed, it was inspired by the surviving Kennedy mandarins in the new court—but the veil screening the ugly reality of the “containment” policies had been torn. This was painfully evident in President Johnson’s military intervention in 1965 in the Dominican Republic. The landing of 23,000 United States marines in the civil war led to the defeat of democratic forces wedded to constitutional order and to the consolidation of the military dictatorship; ironically, the accompanying Presidential speech was faultless:

We know that many who are now in revolt do not seek a Communist tyranny. We think it’s tragic indeed that their high motives have been misused by a small band of conspirators, who receive their directions from abroad. To those who fight only for liberty and justice and progress, I want to join in . . . appealing to you tonight to lay down your arms and to assure you that there is nothing to fear. The road is open to you to share in building a Dominican Democracy and we in America are ready and anxious and willing to help you.⁶

The Vietnam war proved to be the culmination of the process of deception and perversion of purpose to which the escalated containment policy was inherently doomed, as it was also to be the ultimate catalyst that made the new generation look at the reality of American policies rather than to its professions. By the time the Johnson administration came to its tragic end, the government was in the dilemma of trying to play its traditional international role, especially in the continuing Vietnam war,

while surviving the winds of change that the concerned and morally aroused constituency in the country symbolized. The mandarins, who had learned their history from Munich and from the success stories of the toughness rewarded at the time of the Berlin blockade and the Cuban missile crisis, were not prepared to give up over Vietnam; the containment of Communist aggression in the missile crisis had to be matched by the containment of subversion in its most dramatic manifestation in Vietnam. Then the millennium would descend in the shape of a stable world order. Walt Rostow, in a public lecture at Leeds University, declared that the halting of the Communists in Vietnam would signify the end of all wars of liberation. The "credibility gap," with which the Johnson administration was afflicted, was the direct result of policies and postures in Vietnam (and other crises of lesser order) that were out of tune with the moral sensibilities and perceptions of a growing and articulate segment of the American society.

Richard Nixon would not have been in the White House but for the yawning chasm between the surge for peace in Vietnam and the determination of the Johnson administration not to yield to Hanoi and the Viet Cong. But he inherited the dilemma as well. In resolving it, he was to have the assistance of Henry Kissinger; their solution shows the gamesmanship of the political theorist and the value-free maneuvering of the politician.

The increased mechanization of the brutal Vietnam war and the substitution of massive airpower for American ground troops managed to contain a growing antiwar movement. The lesson of the Cambodian invasion was rapidly learned and escalations were handled with more effective reliance on the deceptions (for example, the "protective reaction" air strikes) which were to become the stock in trade of this administration to a degree greater even than in the Johnson administration. The opposition to the war was fiercely countered by invoking the basest emotions of the populace—patriotism, jingoism about America's status as the "first" power in the world, animosity toward the "effete, intellectual snobs," the "treason" of the protesters in providing "aid and comfort" to the enemy—creating thereby a constituency of the "silent majority" to dam the upsurge of the fundamentally moral spirit of the land that fed the antiwar movement. The antiwar protest was finally just "ridden out" by an orchestrated performance whose effect was to increase the conviction that the administration would pursue its policies resolutely and that protests would no longer have an effect.

The *coup de grace*, however, was to be the skillful manipulation of the Sino-Soviet rift to open the door wider for the eventual option of saturation-bombing and mining of the North Vietnamese ports, which is currently being exercised in Vietnam without (at least for the moment) decisive Chinese or Soviet response. This "gamble" was made riskworthy

by the expedient of the reversal of the anti-China policy and the impending accommodation with the Soviet Union—factors reducing the probability of a stiff military response from either of the two Communist powers.

This game of *Realpolitik* has been played shrewdly and with finesse by Nixon—on current showing. The China initiative was particularly brilliant; it was virtually an all-gain, no-loss move. It tied the Chinese more or less to a moderate posture vis-à-vis the United States; it induced the Soviets to take a more accommodating position vis-à-vis the Americans because of Sino-Soviet rivalries; it psychologically prompted a shell-shocked Japan into an appropriate accommodation on trade and exchange rate policies; it confused the domestic radicals who looked upon China as the leader of the anti-American, anti-imperialist cause; it pleased the domestic liberals who had always looked upon the earlier United States' policy toward China with disapproval; it permitted a diplomatic acceptance of a losing battle in the United Nations over the seating of mainland China; finally, it improved the President's election prospects by making him appear a peace-seeking President, in the process freeing him, at least with respect to domestic opinion, for tougher options toward Hanoi.⁷

The spectacular grasping of this opportunity, opened up by the Sino-Soviet split and the Chinese concern with their own security vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, was climaxed in the Chou-Nixon summit, and is, in *some* ways, reminiscent of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. In each case, the beneficiary of the Communist concern for its own security was its avowed enemy; the victim—in this instance, Hanoi and the Viet Cong who have directly suffered the results in the exercise of American options previously thought inconceivable—was a small country. Whether this piece of *Realpolitik*, which subtly exploits the pursuit of self-interest by the major Communist powers, will enable the President to continue "bombing Hanoi into the Stone Age," or whether peace will come on the President's terms, or whether the Communist powers will stand up to halt the American escalation of bombing—92,000 tons were dropped in April 1972 alone—time alone will tell.

While it is possible that the *Realpolitik* of the Vietnam war may yet succeed, though it has irretrievably undermined the values that the United States has proclaimed, the administration's policy on the India-Pakistan-Bangladesh crisis was a uniform disaster. The moral position of the United States was offensive to the civilized world and the *Realpolitik* backfired.

The facts in East Pakistan were painfully clear. President Yahya Khan chose to crack down on East Pakistan, with a brute show of force, when he found that the Awami League had swept the polls and returned Sheikh Mujeeb to potential power. The military atrocities, launched on March 25, 1971, were systematic, resulting eventually in an estimated mas-

sacre of nearly three million Bengalis, a flight of nearly ten million refugees to India across the border, and an upheaval internally of yet additional millions. The ferocity of the Pakistani army's actions can be gauged not only from eyewitness accounts that came from Western observers in the early part of the episode, but also from the fact that the troops came to be widely called the "Khan Senas," a reference to the marauders of an earlier age who had spread devastation in the land.

While these atrocities led to a widespread suspension of aid to Pakistan, and public expression of sympathy for the Bengalis in East Pakistan, including such statements from the Soviet Union, the American administration maintained a studied silence. The United States also continued *military* assistance, first denying that it was doing so, and then, being caught in the lie, characteristically arguing that it was only continuing the supply of arms already contracted for. As evidence has now demonstrated, the United States allowed its "humanitarian relief" for East Pakistan to be diverted by the Pakistani government to building fortifications in the East. The outraged reaction of sensitive Americans—and, of this species, there were countless numbers who gave money, wrote to the President passionately, and in letters to Mrs. Gandhi publicly repudiated their country's official position—is best expressed by the eloquence of Harold Isaacs:

[The Nixon-Kissinger policy] meant in effect turning the American eye away from the plain facts of West Pakistani oppression and repression in East Bengal; the flouting of national election results by President Yahya Khan; the contrasting democratic character of Indian politics and the intolerability of the situation created for India by ten million refugees; it meant above all and especially *not* looking at the massed heaps of victims of West Pakistan's officially-ordered rampage of rape and murder in East Pakistan. Put another way, it meant that the United States had to ignore in Pakistan what it claimed to be the basis of its policy in Vietnam—support of democratic self-determination through open free elections. It also meant making a cynical joke of traditional American humanitarianism. The massacres had to be officially ignored, remonstrances, if any, were to be made in private, and relief funds given for use in East Pakistan under the control of the West Pakistani regime which had created the need for the relief in the first place.⁸

The climax was provided by the frantic and frenzied criticisms of India at the United Nations, where the Chinese were found in the cynical embrace of the United States in their pro-Pakistan positions, but also by the dispatch of the nuclear carrier *Enterprise* to the Indian Ocean at the moment that Dacca was being encircled. Even this nuclear display did not reverse the outcome of the war: Bangladesh was born; the atrocities were over; Pakistan was cut down to size by India.

Where did the game of *Realpolitik* go wrong? How is the fiasco to be explained? Certainly not in terms of the admiration President Nixon had for President Yahya Khan, both men very clearly caught in the middle of repressive wars on popular insurgency. Nor does it make sense to

dwell on President Nixon's apparent distaste for India, a country that had been particularly gracious to the Kennedys, and whose moral postures in the Nehru era, especially as articulated through the caustic censures of Krishna Menon during the cold war years when he was Vice-President, must have rankled deeply. Nor is it reasonable to argue in terms of Henry Kissinger's personal pique at the no-more-than-correct reception accorded him in New Delhi prior to his Peking visit. Nixon and Kissinger are sufficiently "cold and calculating"—terms used by Kissinger in referring to Mrs. Gandhi—to prevent personal affinities and aversions from determining their course of action, which is not to say that they were not influenced by their feelings.

The most probable conclusion seems to be that the situation on the Indian subcontinent after March 25, 1971, when the massacres began in East Pakistan, was viewed by the Nixon administration excessively in the context of American-Soviet rivalries. India was "pro-Soviet"; Pakistan had been an ally and was still technically a member of SEATO. The wooing of the Chinese Communists—even more than the American fear of the Soviet Union, which would soon lead to the Nixon-Chou meetings in Peking—together with the Chinese friendship for Pakistan based on its hostility to India, only accentuated the view of the subcontinent as one more battleground, like Vietnam and the Middle East, where American and Soviet influence were in competition. Pakistan had to be supported; India, while taking the brunt of the refugee outflow, had to be prevented from taking any military action that might be successful in the East.

These objectives, together with the need to moderate a morally outraged American public, required modest and minimal gestures to be made, including the cutoff of military aid to Pakistan. This policy notwithstanding, some military aid continued to be sent. Meanwhile, Pakistan was to be encouraged to work toward a "political settlement" in the East, a settlement that would have all the right cosmetic touches, but that would yield nothing of substance. As for India, the United States doled out small sums for refugee relief, while making dramatic propaganda claims of being the "largest" aid donor—ignoring the fact that American-promised funds were only a miniscule fraction of the costs to India.⁹ But the critical climax seems to have occurred during Henry Kissinger's meetings in Delhi with Mrs. Gandhi's advisers immediately prior to his visit to China from Rawalpindi. In case of a war with Pakistan, Kissinger is supposed to have said, China would come in and India would not get any American help as she had in the Sino-Indian war of 1962.

Ironically, this declaration of American policy served to set in train the sequence of events that culminated in the war. Faced by the overwhelming burden of refugee relief, the sense of outrage in India at the atrocities continuing in East Pakistan against people with whom Indians had an ethnic affinity, and the growing awareness that the problems

could continue without effective solution for too long, India had to contemplate seriously the possibility of war as *the* solution. With the United States opposing such a war, and warning India of the possibility of Chinese intervention, India clearly had to neutralize the Chinese threat to keep its war option open. This meant that the Soviet Union had to be brought into the picture: hence the Indo-Soviet Treaty. This treaty effectively reduced China and the Soviet Union to “paper tiger” status by mutual neutralization, and left the principals, India and Pakistan, to confront each other in war.

The Nixon administration never grasped this fact. Although the Soviet Union had long been angling for such a treaty, it was generally assumed by Washington that India was the weaker partner. The fact that the treaty freed India from the threat of Chinese intervention was obscured by the view that the treaty would make the Soviets restrain the Indian “war lobby,” as they apparently had done in the Middle East, lest they themselves become directly involved. The Indian confidence that it would defeat Pakistan on the Eastern front, while successfully holding the Pakistani thrust into Kashmir and Punjab on the Western front, was founded on the steady buildup of Indian armor and ordnance after 1965, as well as the successful but wisely unpublicized worsting of the Chinese in border skirmishes after 1965. Such facts were ignored while the Pakistani claims of a three-to-one efficiency in armed combat with the Indians may have seemed plausible to certain sympathetic ears in Washington.¹⁰

Even when the spectacular success by Indian armed forces in the East made a shambles of the American policy assumptions, the United States seems to have clung to the notion that the Soviet Union was somehow in control and could be intimidated into forcing a ceasefire on India by the display of a nuclear carrier. The presence of Soviet Deputy Minister Kuznetsov in New Delhi was taken to underline the validity of this assumption. As always, the assumption was false; the presence of Kuznetsov in Delhi was designed principally to coordinate the United Nations diplomatic maneuvers; it was mainly to emphasize the Soviet presence to the Chinese just in case the Chinese decided to back their war talk with action. The *Enterprise*, had it miraculously intimidated the Soviet Union, could hardly have influenced the Indians, who had virtually won their war, had every logical reason to terminate it, and were in any case not “controlled” by the Soviets.¹¹

The American game was played foolishly, in total disregard of the overriding morality of the issue involved. The astonishing thing is that it *could* have been played with a much more favorable outcome for the Americans. The United States might have expressed concern for East Pakistan consistent with the territorial integrity of Pakistan, terminated military aid entirely, and reassured India by relieving her of the entire economic cost of the refugee burden while praising her humanitarian acceptance

of the refugees on her own territory. It might also have put effective pressure on Pakistan to grant Sheikh Mujeeb his freedom and East Pakistan autonomy; Yahya Khan might have been told that anything short of this would prolong the civil war and prompt India into military action, in which case the United States would *not* assist Pakistan at the United Nations nor initiate military operations, such as those involving the transshipment of arms through the Middle East. Can anyone doubt that such pressures would have prompted the overextended military regime in Rawalpindi to move more swiftly toward a democratic settlement in the area destined instead to become Bangladesh?

The two crises in Indochina and the Indian subcontinent underscore the American sacrifice of values to geopolitical gameplaying, which, however subtle, complex, and even spectacular, is not therefore successful. Such gameplaying is inevitable in a world where the United States' role cannot be wished away in international politics. It would be naïve to assume that the balance of power is an outmoded concept; history teaches otherwise. It is improbable, however, that a Kennedy, playing his geopolitical games, would have sacrificed his country's idealism in quite the way that has been done in recent years.

But it is not merely the lack of moral sensibility that vitiates the geopolitics of the Nixon administration. The notion that the world order can be conceived of as being predicated on five major powers—the United States, the Soviet Union, Europe, Japan, and China—has been professed as representing the more sophisticated new foreign policy that is no longer premised on the earlier bipolar American-Soviet reality. Such a view conceals the continued arrogance of power vis-à-vis those countries not admitted to the select group. It also leads, inevitably, to the distortion of the realities of power in countries outside the league.

The arrogance toward the “nonpowers” is clearly manifest in the actions and pronouncements of the United States. “Everything seems yellow to the jaundiced eye,” and the arrogance of American power is reflected in the charges of arrogance leveled at those who defy the American will. Max Frenkel, writing during the Bangladesh crisis of Washington's attitude to the aid-receiving but assertive Indians, said: “The Indians are almost always spoken of in tones of deep annoyance, as not very lovable people. . . . The Indians are variously described as uncooperative and arrogant.”¹² President Nixon, in his speech of May 1972, announcing the latest escalation, had this to say of a North Vietnam that, with the Viet Cong, would not bow to the American terms: “And North Vietnam has met each of these offers with *insolence and insult*. They have flatly and *arrogantly* refused to negotiate an end to the war. . . . The North Vietnamese *arrogantly* refuse to negotiate anything but an imposition—an ultimatum. . . . There is only one way to stop the killing. That is to keep the weapons of

war out of the hands of the *international outlaws* of North Vietnam.”¹³ Was it arrogance or merely a clever political move to appease certain right-wing elements when President Nixon imperiously admonished the United Nations delegates from Tanzania and other small countries for their “unseemly” expressions of joy at Peking’s victory in the United Nations? Is it an accident that while the American ambassador to India imagines that he can speak only to the foreign minister or the foreign secretary to the government of India, the Indian ambassador’s access to Secretary of State Rogers is a rare privilege?

But, arrogance apart, the notion that the world can be effectively managed by a five-power hookup ignores the limitations of these powers. Japan has economic size, but is vulnerable to external retaliation precisely because it requires rapidly expanding trade to sustain its spectacular growth rate; in any case, it is at the moment militarily impotent. China may bluster, but it has been effectively checked on its Russian and Indian borders by matching force; its industrial economy is no more equipped to sustain long *external* wars than is India’s. Europe is not yet the cohesive unit that some wish it to be. The five-power model also underrates the capacity of the “nonpowers” to create zones of substellar influence—*either* through local wars, as was done by Israel in the Middle East in the 1967 Six Day war or by India in South Asia in the 1971 India-Pakistan-Bangladesh war,¹⁴ *or* through charisma and appeal disproportionate to a country’s economic and military strength, as was true of Kwame Nkrumah’s Ghana during the early 1960’s.

The decline of moral leadership in the United States has been nowhere more evident than in the dramatic reversal of the American position with respect to foreign aid. The United States’ aid flows are at an all-time low, having collapsed in 1969 to .35 per cent of GNP from a Kennedy peak of .65 per cent in 1961 (Table 1). This has happened when the other rich countries have committed themselves more actively to the UNCTAD target of official development aid at 0.7 per cent of GNP.¹⁵ The continuing and dramatic collapse of the relative American position among the rich donor countries at the OECD in its share of the aid burden is also obvious in Table 2: While the United States enjoys the highest per capita GNP rank, her rank as an aid donor has dropped. Having once given the lead in movements to soften aid terms and conditions, the United States now falls short of the 1965 OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) guidelines; lesser countries have met them.¹⁶

The *de facto* “copping out” of the United States from its developmental aid commitments cannot be put down simply to the difficulty of securing sizable aid programs from Congress because of “disillusionment” over the success of the aid programs or the “competing needs” of other fiscal programs for domestic purposes. These are facile explanations. In com-

Table 1. The flow of net official resources in relation to gross national product,^a 1960-1969 (in percentages).

<i>Country</i>	<i>1960</i>	<i>1961</i>	<i>1962</i>	<i>1963</i>	<i>1964</i>	<i>1965</i>	<i>1966</i>	<i>1967</i>	<i>1968</i>	<i>1969</i>
Australia	0.38	0.44	0.43	0.51	0.50	0.54	0.53	0.64	0.56	0.56
Austria	—	0.03	0.19	0.03	0.17	0.34	0.33	0.25	0.24	0.18
Belgium	0.88	0.76	0.54	0.57	0.45	0.59	0.44	0.50	0.51	0.52
Canada	0.19	0.16	0.14	0.23	0.28	0.24	0.37	0.35	0.32	0.41
Denmark	0.09	0.12	0.10	0.12	0.12	0.13	0.23	0.23	0.23	0.41
France	1.38	1.41	1.30	1.01	0.89	0.75	0.69	0.71	0.69	0.69
Germany	0.49	0.76	0.53	0.46	0.41	0.42	0.40	0.45	0.44	0.35
Italy	0.30	0.21	0.25	0.16	0.07	0.16	0.18	0.22	0.20	0.17
Japan	0.33	0.42	0.29	0.26	0.27	0.40	0.48	0.51	0.48	0.49
Netherlands	0.31	0.44	0.48	0.26	0.29	0.36	0.45	0.49	0.53	0.55
Norway	0.22	0.18	0.13	0.36	0.27	0.17	0.17	0.18	0.27	0.39
Portugal	1.46	1.63	1.41	1.65	1.83	0.57	0.59	1.02	0.69	1.42
Sweden	0.05	0.06	0.12	0.14	0.18	0.19	0.25	0.25	0.28	0.44
Switzerland	0.04	0.24	0.05	0.05	0.07	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.11	0.13
United Kingdom	0.56	0.59	0.52	0.48	0.53	0.48	0.48	0.47	0.42	0.39
United States	0.54	0.65	0.62	0.62	0.54	0.51	0.46	0.46	0.41	0.35
Total DAC countries	0.54	0.63	0.58	0.54	0.48	0.47	0.45	0.46	0.42	0.40

SOURCE: DAC *Review* (Paris: OECD, 1970), p. 182.^a At market prices.

menting on the management of American foreign policy, Harald Malmgren has recently made insightful remarks that are pertinent here:

A major element of the problem [in foreign economic policy management] is the managing of the domestic political forces inside the United States. . . . To manage these problems effectively, a substantial portion of total time of the people involved in decision-making has to be taken up by bargaining with specific domestic interest groups, or with neutralizing them with counterbalancing forces

In development policy the situation bordered on chaos. AID tried to manage foreign aid in terms of development needs of the poorer countries, but found itself overridden by security policies of the President, the NSC, and State, and overridden on purchasing and financing policies by a variety of other departments and committees. It was the only major voice expressed on behalf of development as such, and it was inevitably a weak voice in the bureaucratic jungle. The State Department occasionally took initiatives, but these were resisted by other departments. For example, it was the Department of State that conceived and negotiated understandings leading to the implementation of preferential tariff policies to aid the exports of emerging nations. Domestic politics worked against implementation, however, and the 1968 international agreement is still languishing on the U.S. side, as State has been incapable of securing congressional support in the present protectionist context.

President Nixon appointed a special commission to review policy toward developing countries, chaired by Rudolph Peterson. That report recommended among other things the establishment of a Cabinet-level committee, to be chaired by an Assistant to the President, for development policy. The theory was that this would give special high-level attention to the plight of the poor countries, and

Table 2. Ranks of Western donors by GNP per capita; percentage of aid to GNP by development assistance and by grant element in aid, 1967, 1968, 1969.

		1967						1968						1969						
		Total official flows			Official development assistance ^a			Total official flows			Official development assistance ^a			Total official flows			Official development assistance ^a			
		Grant element ^c			Net flows ^b			Grant element ^c			Net flows ^b			Grant element ^c			Net flows ^b			
GNP per capita		Rank	% of GNP	Rank	% of GNP	Rank	% of GNP	Rank	% of GNP	Rank	% of GNP	Rank	% of GNP	Rank	% of GNP	Rank	% of GNP	Rank	% of GNP	
\$		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14					
Countries ranked in order of per capita GNP	United States	4,380	1	0.41	7	0.44	7	0.34	7	0.38	8	0.31	12	0.33	11					
	Sweden	3,230	2	0.21	11	0.25	11	0.26	11	0.28	10	0.42	6	0.44	6					
	Canada	3,190	3	0.37	8	0.34	9	0.28	9-10	0.26	11	0.35	9	0.34	10					
	Switzerland	2,790	4	0.08	16	0.07	16	0.11	16	0.13	16	0.15	14	0.16	15					
	Denmark	2,540	5	0.20	12	0.21	14	0.22	13	0.23	13	0.38	8	0.41	7					
	France	2,510	6	0.70	1	0.75	2	0.65	1	0.69	1	0.64	2	0.69	2					
	Norway	2,360	7	0.18	13	0.17	15	0.28	9-10	0.29	9	0.29	13	0.31	12					
	Australia	2,340	8	0.60	3	0.60	3	0.57	2	0.57	3	0.56	3	0.56	3					
	Germany	2,210	9	0.35	9	0.43	8	0.33	8	0.41	6	0.33	11	0.39	8-9					
	Belgium	2,150	10	0.44	5-6	5-6	0.45	6	0.41	5	0.42	5	0.48	4	0.51	4-5				
	Netherlands	1,980	11	0.44	5-6	5-6	0.50	4	0.43	4	0.49	4	0.45	5	0.51	4-5				
	United Kingdom	1,850	12	0.45	4	4	0.46	5	0.40	6	0.40	7	0.39	7	0.39	8-9				
	Austria	1,550	13	0.12	14	14	0.24	12	0.13	15	0.20	14	0.12	15-16	0.12	16				
	Italy	1,420	14	0.13	15	15	0.23	13	0.15	14	0.19	15	0.12	15-16	0.17	14				
	Japan	1,400	15	0.25	10	10	0.33	10	0.24	12	0.25	12	0.34	10	0.26	13				
	Portugal	530	16	0.64	2	2	1.01	1	0.46	3	0.68	2	0.77	1	1.04	1				
Total DAC	2,730		0.40			0.44		0.35		0.38		0.35		0.36						

Source: DAC Review (1969), p. 292 (1970), pp. 150-151.

^a Official flows which are development-oriented and intended to be concessional in character.^b Gross flows less amortization payments received.^c Gross disbursements less estimated present values (discounted at 10 per cent) of expected future receipts of amortization and interest on loans disbursed in that year.

result in more coherent and responsible policies. A combination of bureaucratic infighting between State and AID, and resistance from White House staff resulted in the death of this proposal.¹⁷

In this maze of conflicting interests, accurately described by Malmgren, is there any doubt that an effective moral leadership from the White House would have made a substantial difference? The argument that the Congress would not approve larger aid bills has a hollow ring when two facts are noted. First, the unwillingness of pro-aid veterans like Senator Fulbright to approve aid bills recently has been the consequence largely of the covert use of these funds for military purposes and the linking of military with developmental authorizations. The solution for this problem is to separate out these two types of activities; developmental aid ought to be considered a moral obligation of the rich countries. Second, the administration has withheld its commitment to the *nonbudgetary* methods of increasing aid flows to the poor countries; it is in almost solitary hesitation at this time about the SDR "link scheme."

The willingness to use the developmental aid process to indulge Presidential pique—as in the continued suspension of aid to India—contrasts sharply with the unwritten code of Western developmental aid which precludes the suspension of aid for reasons other than policies (such as those of Haiti) which outrage civilized opinion. Stranger still is the spectacle of a United States' administration unashamedly suspending aid *commitments* in India—all nonproject loans where letters of credit had not been opened were suspended indefinitely—while urging the World Bank to suspend aid to nations that do not adequately compensate expropriated foreign enterprises.¹⁸

The United States ought not to be allowed to adopt the role of an indifferent and apathetic member of the world community when it comes to the needs of the poor countries. It is not simply a question of what the United States will do to aid and assist them. The United States is, whether it likes it or not, and notwithstanding the growth of other major economic giants in recent years, a *force majeure* whose economic tentacles move out across the world into the poor countries and whose sheer economic size in the world community inevitably creates repercussions in their Lilliputian structures. Unless the United States takes imaginative action to anticipate and understand the economic and social problems of these poor countries, such places are doomed to unending difficulties in their uphill struggle for development.

Apart from its major importance in world trade, which has always been recognized, and where the recent and belated conversion of American policy to the acceptance in principle of the poor-country demand for preferential entry is clearly a step in the right direction, there are two other major areas where the gargantuan size of the United States has begun to matter dramatically.

The extension of multinational corporations (MNC's) from the United States around the world has now reached significant proportions in several industries and continents. Table 3, summarizing the situation as of 1968, indicates a worldwide distribution of American direct investments running at an unprecedented total of over \$67 billion; that sum has grown steadily ever since. Raymond Vernon's analysis of 187 United States' MNC's, which own six or more overseas subsidiaries, has shown that in the manufacturing sector in 1966 the ratio of their sales to sales of all American enterprises was as high as 39.2 per cent; the ratio of their assets to the assets of all American enterprises was higher still, 45.7 per cent. This growth of MNC's to dominance within the United States itself is complemented by their relative scale in the manufacturing sector of the poor countries (and of some concerned rich ones, like Canada and France). In Latin America, as indicated in Table 4, the share of the subsidiaries controlled by MNC's from the United States in the sales of all manufacturing was significant in a number of industries. This development raises a difficult dilemma which will require the full attention of the United States' government: While the power and influence of MNC's has increased within the United States, lead-

Table 3. Foreign direct investments of United States enterprises, by industry and area, 1969^a (millions of dollars).

Area	Manufac- turing	Petroleum	Mining and Smelting	Other	Total
All foreign countries	\$29,450	\$18,277	\$5,635	\$14,339	\$67,702
Canada	9,389	4,359	2,764	4,563	21,075
Latin America	4,347	3,722	1,922	3,821	13,811
Mexico	1,108	35	136	352	1,631
Argentina	789	^b	^b	455	1,244
Brazil	1,112	100	99	321	1,633
Europe	12,225	4,805	72	4,452	21,554
European Community	6,340	2,243	17	1,593	10,194
France	1,518	295	10	268	2,091
Germany	2,750	1,067	^b	434	4,252
Italy	716	506	^b	201	1,423
United Kingdom	4,555	1,563	2	1,037	7,158
Other Europe	1,329	998	52	1,822	4,202
Southern dominions ^c	2,029	836	479	510	3,854
Asia and other Africa	1,459	4,555	399	992	7,407
Japan	639	447	0	131	1,218
India	143	^b	^b	150	294
Other	677	^b	^b	5,218	5,895

SOURCE: *Survey of Current Business* (October 1970), p. 28; Raymond Vernon, *Sovereignty at Bay* (New York: Basic Books, 1970), Tables 1-3.

"Foreign direct investment" is defined as the book value of equity and long-term debt of United States' enterprises in those foreign enterprises in which the United States' enterprise holds 25 or more per cent of the equity. Investment attributed to "international shipping" is excluded. All data are preliminary.

^b Combined in "other" industries. As a result, subtotals in petroleum, mining and smelting and "other" columns cannot be obtained by addition of constituent areas.

^c Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa.

Table 4. Sales of United States-controlled foreign manufacturing subsidiaries in relation to sales of all manufacturing establishments, Latin America, 1964.

<i>Industry</i>	<i>Sales of U.S.-controlled manufacturing subsidiaries (millions of dollars)</i>	<i>Total sales of manufacturing establishments (millions of dollars)</i>	<i>Subsidiaries sales as % of all sales (per cent)</i>
Food products	\$950	\$12,120	7.9
Paper and allied products	145	790	18.4
Chemicals	1,250	4,420	28.3
Rubber products	355	611	58.1
Basic metals and metal products ^a	1,840	9,104	20.2
Other products	560	2,484	22.5

SOURCE: Raymond Vernon, *Sovereignty at Bay*, adapted from Tables 1-4.^a Includes primary and fabricated metals, nonelectrical and electrical machinery, and transport equipment.

ing to overt and covert pressures on foreign policy of the kind embedded in the 1962 Hickenlooper amendment¹⁹ and revealed by columnist Jack Anderson in his report on ITT's active lobbying against the Allende government, the growth of the MNC's in the poor countries has made them the subject of attention, analysis, control, and expropriation; all of this increases their itch to exercise the unprecedented (though not decisive) power that they enjoy in Washington.

Will American leadership be able to resist such pressures and exercise statesmanship? Will it be able to perceive the aspirations of the poor countries, their desire for genuine independence and the control of their resources, very different from a "neocolonial" dependence on foreign MNC's? Clearly, understanding and an imaginative initiation of policies to allay the concerns of the poor countries are called for. Among the policies now proposed, inspired by the growing concern regarding the inhibiting impact of large MNC's on the development of domestic enterprise in Latin America and elsewhere in the poor world, is one that would have MNC investments in specific industries be "self-destructing," with the rich countries providing the funds to facilitate this process of "divestment" by design.²⁰

Complementing the problems created by the spread of MNC's, and arising largely from the same sources—the scale of the American advantages in technology and capital—is the problem of the "brain drain" from the poor countries to the United States. The enormous salary differentials between the poor countries and the United States, the possibility of immigration among the skilled groups, the facilities for research in universities and scientific laboratories in the major corporations, the access by resident foreigners to federally-funded research grants, the tremendous openness of American universities and society to absorption of immigrants

at high levels, and the pursuit of efficiency and high performance which makes American academia seek talent everywhere—all these have contributed to the problem of a steady absorption of skilled personnel from the poor countries into the United States (and, in microcosm, into the other rich countries). Table 5 suggests the general nature of the problem—the absorption of scientists, engineers, and physicians from the poor countries during 1956 through 1966. The United States has become in certain professions heavily dependent on immigration. Table 6 suggests how the poor countries have been affected, comparing by continent those nationals who are graduated at home and in the United States with the amount of emigration that takes place in these same categories. The results are particularly alarming when one realizes that emigration as a percentage of those trained and graduated from the generally superior American universities is remarkably high for nearly all the continents, and that the migrants almost always include some of the finest minds of the poor countries.

The solution to this problem requires an ingenuity and persistence that the United States possesses, but has not used. It is not enough to offer technical and financial assistance to build up research and technical facilities in the poor countries. Nor will restrictions on exchange visitors, requiring that they return to their home country for at least two years—a requirement that is now relaxed—be enough. These, in essence, are the basic policies that the United States has adopted to deal with a problem that has so baffled the poor countries that some of them have seriously begun to question the principle of their open-door policy with regard to the exit of their skilled manpower. Since the problem requires that attention be given to the human aspects of migration, the Americans ought to persist in their belief that migration ought to be permitted, while realizing that present policies are clearly inadequate, and that additional

Table 5. Annual additions to scientific manpower by United States' educational institutions and by immigration from poor countries, fiscal years 1956 and 1962–1966.

Year	SCIENTISTS		ENGINEERS		PHYSICIANS	
	<i>Number of immigrants</i>	<i>Per cent of U. S. graduates</i>	<i>Number of immigrants</i>	<i>Per cent of U. S. graduates</i>	<i>Number of immigrants</i>	<i>Per cent of U. S. graduates</i>
1956	357	0.8	712	2.2	699	7.1
1962	297	0.4	985	2.2	1,101	10.6
1963	563	0.7	1,642	3.7	1,158	11.1
1964	546	0.6	1,371	2.9	1,284	12.2
1965	418	0.4	1,050	2.1	1,180	11.3
1966	851	0.9	2,013	3.9	1,615	15.3

SOURCE: *The Brain Drain into the United States of Scientists, Engineers, and Physicians*, a staff study for the Research and Technical Programs Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, House of Representatives, July 1967, pp. 3, 5, Tables 3 and 5.

Table 6. Immigration of skilled manpower into the United States from poor countries, by continent, circa 1964.

Continent	Average number of graduates in U. S.	Total graduates at home	Average number of immigrants to U. S.	Immigrants to U. S.	
				as per cent of total of graduates at home and in U. S.	average number of graduates in U. S.
NATURAL SCIENTISTS ^a					
Africa	96	1,879	24	1.2	25.0
Latin America	138	2,815	81	2.7	58.7
Asia	1,238	67,768	756	1.1	61.1
Asia (excluding India)	885	14,448	526	3.4	59.0
ENGINEERS ^b					
Africa	65	2,303	43	1.8	66.2
Latin America	137	7,750	408	5.2	297.8
Asia	1,101	22,624	2,227	9.4	202.3
Asia (excluding India)	651	13,989	1,371	9.4	210.6
SOCIAL SCIENTISTS ^c					
Africa	111	5,933	6	0.1	5.4
Latin America	147	7,942	50	0.6	34.0
Asia	672	45,258	130	0.3	19.3
Asia (excluding India)	535	26,879	100	0.4	18.7
DOCTORS AND DENTISTS ^d					
Africa	30	1,388	41	2.9	136.7
Latin America	47	15,325	563	3.7	1,197.9
Asia	222	19,196	862	4.4	388.3
Asia (excluding India)	172	10,446	498	4.7	289.5

SOURCE: UNESCO Statistical Yearbook (1966) and The Brain Drain into the United States of Scientists, Engineers, and Physicians.

^a Countries included: Africa: Algeria, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, Tunisia, United Arab Republic, Latin America: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Venezuela, Asia: Burma, China (Taiwan), Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Republic of Vietnam, Syria, Thailand.^b Countries included: Africa: excludes Morocco from natural scientist list, Latin America: includes Dominican Republic and Uruguay with natural scientist list, Asia: Same as natural scientist list.^c Countries included: Africa: excludes Morocco from natural scientist list, Latin America: includes Dominican Republic and Uruguay with natural scientist list, Asia: excludes Malaysia from natural scientist list.^d Countries included: same as natural scientist list.

measures consistent with the basic human aspects of the problem are called for. What shape might these take? One suggestion illustrates what might be done. The United States might assist the poor country that loses its skilled manpower to earn some of the private returns that accrue to the migrant from his migration and from the vast differentials in salary between the United States and the home country. The simplest device would be for the Internal Revenue Service to collect on behalf of the poor home country a tax, possibly 15 per cent of taxable income, that would be automatically transferred to that country. This would to some extent compensate the poor country, while discouraging, however marginally, those migrants who shift locale simply for improved incomes.

Will the United States turn its energies, resources, and fundamental moral values to seeking these and other such solutions to the problems of the poor world? Will it seize the initiative and offer voluntarily its own imaginative programs for these urgent and pressing problems? Or will it continue to yield, halfheartedly and grudgingly, to the growing clamor for action at UNCTAD and in other poor-country forums? Will the geopolitical gameplaying come to reflect what Harold Isaacs has called the "broader and deeper matter of American identifications, values, self-esteem as expressed in our government's behavior in world affairs"?

These are impossible questions to answer in a political season. Much depends on whether the analysis of this paper is fundamentally correct, and whether the next President, out of commitment or guile—opportunism if you prefer—chooses to recall the United States to those basic values that once made the country, deservedly, the object of respect by other civilized societies.

REFERENCES

1. The State Department, acting probably in reaction to the reported collapse of the Rhodesia accord following the Pearce Commission findings that the proposed settlement was rejected by the people "as a whole," did finally throw its weight behind Senator McGee, who sought a repeal of the Byrd bill permitting American imports of Rhodesian chrome and other "strategic minerals." See the *New York Times* report on May 24, 1972.
2. Since 1965, American bombing has created nearly 26 million craters in Vietnam. This has been accompanied by herbicide spraying, aimed at rooting out Viet Cong, which has practically destroyed much of South Vietnam's forests and denuded over 5 million acres. According to a *Newsweek* report (June 12, 1972): "After the spraying stopped, the stripping operation continued with huge 'Rome Plow' bulldozers denuding 800,000 more acres at 1,000 acres a day. . . . 'There is nothing in the history of warfare to compare with it,' Wisconsin Senator Gaylord Nelson recently told Congress. 'Never before has a land been so massively altered and mutilated'"

The cold, hard and cruel irony of it all is that South Vietnam would have been better off losing to Hanoi than winning with us.”

3. Dean Acheson has tried to assign the blame for the Korean war to the rejection in the House of Representatives of the aid appropriation requested for Korea, on January 19, 1950, and argued as follows: “Damage had been done. Without question, the government and people of the United States wished to end their responsibility for the government and future of Korea. Apparently, however, the impression was given that both would tolerate having this responsibility ended by force from the outside, even though this force should be created, organized and launched by the Soviet Union as part of a series of moves against the position and purposes of the United States.” Dean Acheson, *The Korean War* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1971), p. 3. At the same time Acheson has rejected the claim made by “partisan opponents of the Administration that a speech made by the author at the National Press Club on January 12, 1950, had given support to this impression.” *Ibid.*, p. 3.
4. The self-image of Americans is best described in the words of Philip Quigg, formerly managing editor of *Foreign Affairs*: “As a people we tend to be unpretentious and well liked. . . . We are less haughty than the British, less demanding than the Germans, less self-righteous than the Indians.” *America the Dutiful: An Assessment of U. S. Foreign Policy* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1971). The irony of the contrast between this self-image and the reality is poignantly revealed in the following remark from *New York Times* correspondent Anthony Lewis: “In Phuc Loc . . . there was a stone on the rubble. On it was printed: ‘At 2:20 in the morning of April 16, 1972, American planes dropped 142 bombs on this hamlet. . . . Generation after generation will keep this hatred in mind.’ As I read the stone, there suddenly came to mind a comment on Vietnam that I had read shortly before leaving for Hanoi. It was by a veteran American adviser in South Vietnam. Speaking to a British correspondent, he said, ‘You and I regard human life as of some value. That’s the difficulty for Western nations fighting large Oriental countries.’” *New York Times Magazine*, June 18, 1972, p. 30.
5. The quote is from the text of the Inaugural Address, January 20, 1961.
6. See the Presidential speech on May 2, 1965. An excellent account of the episode is contained in Jerome Slater, *Intervention and Negotiation: The United States and the Dominican Revolution* (New York: Harper and Row, 1970). See also the excellent review article by Norman Gall, “Santo Domingo: The Politics of Terror,” *New York Review of Books*, July 22, 1971.
7. It is interesting and revealing that the only major achievements of the Chinese Communists, the redistribution of income and the generation of considerable equality through the Chinese communes, were *not* what impressed the visiting dignitaries who accompanied President Nixon to Peking.
8. Harold Isaacs, “The ‘Tilt’: American Views of South Asia,” essay prepared for the Subcommittee to Investigate Problems Connected with Refugees and Escapees, of the Committee of the Judiciary, United States Senate, 92d Congress, February 2, 1972, Washington, p. 183.
9. The latest figures show that the total foreign assistance pledged for refugee relief (inclusive of contributions from multilateral agencies) was about \$220 million; an estimate of actual receipt by the time the budget was presented to Parliament on March 16, 1972, is \$160 million. The American contribution amounted to \$89.2

million, \$35.5 million being contributions in cash or kind through the United Nations and voluntary agencies, and \$53.7 million being supplies under PL-480 title II of foodgrains and foodstuffs. The total expenditures on refugee relief by the government of India is estimated at between \$465 and \$480 million.

10. At dinner in Cambridge just before the war, John Kenneth Galbraith remarked to me that a war was *not* a solution because the Indian and Pakistani armies could cross into each other's territories twenty-five miles at most and would then grind to a halt in their tracks. The impression of Indian inability to fight, fostered mainly by the brief and disastrous border war with China in 1962, but partly by the standoff during the 1965 war with Pakistan, appears to have deceived even those who are sympathetic to India.
11. In a letter to the *New York Times*, May 13, 1972, Padma Desai and I have argued that the administration's claim that the *Enterprise* prevented an Indian thrust into West Pakistan and Pakistan-controlled Kashmir was no more than a self-congratulating piece of fiction: "India's spectacular military victory in East Pakistan had achieved fully its only two major objectives. The creation of Bangladesh freed the Bengalis from the atrocities since the Pakistani military crackdown; the division of Pakistan and the taking prisoner of nearly 70,000 Pakistani troops in the East, plus the successful defense of the western borders during the war, also meant that Pakistan had decisively been 'cut down to size' and no longer could be a serious threat to India. Marching into West Pakistan against a hostile population and the bulk of the Pakistani army on home ground, would have been not merely foolhardy; it would also have been foolish in not achieving any further objectives. The single possible objective, the further destruction of the Pakistani military machine, could have been achieved only at the matching and vast expense of Indian men and armor; this would, however, have dramatically increased the cost of the war—and possible dependence on Soviet military supplies to replace these losses—with nothing to be gained politically. Indeed, this logic was so clear and intuitively obvious to Indians that when Mrs. Gandhi announced her Cabinet's decision on the cease-fire to the leaders of the opposition parties, there was unanimous cheering and approval."

It is disturbing that Kissinger is reported to hold the view that the *Enterprise* did deter India from expansion; views to the same effect have been expressed, in different forms, by C. L. Sulzberger (*New York Times*, April 21, 1972) and Eugene Rostow (*New York Times*, April 5, 1972).

12. *New York Times*, October 5, 1971.
13. See the text in *U.S. News and World Report* (May 22, 1972). Italics inserted.
14. In this regard, Max Frenkel (*New York Times*, October 5, 1971) is worth quoting again: "Whereas China has been accorded almost big-power standing in the new American view of Asia—as a nation with which the United States, the Soviet Union and Japan must now share influence in the Pacific—India remains merely an object of policy. Specifically, she is regarded as only the largest country of a vast sub-continent in which the main American objectives are the preservation of a big-power balance of influence and of commercial access for American enterprise." Indeed, there is cause for concern that the tendency either to neglect or pressure countries outside the five-power network, implicit in the Nixon-Kissinger policy, will make more countries, India included, opt for what I like to call the "Chinese solution": that is, go nuclear to obtain big-power recognition. Indeed, the recent Indian policy announcements concerning atomic tests suggest that this is exactly what has happened as a result of the 1971 war and of American policy in that war.

15. The *Economist* (April 20, 1972), p. 97, had this distressing report of the United States at the third UNCTAD conference in Santiago: "The Americans are keeping out of sight, but various European countries have seized the occasion to commit themselves to the target for official development aid of 0.7 per cent of GNP, some of them by 1975 (Belgium, Holland, Norway, Sweden, Portugal). Austria has gone so far as to announce a target of 1 per cent." On April 15, 1972, the *Economist* commented: "deplorably, the United States has not yet ratified its key contributions to the new replenishment of funds [to the International Development Agency]: \$320 million out of the proposed total of \$813 million a year."
16. See Jagdish Bhagwati, *The Amount and Sharing of Aid* (Washington: Overseas Development Council, 1970), pp. 28-30.
17. "Managing Foreign Economic Policy," *Foreign Policy* (Spring 1972), pp. 44, 49.
18. An excellent example is provided by the following report in the *New York Times*, June 23, 1972: "The Treasury disclosed today that the United States had cast its first formal vote against a loan by the World Bank—a negative vote based on President Nixon's new policy on compensation for American companies whose property has been nationalized or otherwise expropriated by other countries. At issue was a loan of \$13.4 million for education projects in Iraq, which earlier this month nationalized the Iraq Petroleum Company, owned jointly by oil companies from four Western countries, including two from the United States. . . . The three other countries whose oil companies were involved—Britain, France and the Netherlands—favored the loan and even spoke in its behalf during the discussions in the bank executive board."
19. The Hickenlooper amendment requires the suspension of American foreign aid if expropriation occurs without "adequate compensation."
20. See Albert Hirschman, *How to Divest in Latin America and Why*, Essays in International Finance, No. 76 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969).

ACHILLE ALBONETTI

The United States: Economic or Political Challenge?

EUROPEANS ARE perpetually rediscovering America; it is good for them to do so, since it gives them an opportunity to rediscover themselves and, in the process, to reflect on where the Old World may itself be heading. The tradition of European exploration of the United States is long and distinguished; it is no denigration of nineteenth-century European scholarship to say that it did not entirely appreciate the nature of the “American challenge” (*défi américain*), at least not in the sense that we presently perceive it. The two great wars of this century—particularly World War II—had immense importance for Europe in its education about the nature of the American colossus.

The avalanche of technical resources that poured into Europe after 1943 profoundly impressed Europeans, especially those of my generation. The extraordinary means at the disposal of the American troops; the thousands of jeeps, trucks, tanks, guns, and arms of all sorts; the abundance of consumer goods, cases, boxes, and packages of every size doled out to the American G.I.—all this contrasted markedly with the limited means available to the Axis forces. Europeans were impressed also by the openness of the American soldier, by his seeming candor and good nature, and by what appeared to be the easy rapport that subsisted between the American enlisted men and their officers.

The European visitor who arrived in New York harbor in the early 1950's was immediately struck by the contrast between this bustling American metropolis and the destruction he had left behind. For days he remained stunned by the power and luxury of American life; and his impression was reinforced if he visited other states, with their industrial plants, ports, air terminals, and general atmosphere of prosperity. Europe was still largely in ruins. Rebuilding was only just beginning; consumer goods were rare and costly; cars and planes were luxury items reserved for the privileged few. More important, Europeans were not aware that in order to survive and prosper in the postwar period, radical changes in human relationships, administrative and governmental apparatus, and methods of production would be necessary. Many in Western Europe still held to the

illusion that their countries were in the forefront of the industrial revolution. They imagined that as soon as their cities and factories were rebuilt, and their industrial and agricultural production reestablished, they would enjoy the prominence they had known before. They did not realize that a profound revolution had taken place in the United States, while in Great Britain, West Germany, France, and Italy out-of-date methods and attitudes still prevailed.

The rate of growth of the American gross national product and per capita income from 1870 to 1950 had been consistently higher than that of the principal industrialized countries of Western Europe.¹ Most West Europeans believed—wrongly—that American prosperity was owing to the vastness of the American continent and the abundance of raw materials; in fact, the explanation of its phenomenal growth could be traced to its industrial practices. The United States had exploited the logical implications of the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century industrial revolution; Western Europe, even that part which had accepted the imperatives of industrialization, had largely overlooked them.

In April 1943, at the height of the war, *The Economic Journal* published an important article by Lazlo Rostas,² where the argument was advanced that American productivity (production by man-hour or production by worker) was at least double that of Great Britain and Germany—the two countries thought to be the most efficient and highly industrialized, not only in Europe but in the world. The American advantage did not appear to be significantly diminished because a considerable portion of the American labor force was committed to agriculture—where productivity was less than the national average—or because the United States worker enjoyed a shorter work week than his European counterpart. According to Rostas, the average American worker produced in one hour at least twice the output of the average British worker.

Though the suspicion had existed that such discrepancies might be discovered, there had previously been no conclusive evidence to suggest that the gap would be so enormous. Even after the publication of the Rostas article, many refused to accept its validity. To do so was to admit inadequacies in European systems of management and to question the economic policies of governments and the efficiency of English and continental workers.

A brilliant series of articles in *The Economist*³ showed evidence of a growing concern about the issue of productivity. *The Economist* recommended that a fourth slogan—productivity—be added to the three that had been coined to point the way toward postwar social and economic recovery. Full employment, an active system of international trade, social security—these were not enough. “Doubling production by man-hour means doubling consumption by man-hour,” *The Economist* announced triumphantly.

Continental Europe was largely impervious to such ideas. Liberation

was approaching—an era of great hope, where each party presented itself as the advocate of extensive social reform, with nationalization and socialization appearing to be the principal remedies for all major economic ills. Within the limits of democracy and the difficult economic situation, European governments tried to satisfy even the most intransigent segments of their populations. Parties deemed to be on the right now advocated social reforms that had once been the battle cry of the extremists.

The so-called experts did not worry; they imagined that everything would quickly return to normal. Even the most hot-headed radicals would be mollified when the machinery of production had begun to turn out scaffolding for new houses, millions of yards of fabric for new clothes, cars, bicycles, motorcycles, and all those other commodities that consumers yearned for. Communism would be checked by abundant harvests of wheat, oil, and wine, by the allotment of a house to every family, perhaps even a car of modest horsepower. Their slogan was production, production at any price, and still more production.

These experts were not entirely misguided, but when they demanded an increase in production and failed to raise the issues of production and labor costs and of a more efficient standardized production, they put the cart before the horse. Similarly, when the reformers advocated a more just distribution of goods without worrying about quality or quantity or about how these goods were to be produced, they failed to attack the problem at its roots. Sooner or later such miscalculations would have their effect.

In the meantime, production rose, factories returned to their peacetime activities, and the European countryside produced adequate harvests. The system of distribution of wealth was somewhat altered. Reformers introduced or increased progressive taxation, taxed capital, nationalized certain industries, and set up factory councils. But these measures altered the situation only minimally.

The rapid economic recovery of the immediate postwar years, with production rising sufficiently so that it came very close to achieving the prewar levels, began to show the first signs of slowing down in 1947. Buyers who had reacted to the years of rationing by accepting any consumer product that came on the market were becoming more discriminating. International competition began to be an important economic restraint on growth. There were bankruptcies, factory shut-downs, a rise in unemployment, and large fluctuations in prices, and there was still widespread poverty in Europe and many needs yet to be met.

The United States was required to intervene once again; this time, through the Marshall Plan, announced in June 1947 and put into operation in 1948. It is impossible to exaggerate the importance of this program. Not only did it establish contact among the European states, obliging them to act as much as possible as a single economic unit; it also laid the basis for an

exchange of ideas and experience between Europe and the New World—an exchange which bears fruitful results even today.

This is not to suggest that everything ran smoothly. For certain of the beneficiaries of the program, there were very substantial difficulties. While everyone granted the importance to Europe of the imports which the Marshall Plan supplied virtually without cost—imports of consumer goods such as wheat, coal, steel, petroleum, and fertilizer, and of equipment such as machine tools, generators, and plant fittings—few acknowledged the importance (perhaps greater in terms of long-range effects) of the importation of new methods of operation, new systems of production, and new managerial techniques. Even some of those who understood the importance of the technical assistance program included in the Marshall Plan opposed it out of fear that their own interests would be adversely affected. Certain industrial and trade union groups were very reticent. In some cases national pride was at issue; in others it was a more common malady—an unwillingness to admit that they might learn from others, least of all from Americans. These facts notwithstanding, the technical assistance program of the Marshall Plan contributed significantly to the solution of Europe's economic crisis—not only a crisis of production, of distribution of income, and of foreign trade, but also, and most important, a crisis involving the organization of European industry.

The extent of Europe's industrial backwardness in 1948 may be rendered by even the simplest statistics. The gross national product of the United States (260 billion dollars) was almost three times larger than that of the United Kingdom, France, West Germany, and Italy, which together had a GNP of 88 billion dollars. Per capita income in the United States (\$1,770) was considerably above that of Britain (\$880), France (\$455), West Germany (\$415), and Italy (\$230). Steel production in the United States stood at 80 million tons; the total for the four European states was 30 million tons. The United States produced 337 billion kilowatt-hours of electrical energy, approximately three times the total electrical output of the four major West European states. Americans owned more than 30 million automobiles, eight times the number that existed in Western Europe. Automobile production in 1948 stood at 4 million units in the United States; just half a million were being manufactured in the four major European countries.

The American merchant fleet (about 30 million tons) exceeded by a third the sum of the other four, which came to only 23 million tons. United States exports (13 billion dollars) surpassed the total exports of the four major European countries and Japan as well (11.3 billion dollars). Reserves of gold and foreign currency in America, whose value was put at 24.4 billion dollars, compared very favorably with the modest holdings of the four major European countries, which could claim about 2.4 billion dollars.

Air traffic was virtually nonexistent in Europe, while the United States maintained hundreds of airports, dozens of private airlines, and thousands

of aircraft for both internal and overseas service. Industries boasting advanced technology were common in the United States; they were virtually unknown in Europe. On the consumer level, supermarkets were making their appearance in the United States, while traditional modes of retailing were still all-powerful in Europe. American highways offered great advantages for rapid transit of goods; there were no comparable facilities in Europe. The high productivity of the United States was in marked contrast to the seeming stagnation of Europe.

Bridging the Economic Gap

This situation began, gradually and then rapidly, to change in the 1950's. The European who came to the United States during these years left with much the same impression of power and prosperity that had so impressed the European visitor immediately after the war. However, it was evident even from the most summary contact that the gap between the economies of the Old and New Worlds was beginning to be bridged. Automobile traffic, for example, while not yet equally common on both sides of the Atlantic, was no longer so different as it had been. Highways, supermarkets, and airports were all becoming conspicuous features of the European landscape. Europe was being invaded by refrigerators, radios, televisions, washing machines, and all the other products that were said to be typical of the so-called American consumer society.

Statistical evidence confirmed these surface impressions. During the period 1950-1960, the average annual growth rate of the American gross national product (2.9 per cent) was greater only than that of Great Britain (2.7 per cent). In contrast, France (4.3 per cent), Italy (5.5 per cent), the German Federal Republic (7.9 per cent), and Japan (7.7 per cent) all topped the American figure by substantial margins. Moreover, the average annual rate of growth for American per capita income was lower (1.1 per cent) than that of all the others: Great Britain (2.3 per cent), France (3.4 per cent), Italy (4.9 per cent), the German Federal Republic (6.8 per cent), and Japan (6.5 per cent).

Steel production in the United States fell from 45 per cent of total world production in 1950 to 27 per cent in 1960 (92 million tons). During the latter year, steel produced in the four major West European states amounted to 23 per cent of total world production (78 million tons). American automobile production fell from 67 per cent in 1950 (4.9 million units) to 52 per cent of the world total in 1960 (6.7 million units). In that same year, European production had risen to 4.9 million units (or 39 per cent of total world production).

American exports (approximately 20 billion dollars, or 16.3 per cent of the world total) were greatly surpassed by the combined exports of the four major European countries (32 billion dollars, or 25 per cent of the world

total). The rise in the exports of manufactured goods from the four principal European countries was particularly impressive. While they now commanded 50 per cent of the world market, such exports from the United States fell from 27 per cent in 1948 to 21 per cent in 1970. Gold reserves and foreign currency held in the United States were significantly reduced (19.4 billion dollars, or 31 per cent of the world total) in 1960, while those of the four European countries had reached 16.3 billion dollars, or 24 per cent of the world total.

A similar but even more pronounced change occurred during the decade that followed. The birth of the European Economic Community, which created a unified market without customs barriers, played an important part in this change. The gross national product of the United States, while continuing to increase, represented only 30.2 per cent of the world gross national product in 1970 (versus 39.3 per cent in 1950 and 33.9 per cent in 1960). The sum of the six countries of the European Economic Community and of Great Britain rose to 18.4 per cent of the world total (versus 16.1 per cent in 1950 and 17.5 per cent in 1960), while Japan alone accounted for 6.2 per cent. The average annual growth rate of per capita income was 2.7 per cent for the United States, against 2.1 per cent for the United Kingdom, 4.7 per cent for France, 4.7 per cent for Italy, 3.7 per cent for the German Federal Republic, and 9.9 per cent for Japan.

Steel production in the United States, which reached 123 million tons in 1970 (roughly 25 per cent of the world total), was virtually equaled by that of the four major European states with 114 million tons (or 19 per cent of the world total). If one includes Japanese production, 90 million tons (15 per cent of the world total), the extent of the change is even more obvious.

In 1970, American automobile production (6.6 million units, or 31 per cent of world production) was less than that of the four major European countries (9.3 million units, or 45 per cent of world production). Japan alone manufactured almost half the American total (3.2 million units, or 15 per cent of world production).

Reserves of gold and foreign currency held by the United States were reduced to 12.5 billion dollars in 1971, while those of the European Economic Community countries plus Great Britain rose to 41.6 billion dollars. The Japanese reserves alone exceeded the American holdings (14.8 billion dollars). Total United States exports amounted to only 14 per cent of the world figure in 1970 (as opposed to 16 per cent in 1950), but those of the European Economic Community countries rose to double that figure, or 28 per cent (versus 23 per cent in 1960 and 15 per cent in 1950). Exports of manufactured goods from the United States were 17 per cent of the world total in 1970; those of the four major European countries, 37.3 per cent, and those of Japan, a remarkable 13 per cent. The growth rate of manufactured products exported between 1960 and 1970 was even more significant: 110 per cent in the United States, 91 per cent in the United Kingdom, 165 per

cent in France, 200 per cent in the German Federal Republic, 310 per cent in Italy, and 400 per cent in Japan. The percentages of gross investments in relation to national income are no less revealing. For 1968-1970 the annual averages are: United States, 18 per cent; United Kingdom, 19 per cent; Italy, 21 per cent; France, 27 per cent; German Federal Republic, 27 per cent; Japan, 39 percent.

Despite these and other similar statistics, it is still generally assumed, especially in Europe, that American economic power is continuing to grow at impressive rates. The various products of advanced technology in the United States (airplanes, nuclear reactors, computers, and submarines), the moon launchings, and the voyages of men in space have tended to confirm this impression. Some have even asserted that the economic gap between America and Europe is growing. Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber's *The American Challenge* may be cited as proof that even in the best-informed circles the idea is still current that the gap is widening. Servan-Schreiber reminds Europeans of the high productivity and elevated income levels in the United States, and forecasts—if the American challenge is not met—a further decline in the economy and civilization of Europe.

As has already been suggested above, such an interpretation is only partially borne out by the economic evidence. The American challenge at the moment is more political than economic. This is not to deny America's economic strength or to exaggerate that of Western Europe. The substantial European capability in agriculture, industry, and services has been demonstrated, but much progress has yet to be made in the area of management training. Thanks to economies of scale and to consolidations and mergers, the prospects for increased productivity are good. American investment ought not to be allowed to threaten the economic development or the political autonomy of Europe. If the relevant statistics of the last twenty years are studied, one can assert, without fear of contradiction, that Europe has already met the American economic challenge.

One should, when speaking of a disparity between the United States and Europe, be careful to distinguish between economic and technological development. The technological gap that presently exists results largely from American dominance in certain leading industrial sectors—that is, in those areas whose development relies most heavily on advanced science and technology. These leading sectors (space, nuclear energy, aeronautics, and electronic components) have evolved in the United States, as in the Soviet Union, in part to meet the needs of defense and space exploration. In terms of budget appropriations for research and the number of people engaged in scientific and technological research, the United States far surpasses the whole of Western Europe. Yet, contrary to some popular opinion, American dominance of the leading sectors ought not, in the short or medium term, hinder the economic development of Europe or impede a further increase

in its productivity. It is only in the long term that the consequences of this gap may well become apparent: they could accentuate the dependence of the European economy on the American, with sinister implications for Europe's political autonomy.

The Political Challenge

Despite the solemn declarations contained in the Atlantic Charter of 1941 and the United Nations Declaration of 1942, and despite affirmations to the contrary at the Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam conferences, the postwar period has seen the growth of an atmosphere of mistrust between the great powers, notably between the United States and Russia.

Shortly after the German surrender in 1945, a pattern of misunderstanding grew between the Soviet Union and the Allies, principally over the peace treaties and the working out of the Yalta agreements. Despite protest from the United States and Great Britain, the Eastern European countries—including East Germany—quickly became Soviet client states. The Middle East difficulties, the first conflicts within the United Nations Security Council, the outbreak of the Indochina war, and, above all, the fact that American demobilization had not been met by a corresponding Soviet military cutback—all these factors contributed to the creation of an atmosphere of mutual uncertainty and mistrust.

The situation deteriorated from a quarrel among allies into a rivalry between two seemingly irreconcilable blocs. By 1947 the Soviets had virtually completed their domination of Eastern Europe. They began to direct threats and pressures against Greece, Turkey, and the other countries of the Middle East, including Iran. Communist propaganda, helped by the activity of national Communist parties, and abetted by the difficulties of economic reconstruction and by the social and political unrest of that period, led to serious instability in various parts of the world. In March 1947, and again in November and December of that year, the foreign ministers of France, Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union convened to discuss the major problems that faced the two blocs. Both conferences ended in failure, and tension grew between East and West.

In early 1947, President Truman announced the doctrine that bears his name; it served notice on the Soviet Union that the United States would no longer stand aside and watch Communist expansion in Greece and Turkey. Great Britain's inability to challenge the Communist advance in this vital area had forced the Americans to intervene. Thus began a period of large-scale American political and military expansion, which was followed later in the year by the refusal of the USSR and the Communist states of Eastern Europe to cooperate in the organizations established by the Marshall Plan. Europe was divided into two hostile camps; the cold war was an incontrovertible fact.

The signing of the Atlantic Pact by the United States on April 4, 1949, formally ended an era of American isolationism. The Berlin air lift (1948-1949), Korean intervention (1950), support of France in Indochina, the Berlin crisis (1948-1962), the series of treaties concluded in the 1950's by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, and, finally, the Vietnam war are all consequences of this new global American involvement. The evolution of the American defense budget provides an index of America's expansionism. From the Armistice in 1918 till the end of 1940, the United States appropriated a billion dollars a year, on the average, to defense. This figure rose to 6 billion dollars in 1941, 23 billion in 1942, 63 billion in 1943, 76 billion in 1944, and 81 billion in 1945; it then fell off abruptly with the end of World War II to 43 billion in 1946, and to between 10 and 14 billion for each year till 1950. As a result of the Korean war and the increase in international tensions, this figure rose to 20 billion dollars in 1951, then 40 billion in 1952 and the years that followed. During the period of the most intensive American engagement in Vietnam (1968, 1969, 1970), the budget often rose to 80 billion dollars.

Coincidental with the end of American isolationism and with the rapid political and military expansion of the United States in the world, Western Europe abandoned its own traditional political and military commitments abroad. The British, French, Dutch, and Belgians liquidated their empires. France's withdrawal from Indochina in 1954 and the nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956, together with the exclusion of European influence from the Congo and Algeria, marked the nadir of European involvement in Africa, as well as in the Middle and Far East. European influence on the United States was greater in 1950, at the time of the Korean war, than in the 1960's, during the Vietnam conflict. The Arab-Israeli crisis of June 1967 and the closing of the Suez Canal are signs that Europe has not only sacrificed its role in international affairs, but is not in a position to ensure its own security or equilibrium and peace at its doorstep.

Although the United States is no longer the commanding world economic power, as the recent crisis of the dollar has so admirably demonstrated, it is still the decisive force within the Atlantic Alliance and commands center stage in international politics. Much has been done in recent years, notably since the creation of the European Economic Community, to foster a dialogue and an economic "partnership" between Europe and the United States. Little or nothing has been done to bridge the growing political, military, and nuclear gap between the United States and Europe.

The real signs of American hegemony should not be sought in the European financial investments of the United States, or in the number of computers it produces, but in the troops it stations on the Elbe, in its Sixth Fleet that patrols the Mediterranean, and in its obvious nuclear superiority. While Europeans ought to be grateful to their American allies for the

commitments they have made, they must also ask why Europe is not yet capable of assuming responsibilities that are essentially European, and why the United States tends, directly or indirectly, to encourage them in their lassitude.

Toward a Multipolar Concept?

Tocqueville wrote more than a hundred years ago: "There exist today on this earth two great peoples who, though they have begun poles apart, are advancing toward the same goal, the Russians and the Americans. . . . No matter how different their points of departure or their routes, each of them seems called by Providence to hold one day in its hands the destiny of the other half of the world." The historical parabola traced by Tocqueville reached its zenith during the 1950's. The United States and Russia today hold the destinies of much more than half the globe in their hands, but their position is now static rather than forward-looking; their concern is to maintain their own hegemony, for we are witnessing today a new configuration of world power.

We must carefully examine what appears to be the new orientation of American foreign policy. The United States is clearly searching for a new worldwide equilibrium that would, on the one hand, guarantee political-military security at the lowest cost and, on the other, yield new economic outlets to replace traditional markets. Only this reading of American policy can account for the recent activities in the international sphere. Many foreign policy decisions (from the nuclear nonproliferation treaty to the handling of the monetary crisis and the overtures to China), though they may appear contradictory, conform to this world view. Since the formulation of the Nixon doctrine, announced by the President in Guam in 1969, it has become clear that the United States is ready to recognize changes in the world situation. The difficulties encountered in Vietnam, together with a mounting protest movement at home and abroad, have encouraged the President to reduce American commitments and to decentralize economic, political, and defense responsibilities. Henry Kissinger, Nixon's most influential adviser, predicted before his arrival at the White House the necessary evolution of a multipolar world order characterized by more than one center of political, economic, and nuclear power.

One of the most surprising aspects of American foreign policy over the last twenty years has been its unipolar and centralizing obsessions, which seem so profoundly un-American. The concept of multipolarity is inherent in American economic and political development. A plurality of decision-making centers, a decentralization of responsibilities, a continuing search for approval, a stern balance between liberty and authority—these have seemed the essential features of the American social and political order. This notwithstanding, American foreign policy during the last twenty years

has conferred on Washington the sole responsibility for the peace and equilibrium of the world. Only in the last ten years, and with some reluctance, has the United States finally admitted that this unique burden ought to be shared, to some extent at least, with Russia. This bipolar theory, in my view, has masked a strong American desire to maintain a crushing economic, political, and nuclear superiority.

A foreign policy so conceived, characterized by the possession and the brandishing of arms of massive destruction, seems somewhat paranoid. It confers upon the state, and, because of the provisions of the American Constitution, upon a single man, the President, superhuman responsibilities and authority. The problem of military and economic resources aside, it seems absurd to demand of any one individual the psychological reserves necessary to take on such responsibilities. The many elements of uncertainty about the future of American society exacerbate the situation. The racial problem, the increase in violence and crime, the Vietnam war, the decline of the cities—these are all elements in a possibly uncontrollable situation. History has never known a civilization, even the most highly developed, which was free of internal crises. And the greater and more absolute the authority, the more exposed it is to the temptations of abuse.

Nixon and Kissinger's policies are attempts to rectify this situation. In the first place, they have openly admitted—with their theory of "nuclear sufficiency"—that the American nuclear deterrent need not necessarily be superior to that of the Soviets. This theory reveals a certain sophistication, for the concept of superiority is no longer related only to the quantity of nuclear weapons but to their quality. The Nixon doctrine and the recognition of China's existence, underlined by the President's visit to China early in 1972, suggest that the world of the two superpowers may one day be transformed into a tripolar system, perhaps even a multipolar order. In the economic sphere, such a change was discussed by the President in Kansas City in October 1971, where he admitted the existence of a five-sided economic hegemony, with the United States, Western Europe, Japan, the USSR, and China all participating. In the same speech, Nixon seemed to show—significantly—a preference for a bipolar (United States, USSR) division of nuclear and political power. America's insistence on the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, the ambiguities of its position on European unity and on European security in general, and its inconsiderate treatment of Japan all point to certain logical inconsistencies in the Nixon doctrine.

The Americans would err gravely if they assumed that international order could long be maintained by three nuclear giants—the United States, the USSR, and China. For one thing, neither Europe—unified or separate—nor Japan would accept this state of affairs. Nationalism cannot be fought by instituting an international order based on two or three super-nationalisms. Also, without an early disarmament accord, the United States will not be able to maintain its privileged nuclear relationship with the Soviet

Union and perhaps, in the long run, with China. Nor will she be able to share atomic secrets with Great Britain without creating resentment in France and among other of her European allies, not to speak of Japan. The contradiction is all too evident between, on the one hand, the American offer of "partnership" and support for European unity and, on the other, her special relationship with Great Britain and her nuclear monopoly.

The theoretical basis of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, for example, is neither just nor realistic. The treaty, as it presently stands, does not address the basic problems inherent in the organization of a viable international order. Peace will not be obtained by a system based on either pressure or controls (safeguards), by an international balance of power, or even by nuclear nonproliferation agreements, but rather by means of a positive initiative in the area of arms control.

Horizontal proliferation—that is, an increase in the number of countries possessing nuclear arms—has not been halted. Instead, it has assumed the more sophisticated guise of the "nuclear option." Nations may press forward the completion of the necessary industrial plant only to halt at the threshold of the decision to produce nuclear armaments. Of course, the great majority of signatories of the treaty could never have faced the cost of a nuclear deterrent. Nor have those countries with nuclear capabilities—among others, China, India, Pakistan, South Africa, Israel, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile—signed the treaty, and they will probably not do so in the future.

Consequently, even if all the countries that have signed were to ratify the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, at least three quarters of the countries in the world—in terms of territory, population, and national income—would continue to possess nuclear arms or be free to do so. The number adhering to the treaty would be insignificant.

Vertical proliferation, in nuclear as well as conventional armaments, is going forward despite the treaty and the Test Ban Agreement. The deterrent forces of the United States, Russia, and China are growing apace, while those of Great Britain and France are certainly not about to be dismantled. In fact, the average yearly number of nuclear tests carried out by these five powers has actually risen since the Test Ban Agreement of August 1963. The average number of nuclear explosions increased from 39.6 for the period 1958-1963 to 48.2 during 1963-1970. The treaty on the limitation of nuclear arms, recently signed in Moscow by Nixon and Brezhnev, will not substantially modify the situation. The race to perfect nuclear arms will continue, becoming a problem less of quantity of arms than of their quality.

For the moment the negotiations over nuclear disarmament or the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons will probably make little progress. Despite all the talk of détente, disarmament, and arms control, we have failed to establish the basic conditions necessary for setting up effective

controls on nuclear or conventional weapons. The optimists await, in addition to these symbolic agreements, the creation of an atmosphere, or a dialogue, which might with time bring about some real understanding. The two nuclear superpowers are indeed trying to come together, but not in order to reduce their power, or limit their spheres of influence, or even—especially in the case of Russia—give up their expansionist policies. Apart from their obvious propaganda value, such talks allow the superpowers to avoid errors of calculation, which could prove fatal, to limit risks, and, last of all, to find ground for agreement whenever possible.

As a result, this dialogue and even a certain measure of nuclear cooperation have been able to coexist with the arms race, local conflicts, guerrilla warfare, and subversive activities. This is a new kind of *détente*, one which disguises the hideous reality and could permit the crushing of those nations that aspire to self-determination or autonomy. Such a *détente* could be extremely harmful to the West, especially to Europe. It could lead to a deterioration of the present situation, already threatened by grave political differences between Europe and the two superpowers. It could also progressively weaken the Atlantic Alliance, the sole existing guarantor of European security and world balance of power; slow down the movement for European unity; bring pressure to bear for unilateral disarmament in Europe; and wreck all hopes of breaking up the present bloc system.

Europe's internal divisions, its nationalist preoccupations, and an atmosphere of disillusionment and failure might just bring about the denuclearization, then the neutralization, of Europe. Such has been the goal of Russian foreign policy for many years. China's coming to power and the schism between Moscow and Peking can only reinforce this aspiration.

For all these reasons the dialogue between the nuclear superpowers must now become multilateral. Not only must China be given her say, but Western Europe and Japan must be admitted as well. A reasonable foreign policy cannot recognize China as a nuclear power, accord India this possibility, but insist that Japan, soon to be the number-two industrial power in the world, ratify the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. It would be a grave miscalculation to deprive Europe and Japan of political responsibility now that they are liberated at last from their colonial burdens and free to devote themselves to reconstruction. To relegate Europe and Japan to positions of inferiority and to perpetuate their lack of defensive autonomy is certainly unwise.

A European and a Japanese Nuclear Force

The creation of both a European and a Japanese nuclear force is probably inevitable. In the long run, it would be unthinkable for Europe and Japan to entrust their own defense entirely to the United States. It is

equally impossible to imagine that a united Europe could take shape as long as France and Great Britain have their own nuclear arms and the other nations depend on American protection. The United States must understand that the nations of Europe, especially a united Europe, and Japan can no longer share the dangers of the modern nuclear era without also sharing the political decisions which can control or eliminate these dangers. History has consistently shown that political influence goes hand in hand with military power. Europe cannot hope to expand her role both within and outside the Atlantic Alliance while unilaterally renouncing her nuclear capability.

Europe's best contribution to détente, to peace, and to democratic development cannot come from weakness or neutrality or a weak-willed pacifism. Europe's defense capabilities and her influence, even in adjacent areas like Africa and the Near East, are at present nonexistent. It would be a utopian dream to imagine that the United States will continue to assure the security and equilibrium of the farthest points of the globe, especially when those areas, particularly Western Europe and Japan, have the potential for self-defense and increased authority. The "burden sharing" of which so much has been said in recent years cannot only amount to payment for the maintenance of American troops in Europe, the purchase of conventional arms from the United States, and a larger contribution by Europe to the expenses of the Alliance.

The temptations of neutralism, unilateral disarmament, and a policy of "clean hands" or "every man for himself" are very great when faced with the possibility of nuclear holocaust. How can one accept the enormous sums required for military budgets, when such an abyss of suffering and misery exists in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and even in Europe? Yet we cannot bring ourselves to believe, realistically, that such positions will have any weight in the context of international politics and relations between states. Europe, representing as it does the principal stake in the game being played out between the United States and Russia, cannot afford to turn in blindly on itself.

Moreover, the United States has an interest in seeing that Europe does not turn its back in this fashion. Were it to do so, it would lapse into an inevitable moral and political decadence and, in the end, endanger its own territorial integrity. Such an attitude would only bring the threat of war closer.

The United States needs to recognize that a Europe united economically, politically, and militarily would have the capabilities for conventional and nuclear self-defense and would, consequently, have a real political influence in the world. Europe could then renounce its atomic arms, in exchange, of course, for an equal and simultaneous renunciation by the United States, the USSR, and China, in the context of a general and supervised agreement.

For several years the trend toward bilateralism has been growing both in Europe and in America. Direct dealings between Washington and Bonn, Washington and London, Washington and Paris, Washington and Tokyo have tended only to encourage national ambitions. This tendency has represented less a policy than an expedient and, if it continues, can only lead to disaster. The United States must above all avoid giving the impression that she will sacrifice European unity, the Atlantic "partnership," and the development of a saner policy toward Western Europe and Japan as the price she must pay for détente. The dialogue with Moscow and Peking will reap a bitter harvest if it is based upon the collapse of Western unity. The eventual Balkanization of Europe would result, followed by her annexation to the Eastern bloc.

An effective dialogue between the United States and Europe would depend, then, on a certain nuclear parity. Between the two extremes of American atomic monopoly—allied to a centralized and conservative "Atlantist" policy—and proliferation of national atomic forces in Europe, only one course is desirable: that of a European nuclear force coordinated, in the near future at least, with the American deterrent. Europe must not, however, acquire nuclear arms at the expense of its arsenal of conventional weapons. The possession of an atomic force without the backstop of conventional defenses would tend, psychologically, to evoke a sterner response in international crises. On the other hand, the alternative whereby Europe's conventional defenses would be increased and supplemented by guarantees of American nuclear support would not resolve the problem, for it would leave Europe in a position of subservience.

A further complication stems from the fact that Europeans have enjoyed their freedom from responsibility. It has suited them to know that the ultimate nuclear decision and, therefore, the burden of Europe's defense have rested in the hands of the Americans. This situation has forced certain European countries to reach national solutions to the atomic question. Thus, Great Britain and France, and Germany in the near future, may be tempted to use nuclear blackmail to assure themselves of American intervention.

European governments at the moment face an important choice. Either they continue to leave their own nuclear defense to the United States, or they attempt to build up an atomic force within their narrow national boundaries. This is the course which has cost the British so dearly and which France has pursued, beginning with the Fourth Republic, through the de Gaulle period, and into the Pompidou presidency. Those in Europe and the United States who propose to limit the Europeans to conventional arms would spare them this choice. But their position is not only out-of-date—for two European nations already possess nuclear arms—but technically and politically unworkable. As we have already seen, such a nuclear subservience has deprived Europeans of a sense of responsibility

for their own defense and, consequently, of any real desire to maintain an adequate conventional force. Even the modest objective of thirty divisions in Europe has not been met. This same nuclear subservience has sapped the confidence of Europeans in their ability to resist attack—a psychological premise underlying the will to self-defense.

The possession of arms does not increase the likelihood of war; it is the threat of war, born of a troubled international situation, which causes nations to stockpile weapons and to use them. A world order and an Atlantic Alliance based upon American nuclear power might ward off war for a certain time, but could never, by the same token, bring peace to the world.

The United States must agree to withdraw her troops from European soil and her fleet from the Mediterranean. She must also reduce her commitments in the Far East. A united Europe in the West and an Eastern bloc composed of Japan, Australia, and New Zealand should be encouraged to insure their own defense as a first step toward greater autonomy.

In the face of the American retreat from Europe and the Mediterranean, Russia would have to accept the gradual integration of Western Europe's defense forces. Such integration would permit Europeans to create both a conventional and nuclear system without greatly increasing their arms budgets. Europe could assure Russia that it would never conclude a treaty with the Chinese against the USSR and could leave to the Russians their traditional role of checking Chinese expansion.

Despite recent pronouncements by Nixon and Kissinger, American policy continues to oscillate between a unipolar and a multipolar concept of international order. Twenty-five years of world dominance have left rigid patterns of thinking, and a new policy cannot be effected overnight. Furthermore, the irresponsible attitudes of their European allies have not helped the Americans, but have encouraged them to keep to their traditional course.

The Americans have unfortunately concentrated more on the weakening of the Soviet and Chinese empires than on the strengthening of Western Europe, Japan, Latin America, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. They have been haunted by the phantoms of *Realpolitik*, by the imperative "divide and conquer," rather than by the ambition to create a new world order in which they share the burden of responsibility. For years now, and more than ever with Nixon's Presidency, Washington has insisted that American foreign policy is multipolar. But we are still waiting to see real evidence of decentralization instead of more subtle reincarnations of a unipolar world with Washington at its heart. Of course, as we have already pointed out, the temptations for Americans to maintain their economic and political hegemony through nuclear and conventional arms supremacy are very great indeed.

To sum up, without a European presence, such European problems as German reunification, the breakdown of the bloc system, arms reduction, and nuclear disarmament cannot be resolved. In the absence of a united Europe, the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, instead of representing a first step toward disarmament, will remain an instrument of the superpowers for preserving their own hegemony. The treaty between the United States and Russia on strategic arms limitation, the rapprochement between Moscow and the government of Chancellor Brandt, Nixon's visits to Peking and Moscow are indeed hopeful signs. But, on the present international scene, the gap between words and actions, between hopes and reality, is still very great.

In the twenty-five years since the announcement of the Truman doctrine and the Marshall Plan, the American image has been greatly altered. The experience of intervention in Europe during the two world wars led Americans to believe that they were a chosen people destined to extend peace and stability to the four corners of the globe. After a quarter-century of economic, political, and military supremacy, their faith has now been shaken, but they are still tempted to build their foreign policy on that traditional premise.

On the economic front, the United States is now disposed to accept a multipolar world in which it shares power with Europe and Japan, and, one day, with Russia and China as well. But Americans seem willing to share their nuclear monopoly only with the Soviets and perhaps China. This would be a sensible step as part of a transitional phase en route to a supervised nuclear and conventional disarmament.

The Nixon doctrine must really show itself to represent a turning point. Otherwise it will seem nothing more than an echo of the theme in *The Leopard*, by Tommaso di Lampedusa: "Everything can change as long as it stays the same."

A viable and balanced international order cannot be created from two triangles with the United States at the apex of each. The first triangle, political in nature, is based upon American, Russian, and Chinese nuclear power; the second, essentially economic, would comprise the United States, Western Europe, and Japan. The United States would err gravely if it relegated its powerful friends to an economic role, while sharing its political and nuclear responsibilities with its potential adversaries, Russia and China. In the absence of worldwide disarmament, the United States must face the problem of the conventional and nuclear defense of Western Europe and Japan.

Today, more than ever before, the international community calls for a system of sharing in the decision-making process. In particular, Western Europe and Japan, and perhaps India and other countries as well, have a contribution to make to peace and international stability. Abandoning its old paranoic world view for one that is more responsible and mature,

the United States would not oppose such an evolution, but encourage it, even in its own interest. After all, one is not chosen leader simply because one is strong and wise and able, but also because one knows how to lead and, especially, to educate.

This article was translated from the French by Susan Darnton.

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OCTAVIO PAZ

Eroticism and Gastrosophy

The Indiscreet Mirror

LONG BEFORE becoming a reality, the United States was for me an image. This is not strange: from childhood on, Mexicans learn to regard that country as *otherness*. This otherness is at once inseparable from us and yet radically and essentially foreign. In Northern Mexico, the phrase “the other side” is used to speak of the United States. The “other side” is a geographical reality: the border; a historical reality: another civilization, another language, and, above all, another time (the United States is a modern culture while we are still struggling with our past). It is also a metaphorical otherness, for the United States is the image of everything we are not. It is otherness itself, except that we are doomed to live with that otherness; the other side is the contiguous side. The United States is always present in our midst, even when ignoring or turning its back on us; its shadow falls on the whole continent. It is the shadow of a giant. The image that we hold of that giant does not really differ from the giant of fairy tales, legends, and myths. It is the overgrown simpleton, kind and smiling, plain and generous, a naïve giant unaware of his own strength who could be easily tricked and whose rage could instantly destroy us. Juxtaposed to this image we find that of the astute and obtuse cyclops. It is a childish and dissolute image: the child-devouring ogre of Perrault and Minsk, Sade’s ogre, in whose orgies libertines used scorched bodies as chairs and tables while eating steaming hot platters of human flesh. Saint Christopher and Polyphemus. Also Prometheus, for the image includes the fires of industry and war. It holds the two faces of progress: the automobile and the bomb.

The United States represents the denial of what we were in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries; of what we could not be in the nineteenth, and of what many among us wished we were in the twentieth. Just like any other country Mexico has been born many times. The first time was in the sixteenth century, right after the Conquest; the second took place at the beginning of the nineteenth century with Independence. The United States appears in our history during the period of our second

birth. It appears not as a strange power which must be fought but rather as a model which should be imitated. It was the beginning of a certain fascination which may have changed its appearance during the last 150 years but has not decreased in intensity. Contrary to the North American Independence, ours was a denial. In cutting their ties with England the North Americans did not cut themselves off from their past; on the contrary, they affirmed what they had been and what they wanted to be. Mexican Independence was instead the denial of what we had been since the sixteenth century; it was not the restoration of a national plan but the adoption of a universal ideology in every way foreign to our past. Between Puritanism, Democracy, and Capitalism there was no opposition but only affinity. The past and the future of the United States are reflected in these words without any contradiction. Between the Catholic world of Mexican Colonial days—which was a mosaic of pre-Columbian and baroque remnants—and the Liberal Republican ideology there was a break: Mexico denied its past. As with any denial, ours contained also an affirmation: that of a future, except that we did not elaborate our own idea of the future but instead appropriated the future of the Europeans and the North Americans. From the sixteenth century on our history—a fragment of Spain's history—had been an impassioned denial of the newly born Modernity—the Reformation, the Enlightenment, and all the rest. With the beginning of the nineteenth century we decided that we wanted to be what the United States was beginning to be: a modern nation.

It was a false start: Independence liberated us from Spain, not from our past. To the inherited evils we added some that were peculiarly our own. As our dreams of modernization began to fade away, our fascination with the United States grew, and the war of aggression in 1847 converted it into an obsession. It was an ambivalent fascination: the titan had become the enemy of our identity and the secret model of what we wanted to be. Besides being a determining reality in our history, the United States also was a political and social idea. This duality—that is to say, the constant oscillation between two extremes—was stretched all along the nineteenth century and became one of the major topics of the running polemic between conservatives and liberals. The liberals were enemies of the Mexican past, which they denounced as a foreign imposition and a Spanish intrusion. That is why they spoke about Mexican “recovery” of its independence, as if the nation had existed before the arrival of the Spaniards. To the unauthentic past of Colonial days they did not oppose the pre-Columbian past—forever lost—but the future of a liberal democracy. Faced with two eccentricities—the Indian and Spanish past (from the point of view of modern Western culture)—the liberals postulated an abstract universality, composed of the progressive ideologies of the period. The United States was thought to be the closest example of that universality: in its present we could see the reflection of our future. The indiscreet mirror: every time that we

asked about our image (as in the case of the stepmother in the fairy tale), it pointed to that of the *other*.

The conservatives thought that the United States, far from being a model, was a menace to our sovereignty and our identity. The ideological contamination did not seem to them any less dangerous than the physical aggression: rather, it was a complementary form of penetration. If the future the liberals offered was a form of alienation, the defense of our present demanded—because of the same complementary reason—the defense of our past. Was our past the one the conservatives envisioned, or was it a Spanish edifice built with the stones of the Indian ruins? The problematic nature of that past became obvious with the Maximilian episode: the conservatives called on a European prince in order to establish a Latin empire that would be able to contain the expansion of the Yanqui Republic. It meant the Europeanization of our historical dilemma. That is why the conservatives failed. Amidst the struggle between past and future, both foreign, the future won. During the second half of the nineteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth century our social, political, and economic model oscillated between the French and the North American. The influence of the former was dominant in our intellectual, aesthetic, and juridical formation. The latter shaped our political institutions and our economic views and ideas.

The change in ideology that followed Independence failed to forge any change in the social structure. The ideas changed but not property ownership or the class system, nor did any of the other characteristics of the traditional society change. Mexico continued to be what it had been but it no longer believed in what it was. The old values came crumbling down, but not the old realities. Soon the new progressive and liberal values concealed the old realities. Masked realities gave way to the beginning of unauthenticity and lying: the endemic evils of Latin American society. At the beginning of this century we were already fully settled into the middle of our pseudo-modernity: railroads and feudalism, democratic constitutions harboring *caudillos* of the best hispano-arabic tradition, positivist philosophers and pre-Columbian *caciques*, symbolist poetry and rampant illiteracy. The adoption of the American model contributed to the disintegration of traditional values; the economic and political action of North American imperialism strengthened the archaic sociopolitical structure. This contradiction revealed that the ambivalence of the giant was not imaginary but real: Edison's country was also Teddy Roosevelt-Nabuchodonosor.

The Mexican Revolution was an attempt to recover our past and elaborate a national vision that would not be a denial of what we had been. If one thinks about Mexico's history and about the number and complexity of our problems, what the governmental heirs to the revolution have accomplished is a *great deal*, but that *great deal* is *little* if one thinks about what remains to be done. Perhaps our revolution broke out at the wrong time: it

was already late within the context of world history for a project of that nature to come to fruition. The Mexican Revolution was captured by a political bureaucracy—not unlike those of Eastern Europe—and by a capitalist class cast in the image and likeness of North American capitalism, on which it was dependent. It became the worst of both worlds.

For a Mexican to travel in the United States is to penetrate inside the castle of the giant and survey his horror and wonder chambers. While the ogre's castle surprises us by its archaic nature, the United States amazes us by its novelty. Our present is always somewhat behind the real present, while the present of the United States is always somewhat ahead. It is a present in which the future is already written. Our world is still tied to the past. I am being misleading in using the singular to speak of our past: rather, they are many, they are all alive, and they continuously fight within us. Aztecs, Mayans, Otomis, Castellians, Moors, Phoenicians, Gallicians—a suffocating tangle of roots. How can one coexist with them without becoming their prisoner? We ask ourselves this question incessantly, and we have not as yet formulated a definitive answer. We have not learned how to relate to our past, perhaps because we have also failed in its critique. The North Americans have precisely the opposite problem: they were born as a sharp critique of the past. That critique was in itself a distinct affirmation of the values of modernity, such as they were established first by the Reformation and later by the Enlightenment. The point is not that North America does not have a past, but rather that its past is light, easily borne, on the way to the future.

The North American tradition entails the conquest of the future. This is why it is the tradition of change while Hispanic tradition entails resistance to change. Spain and its works: lasting monuments and atemporal values. The point is not to get there first, but to remain where one is now. Our pre-Columbian heritage reinforces this tendency: the pyramid is the image of immutability. The opposition between Mexicans and North Americans is crystallized in our differing attitudes toward change. For one is the wind and the other is the rock. I am not speaking now of ideas or philosophies but rather of beliefs and unconscious mental structures: no matter what our ideology—even if it is progressive—we always instinctively refer the present to the past, while the North Americans refer it to the future. Although this paper does not deal with the question of immigrants—the *braceros* and wet-backs—it is important to note a very special characteristic of this group. It could be called their capacity for inadaptation to North American society. This ability is made up of an insensibility toward the future. The past is alive within them. It is this very past that has preserved the chicanos, the minority that has probably most successfully preserved its identity.

These few and disperse thoughts may serve as the point of departure for a description of the Mexican point of view: the United States is the *other*, the foreigner who is inseparable from us, always present and always on

the *other side*. The United States is the giant and the ogre, the future and change, the image (the reality) that simultaneously denies and stimulates us. I do not know if this point of view is really shared by most Mexicans. I think so. In any event it is mine. I will not insist; my purpose is not to get lost in the labyrinth of Mexican psychology (if indeed there exist national psychologies), but to put forth some commentary on certain aspects of contemporary North American reality. But I thought it useful and honest first to give an idea of Mexican attitudes since they have a bearing on my point of view. Although in what follows there will be an almost complete disappearance of references to Mexico, the point of view will be the same: the United States is the *other* and its present is impregnated with the future. One would even have to add that while we Mexicans have not yet arrived at the Modern Era, the North Americans have already begun a new one which, for lack of a better word, could be called postmodern. A new fascination: the United States is going through a mutation.

Eroticism and Gastrosophy

The comparisons that I intend to develop demand some justification. If I wanted to examine the present situation in Mexico, I would spontaneously compare it with the past, and think of Moctezuma, the dictator Santa Ana, or President Cárdenas. In the case of the United States, the comparison would include the present, together with some utopian reality. As with most countries Mexico is more the result of circumstance (the Conquest and Colonial period, especially) than of the will of its citizens. And in this the United States is also an exception inasmuch as the question of will played a crucial role in the birth of the nation. The poet Luis Cernuda used to tell me: "I am doomed to exist as a Spaniard." And a character from Carlos Fuente's novel *La región mas transparente* says: "It was my destiny to be born here, so what can I do about it!" One could argue that there are North Americans for whom to be North American is to be damned, especially so after Vietnam. It does not matter: from its origins and throughout the period of its formation, the United States represented a choice, an election, and not a fate. The North Americans are the children of a *vision of a society* rather than heirs to a concrete history. The North American Constitution is a covenant drawn up for the founding of a new society and in that sense it places itself before history. Before and beyond history, for North American society overvalues change and conceives of itself as the will to annex the future. And thus it is not an absurdity to compare the present reality in the United States with other realities or ideas which exist outside history. One could, for example, compare the United States with certain primitive societies, or with those imagined by utopian thought. Cases in point could be the visions of Rousseau or Fourier, a village from neolithic times, or the phalanstery. The village is outside history, like the

covenant that founded the United States. The phalanstery is beyond history, in the future, the chosen land for the North Americans.

The similarities between utopian and primitive societies are not based solely on the fact that they reside outside history. Primitive society (or our idea of it) is, to a certain extent, a projection of our desires and dreams and in this manner partakes of the essential character of a utopian society. At the same time, the utopian constructions take their inspiration from the real or imagined traits of arcadian societies. Fourier tells us that the future world of Harmony will be closer to the simplicity and innocence of the barbarians than to the corrupt customs of civilized societies. Our visions of what was (or might have been) and of what will be (or might be) human society have the same function. Besides their greater or lesser likeness to reality, they are paradigms, models. We see, examine, and judge ourselves through them.

Lately, perhaps as part of the phenomenon called the "twilight of the future,"¹ there has been a preference for the patterns of archaic societies; one prefers the village to the metropolis, the artisan to the technocrat, direct democracy to bureaucracy. The future seems to let us down when it does not terrify us. Yet, even if only to confront yesterday's hopes with today's reality, it occurs to me that it would be useful to compare the society that Fourier describes with the changes that have taken place in the United States relating to the *moeurs* of love: that is, I wish to compare Fourier's society with the changing North American ideas of love and the variety of sexual inclinations and practices. For it is clear that the change affects mostly ideas and attitudes. The actual customs and habits have, of course, changed a great deal less than has been thought to be the case. The difference is to be found not so much in what we do, but in the attitude with which we approach what we do.

Why Fourier? Because a few years ago a French scholar, Simone De-bout, discovered and published with an intelligent, learned, and unpedantic prologue the manuscript of *Le Nouveau monde amoureux*,² an essential text which certain prudish disciples had managed to lose sight of. In Fourier's society, thanks to cooperative organization of work as well as other social and moral reforms—among them the absolute equality between men and women—"abundance reigns and it has become necessary for the general welfare to have an immense variety of pleasures and for each individual to partake passionately in them." Even though the United States is far from the state of justice and social harmony which Fourier depicts, industry has created an abundance which—without closing one's eyes to its horrors—is unique in history. This material abundance, together with a living tradition of self-criticism and individualism, are the social and historical background on which the erotic rebellion unfolds itself. The analogies between the North American society and the world Fourier envisioned are just as revealing as the differences. Among the analogies we find the material

abundance and freedom of love. The latter is total in Harmony and relative in the United States. The major difference lies in that Fourier's society, as its name implies, has reached harmony, an order which, not unlike the celestial one, is ruled by the law of attraction which unites the opposites without suppressing them. In the United States, one finds, openly or covertly, that it is the profit motive, lying, violence, and the other evils of civilization that prevail.

In Harmony sovereignty is divided, according to Fourier, as in all other societies, between Administration and Religion. The first is charged with production and distribution, that is to say with work, if indeed it is possible to distinguish between work and pleasure in the harmonious society. The second is responsible for pleasure. In civilized societies Religion legislates pleasures, especially those having to do with the table and the bed (Religion is communion and love), but only to repress and deflect them. By denying certain passions and inclinations, Religion transforms them into ferocious obsessions and frenzies. There are no cruel passions: their repression by Morality and Religion inflames us and literally infuriates us. In Harmony, once the morality of civilization is abolished, Religion is no longer oppressive; it liberates, exalts, and unites our instincts, without excluding any of them. "My theory is limited to using the passions such as nature creates them without changing anything in them." One would have to add: except the social context. In civilized society passions are evil, they divide mankind, whereas in Harmony they unite humanity. In spite of the fact that the passions unfold completely and are not curbed, they neither break the social cohesion nor are they harmful to individuals. Precisely because he is completely socialized, Fourier's man is completely free. Everything is permitted, but contrary to what happens in Sade's world, thanks to a radical reversal of values, the destructive passions change their sign and become creative ones. Sadism is always practiced on an erotic object and masochism is precisely the tendency in a subject to become an object. In Harmony, ruled by the principle of passionate attraction, they are all subjects.

Religion's jurisdiction is dual: love and taste, communion and banquet, Eroticism and Gastrosophy. Eroticism is the most intense of passions while Gastronomy is the most extended. Neither the old nor those who are children can practice the first; the second, on the contrary, embraces both childhood and old age. Although both are made up of combinations and connections—bodies and substances—in Love the number of combinations is limited and pleasure tends to climax in an instant (the orgasm), while in Gastrosophy the number of combinations is infinite; pleasure, instead of tending toward concentration, tends to propagate and extend itself through taste and savoring. That is probably why Fourier transforms love into an art, the supreme art, and by the same token transforms gastronomy into a science. The arts fall under Eroticism and the sciences under

Gastrosophy. Eroticism, which is a gift of the self, corresponds to virtue; gastrosophy, which means distribution, is allied to knowledge. Harmony also has its saints and heroes, but they are very different from our own: the saints are those who excel in the art of love; the heroes are the scientists, poets, and artists. In civilized society making love to old people is an eccentricity or an act of prostitution; in Harmony it is a virtuous act. The exercise of virtue is not a sacrifice; it is the result of abundance. It is not difficult to be generous when nobody suffers from sexual deprivation, for everyone is entitled to a sexual minimum. Besides, the male or female saint of Harmony, upon satisfying the other's desires, gains public recognition and in this way satisfies a passion no less violent than sex itself: ambition or the "cabalist" passion, as Fourier calls it. Whether it be taste or sex, pleasure is no longer the satisfaction of a need. It becomes an experience in which desire simultaneously reveals to us what we are and beckons us to transcend ourselves in order to become the *others*. Harmony is imagination and knowledge, or, as Fourier calls it, virtue and wisdom. From the double perspective of Eroticism and Gastrosophy we can now take a look at North American society.

Traditional North American cooking is a cuisine with no mysteries: simple, spiceless, nutritious food. No tricks: the carrot is the honest carrot, the potato is not ashamed of being a potato, and the steak is a bloody giant. It amounts to a transubstantiation of the democratic virtues of the founding fathers: honest cooking, one dish after another, like the sensible and plain-spoken sentences of a virtuous speech. Like the manners of those at the dinner table, the relations among the different substances and flavors are direct. "Traditional North American cooking"? Interdiction of concealing sauces and garnishes that exalt the eye and confound the taste. The separation among the different ingredients is analogous to the reserve prescribed for sexual, age, and class behavior. In other countries a meal is a communion and not only among the people at the table but among the ingredients themselves; a Yankee meal is saturated with Puritanism, is made up of exclusions. The maniacal preoccupation with the origin and purity of food is the counterpart of racism and discrimination. The North American contradiction—a universalism made up of ethnic, cultural, religious, and sexual exclusions—is reflected in its cooking. In this culinary tradition our cult for the passionate and murky ragouts such as *moles*—green, red, and yellow sauces—would constitute a major scandal. So would our preference for the *huítlacoche* which is not only a corn disease but also looks black. And what of the parrot-green and ecclesiastical-purple chiles, and the golden and dark blue ears of corn? These colors are as violent and sharp as the flavors themselves. The North Americans, on the other hand, love tender and fresh colors and flavors. A cuisine equivalent to pastel and watercolor painting. It is a cooking that fears spices more than the devil himself, but that wallows in swamps of cream and butter. Orgies of sugar. Extremes: the al-

most apostolic simplicity and sobriety of lunch together with the suspiciously innocent and pregenital pleasures of ice cream and the milk shake.

The glass of milk goes together with the glass of whiskey. The first affirms the primacy of the home and mother. The glass of milk contains a set of dual virtues: it is a healthy food and it returns us to infancy. Fourier hated the family meal, for it seemed to him the very image of the family in civilized society; the daily ceremony of tedium officiated by a tyrannical father and a brutalized mother. What would he have said of the cult of the glass of milk? Whiskey and gin are beverages for the solitary and the introverted. For Fourier, gastrosophy is not only the science of the combinations of foods; it involves those who eat as well. The variety of the meal's delicacies should be matched by an equal variety among the guests. Wines, liqueurs, and alcoholic beverages are the complement of food; their function is to stimulate the relationships that develop around a table. Unlike wine, pulque, champagne, beer, and even vodka, neither whiskey nor gin is a good companion for a meal. They are neither aperitifs nor digestives. They are beverages that accentuate withdrawal and unsociability. In a gastrophic age they would not enjoy very much of a reputation.

North American cooking ignores ambiguity and ambivalence. It is the very opposite of French cooking which is characterized by shadings, varieties, and modulations of extreme delicacy. A French meal is marked by the transition from one substance to another, from one flavor to another; even a glass of water is a kind of profane Eucharist, it is transubstantiated into an erotic chalice: *Ta lèvre contre le cristal/gorgée à gorgée y compose/le souvenir pourpre et vital/de la moins éphémère rose.*³ North American cooking is also the antipode of Mexican and Indian cooking, whose secret is the clashing of flavors. They unite the fresh and the piquant, the salty and the sweet, the acid and the hot, the harsh and the delicate. Desire is the active agent, the secret producer of changes, whether it be the passage from one flavor to another, or the contrast among flavors and textures. Desire, both in Gastronomy and Erotica, initiates movement among the substances, the bodies, and the sensations. It is the force that regulates connections, mixtures, and transmutations. A stable cooking, in which each substance is what it is and in which both variations and contrasts are avoided, is the type of cooking which excludes desire. Pleasure is a concept (a sensation) absent from traditional Yankee cooking. It prefers health to pleasure, the satisfaction of a necessity to the matching of flavors. Two basic values are implied here; one is physical and the other is moral, and both are associated with the idea of the body as an instrument of work. Body and work are both economic and spiritual concepts: production and redemption. We are condemned to work and food repairs the body after the sorrow of work. It is really a question of *reparation*, in both the physical and moral sense of the word. By means of work the body pays its debt, and by earning its physical sustenance it also earns its spiritual reward. Work

redeems us and the sign of that redemption is food. It is an active sign and an agent that restores bodily and moral health. Because food gives us physical and spiritual health, the exclusion of spices is justified on moral and hygienic grounds, for they are the signs of desire and are also indigestible.

Health is a precondition for two of the body's activities: work and sports. For the first the body is both a productive and redemptive agent; for the second, the sign changes: sports are a waste of energy. This is only an apparent contradiction, for the two constitute a system of communicating vessels. Sports are a physical waste, which, contrary to what happens with sexual pleasure, in the end becomes productive: sports become an expense that produces health. Work in turn is a waste of health that produces goods and thus transforms biological life into social, economic, and moral life. There is also another link between work and sports; both take place in the context of rivalry. They both involve competition and emulation. They are forms of the "cabalist" passion that Fourier talks about. In this sense sports are carried out with the same rigor and seriousness as work, and, by the same token, work takes on the gratuitousness and lightheartedness of sports. Playfulness as an aspect of work is one of the North American traits that might have received Fourier's praise, though he would have certainly been terrified by the commercialism of sports. The pre-eminence of work and sports, activities which in themselves exclude sexual pleasure, is analogous to the exclusion of spices in cooking. If gastronomy and eroticism mean union and the copulation of substances and flavors, of bodies and sensations, it is obvious that no one of them has been the central concern of North American society. Again, I am talking about ideas and social values, not half-secret realities. In the North American tradition the body is not a source of pleasure but of health and work, both in the moral and physical sense.

The cult of health appears in the guise of the "ethics of hygiene." I speak of ethics because its prescriptions are not only physiological but moral. It is a tyrannical ethic, for it includes under its domain sexuality, work, sports, and cooking. Again, we are facing a dual concept. Hygiene rules both moral and bodily life. To comply to the precepts of hygiene means not only to obey physiological rules but also ethical principles: sobriety, moderation, and reserve. The morals of separation inspire the hygienic rules in the same manner in which the aesthetics of fusion encourage the combination of Gastronomy and Eroticism. When I lived in India I often witnessed the exaggerated hygienic preoccupations of North Americans. Their horror about the possibilities of contamination seemed boundless. To them anything could be the carrier of germs: food, drink, things, people, the air itself. These kinds of preoccupations are the exact counterpart to the ritual preoccupations of the Brahmins before the danger of contamination by impure castes, objects, and foods. Many

would argue that the preoccupations of the North Americans are justified while those of the Brahmins are mere superstition. Everything depends on the point of view: for the Brahmins the germs the North Americans fear are absolutely illusory; the stigmas that contact with strange people and impure substances produce are absolutely real. Those stigmas are visible spots and no member of his caste would dare touch him until he had celebrated the appropriate and complicated rituals required for purification. The fear of social ostracism is no less intense than the fear of illness. The ritual and hygienic taboos have one element in common, which is the basis of both: purity. That basis is religious even if in the case of hygiene it is concealed by the authority of science. The cult of hygiene exhibits the same principle that inspires certain attitudes toward sports, work, food, sex, and race. The other name for purity is separation.

Hygiene is a social moral that has its basis in science. The unconscious root is religious, but the forms in which it appears and its justification are rational. In North American society, unlike ours, science from the beginning occupied a place of prestige in the system of beliefs and values. The quarrel between faith and reason never reached the same intensity that it did in the Hispanic world. From their birth the North Americans were modern. For them it is natural to believe in science; for us such a belief implies a denial of our past. The prestige enjoyed by science is so great in the public mind that even political controversy frequently takes the form of a scientific polemic (while in the Soviet Union it takes the form of quarrels centered on Marxist orthodoxy). The racial question and the feminist movement are only two recent examples. Are the intellectual differences between the races and the sexes of genetic or of sociocultural origin? The universality of science (or what passes as science) justifies the elaboration and imposition of collective patterns of normality. This overlapping between science and Puritan morality permits, without recourse to direct coercion, the imposition of rules that condemn all singularities, all exceptions and deviations in a fashion no less categorical and implacable than any religious anathema. Against the excommunication from science there is neither the religious recourse of abjuration nor the judicial recourse of habeas corpus. Even though they wear the mask of science and hygiene, the function of the patterns of normality in the domain of eroticism is no different from the role of "healthy" cooking in relation to gastronomy. Both mean the removal or separation of that which is foreign, different, ambiguous, and impure. One single condemnation for blacks, chicanos, sodomites, and spices.

The Insurrection of Spices

The preceding remarks tend to paint the image of a world characterized by social conformity. It is not so, for the very Puritanism that

watches over tasteless food and that has converted work into a way of salvation is at the root of the movements of criticism and self-criticism that have periodically affected North American society, forcing it to examine itself and to repent. This trait is wholly modern. Baudelaire used to say that progress was not measured by the number of gas lamps in the streets, but by the decrease in the number of the signs of original sin. I prefer another index: modernity is not measured by industrial progress, but by the capacity for criticism and self-criticism. It is often said that Latin American countries are not modern because they are not as yet industrialized. Nobody has said that throughout our history we have demonstrated a singular incapacity for criticism and self-criticism. The same applies to the Russians. Their industrialization was literally paid for with blood, but criticism continues for them to be an exotic object; that is why their modernity is superficial and incomplete. It is true that both the Russian and Hispanic people are acquainted with irony, with aesthetic criticism and satire. We have Cervantes and Chekhov, but not a Swift, a Voltaire, or a Thoreau. We are still in need of philosophical, social, and political criticism. Neither the Russian nor the Hispanic people experienced the eighteenth century. This lack has been most unfortunate for the Latin American, for criticism not only prepares social change, but in its absence those very same changes become externally determined. Criticism permits us to bear change, to make it part of our inner being and thus to change ourselves. In this the North Americans have been truly admirable. Their historical changes have been social crises, but also crises of conscience and consciousness.

The United States has gone through several crises and is now experiencing one that may prove to be the gravest of its history. In any case, dissension, even when it borders on secession, as in the case of the blacks and chicanos, has restored health to the United States. The word *pleasure* was never before part of the dissidents' vocabulary. It is only natural. It is not a word that belongs to the philosophical or moral tradition of the United States. The country was founded under the sign of other words, even opposite words: duty, expiation, guilt, debt. These constitute the moral and religious foundations of Puritanism. In conceiving life as a fall and a debt that must be paid to the Creator, the words themselves became the yeast of Capitalism. They can all be translated into social and economic terms: work, savings, accumulation. Pleasure represents an expense and is therefore a negation of all such values and beliefs. The fact that the word pleasure is today uttered so easily and so aggressively by so many is perhaps a wonder, analogous to the "twilight of the future" and other signs. It may mean that North American society intends to change its course. But the chances for a revolutionary change are remote. This is because, as we all know, both in the United States and in Europe there is no international revolutionary class. The proletariat has shown neither

an international frame of mind nor a revolutionary calling. If the revolution is not within sight, at least in the Marxist meaning of the word, a large mutation is indeed visible and its consequences cannot as yet be anticipated. A mutation in this context means a change in values and attitudes.

The tastes of the North Americans have changed. They have discovered other worlds and are now living in a kind of gastronomic cosmopolitanism. In the large urban centers one finds that the culinary traditions of five continents coexist on a single street. Because of the excellence and variety of their products, the restaurants are virtually rivals to the great museums and libraries. The association is with Alexandria rather than with Babel. Not only do we find a great number of restaurants specializing in the most unusual foods—African ants or Périgord truffles—but it is not at all surprising to find supermarkets offering in their spice and exotic counters such a complete variety of products that even Brillat-Savarin would have been enraptured (he was Fourier's cousin). There is also a profusion of cookbooks and cooking schools and institutes. Television programs on culinary art are more popular than religious programs. The ethnic minorities have contributed to this universalism. Many families still keep the cooking traditions of Odessa, Bilbao, Orvieto, or Madras. However, eclecticism in cooking is no less dangerous than in philosophy or morality. All of that knowledge has perverted native cooking. It used to be humble but honest; now it is ostentatious and fraudulent. And what is worse, eclecticism has inspired many self-styled chefs into inventing hybrid dishes and other *para gustias*. The melting-pot is a social ideal, but when applied to cooking it produces abominations. This failure is not really strange: it is more difficult to evolve good cooking than it is to have a great literature, as England's example teaches us.

To the perverse fantasies of well-meaning but untalented cooks, one must add the industrialization of food. That is the real danger. The food industry has been and continues to be the principal agent in the degradation of taste, and it has now become a threat to public health. This is poetic justice: the possibility of collective poisoning is fit punishment for the obsession with the origin and purity of food. Nobody knows what it is they are eating when they open a can or package of processed food. The industry's impudence is as amazing as its impunity. It violates the old food taboos, mixes all substances, uses more than three thousand "additives" and chemical compounds, and sells gold bricks—all this not even in the name of health, but just in the name of gigantic business. The question of the food industry has social and political ramifications: it is sufficient to think of the millions of starving and undernourished people of the Third World. There are economic implications also; the food industry is a gigantic monopoly controlled by three or four companies. And finally there are hygienic implications, for North Americans are consuming more and more

substitutes whose long-range effects on public health are unknown. Foods such as nondairy creamers, filled-milk, synthetic fruit juices, and other wonders of Food Engineering are too vast a topic for the limits of this article, not to speak of my own competence.⁴

My interest is to point out that culinary morality (for in this case we are talking about a morality and not an aesthetic) has suffered a double breach in the United States: first, through the industrialization of food and its harmful consequences; second, through the contemporary cosmopolitanism and eclecticism. Both have undermined the old food taboos. The acceptance of rare sauces, strange condiments, marinades, dressings, and seasonings reveals a change not only in taste but also in values. Pleasure in its more immediate instantaneous form, taste, and smell displaces traditional values. Pleasure is the opposite of work and saving. This change modifies the very idea of time. The now is the time of pleasure; work sacrifices the now for the sake of the future.

The discovery of ambivalence and exception in the realm of eroticism parallels the changes in the use of spices and seasonings in gastronomy. But it is a mistake to speak of discovery here as if eroticism and the body had heretofore been unknown realities. Not at all; the North Americans knew very well the powers of the body, that source of wonder and horror. It was precisely because they knew them that they feared them. The body is a constant presence in Whitman, Melville, and Hawthorne. The United States is a country poor in spices but rich in human beauty. It is also a mistake to think that the relaxation in public morality has increased perversion and deviation. (Assuming a greater objectivity, Fourier calls these *manias*, for deviation and perversion are words that imply a pattern of normality known to be arbitrary, that vary from culture to culture and epoch to epoch.) No doubt the new morality has caused the fall of many a collective and individual mask. Many who did not even dare self-confess their homosexuality or lesbianism are now more openly confronting their own erotic truth. Similarly, it would be obtuse to deny that people today enjoy their own bodies more and those of others as well. This is done with greater freedom and without the fear that once prevailed. At the same time it is obvious that sexual practices have not changed and that the erotic rebellion has not altered or modified the art of loving. I do not know if there are more numerous erotic encounters, but I am sure that there are no new ways of copulating. Perhaps people make love more (how could one know?), but the capacity for suffering and enjoyment has not increased or decreased. The body and its passions are not historical categories. It is more difficult to invent a new position than to discover a new planet. In the realm of eroticism and passion, as in the arts, the idea of progress is particularly ludicrous.

The erotic revolts of the past affected almost exclusively the elites of society. The extraordinary erotic freedom of the eighteenth century was

a phenomenon limited to the nobility and the high bourgeoisie. Libertine philosophy never filtered down. Neither Laclos nor Restif de la Bretonne was a popular author. The same can be said for "courtly love" which was an erotic ideal and a poetics for aristocrats and for poets and literati. So, this is the first time in Western culture when the masses participate directly in a revolt of this nature. In other civilizations, the erotic movements sometimes had a real popular character: sexual Taoism in China and the Tantrism of India, Nepal, and Tibet. But both Taoism and Tantrism were essentially religious movements, while the present erotic revolt takes place outside the churches and is often violently anti-Christian. I insist that it is anti-Christian and not anti-religious. It is, in fact, religious. The religious instinct, as Hume feared, and the twentieth century has seemed to confirm, is congenital to mankind. I wonder if the erotic frenzy of our times is not an omen of the coming of future orgiastic cults. Until recently the defense of erotic liberty was argued on the basis of individual civil rights; now the emphasis has shifted to collective and public rights. There is another difference: pleasure is seen as a form of collective participation. The erosion of traditional morals and the decadence of Christian rituals (not to mention the discredit attached to official ceremonies) have made acute the need for communion and collective rituals. Our time suffers from hunger and thirst—for fiestas and rites.

The popular character of the erotic revolt was immediately appreciated by the mass media, by the entertainment and fashion industries. For it is not the churches nor the political parties, but the great industrial monopolies that have taken control of the powers of fascination that eroticism exerts over men. In the allotment the advertising industry took the lion's share and left the crumbs to the old pornographic business. Mouth and teeth, belly and breasts, penis and vulva—alternatively sacred or evil symbols of dreams, religions, myths, and art—are all converted into a slogan for this or that product. What began as a liberation has become a business. The same has happened in the realm of gastronomy; the erotic industry is the younger sister of the food industry. In the world of Harmony, erotic freedom coincides with abundance and social freedom. The economic necessities have disappeared and the authority of the State is reduced to the self-administration of each phalanstery. In the twentieth century, both in the United States and in Western Europe, industry appropriates and mutilates the erotic revolt. Private business expropriates utopia. During its ascendancy capitalism exploited the body; now it has turned it into an object of advertising. We have gone from prohibition to humiliation.

The North American erotic movement is saturated by morality, pedagogy, good intentions, and progressive politics. All of this, plus its popular and democratic character, make it quite different from the European erotic movements. It also differs from the tradition of the intellectual family, ex-

tending from Sade to Georges Bataille, that viewed eroticism as violence and transgression. Compared to the somber visions of Sade and the philosophical pessimism of Bataille, the optimism of the North American rebels is really amazing. It makes it worthwhile to take a closer look at their rebellion. By breaking the structure of Puritan morality, which condemns the lower half of our bodies to a clandestine existence, the erotic rebellion has accomplished something of a strange but undoubtedly moral coloration. It is not a question of knowing something that was hidden, but of *recognizing* it, in the legal sense of the word. This recognition amounts to a consecration of sex as a part of nature. The recognition covers all the exceptions, deviations, and perversions for they become natural inclinations. There are no longer any exceptions; everything is natural. It means the legitimization of all the forbidden and secret aspects of eroticism, something that would have shocked Bataille. The rebels affirm that the so-called antinatural passions, the old sins "against nature," are natural and therefore legitimate. Their critics reply that the sins against nature as well as the perversions are truly exceptions, violations of normality: vices and illnesses which must be faced with the psychiatrist's couch, the straitjacket of the insane asylum or jail. These critics must once be reminded that "nature" and "normality" are mere conventions. But the rebels must be told that eroticism is not natural sex but social sex.

The dissidents' idea is based on a confusion between the natural and the social, the sexual and the erotic. Sexuality is animal—it is a natural function; eroticism takes place within society. Its essence is imagination, for eroticism is a metaphor for sexuality. There is a line of separation between eroticism and sexuality; it is the word *like* or *as*. Eroticism is an act—a ceremony of transfiguration; men and women are born to make love *as* lions, eagles, doves, or the praying mantis. Neither the lion nor the praying mantis makes love *as* men do. Man sees himself in animals, but they do not see themselves in man. Upon contemplating himself in the mirror of animal sexuality, man changes himself and changes sexuality. Eroticism is an imitation and a representation; it is not raw sex but sex transfigured by imagination: rite, theater. That is why it is inseparable from perversion and deviation; both are its extremes. A natural eroticism, besides being impossible, would mean a return to animal sexuality. It would be the end of Fourier's *manias* and the "penchants" of Sade, but also the end of the most innocent caress, from the bouquet of flowers to the simple kiss. The end of that whole gamut of feelings and sensations which from neolithic times, or maybe even before, have enriched the sensibility and imagination of men and women. It would be the end of love, the great invention of Western culture. The final consequence of the erotic rebellion would be the disappearance of eroticism itself and of what has been its highest and most revolutionary expression: the idea of love. During all

of Western history, love has been a secret and subversive power, the great medieval heresy, the dissolvant of bourgeois morality, the impassioned wind that was born with the German Romantics and reached all the way to the Surrealists.

Is a society without prohibitions and repressions possible, viable, or imaginable at least? Here Freud, Sade, and Bataille agree. There is no civilization without repression and thus the essence of eroticism, which makes it different from animal sexuality, is its transgressing violence. Fourier would argue that there is transgression because there is prohibition; it is not instinct but repression that has turned man into beast. Even though I cannot help but sympathize with those who struggle against repression, whether it be sexual or political, I do not believe that it is possible to do away with it completely. Sade imagined a society ruled by "strong passions and soft laws," in which the only sacred right would be the right to *jouissance*. Nothing would so much resemble a bullfight or a hunt than such a society. Having said this, I must add that, unlike Bataille, I do not think that the essence of eroticism is transgression. For me eroticism is before and above all a *representation*, something that one cannot find in animal sexuality and that man has invented. Eroticism always implies the desire to *go beyond*, precisely beyond animal sexuality. That is why one of its chords—to see the body as a musical instrument is a metaphor as old as music and eroticism—is transgression. Transgression is but one extreme of the movement that makes us, departing from our own bodies, imagine other bodies, and later search for the embodiment of those imaginings in some real body. Eroticism, precisely because it is an urge to go beyond, is also a search. For what or for whom? For the *other*. The other is our double. A double that denies us. Faced with the other's denial there appears a double possibility: the destruction of the *other* (Sade), or to go beyond still. That beyond holds the *other's* freedom and my recognition of that freedom. The other extreme of eroticism is the opposite of transgression: the acceptance of the *other*.

The erotic revolt is a protest against Western morality, and especially against Puritanism. That is why it has particularly flourished in the United States and in other Protestant countries like Denmark and Sweden. This protest leads to a political and social demand: the recognition of exception. Through a very curious process sexuality is transformed into ideology. On the one hand, the erotic exception disappears as such and becomes nothing but a natural inclination. On the other hand, it reappears as dissent. Eroticism becomes social and political criticism. The effort to make eroticism moral and legal tends to politicize it. Sex takes on a critical function; it writes manifestos, delivers speeches, and marches in the streets and parks. It is no longer the lower half of the body, the sacred and condemned region of passions, convulsions, emissions, and rattles. In Sade sex philosophizes, and its syllogisms are an eruption of lava: the

logic of eruptions and destruction. Now sex has become the public preacher and its speech is a call to arms: it makes of pleasure a duty. We have an inverted Puritanism. Industry has converted eroticism into a business and politics into ideology.

Many critics have pointed out that Fourier did not anticipate the development of industry and the changes it would introduce in the world. That shortsightedness would be enough to discredit him as a prophet. However, it is not altogether impossible that his lack of vision may have been, on closer look, a more accurate vision of the future. Fourier never hid his dislike for the manufacturing industry, the only one that existed during his lifetime. No doubt his attitude reflects his experience with the wretched mill workers of Lyons, whom he knew intimately. But the reasons for his dislike of industry run deeper. The axis of Harmony's system is *attractive* work. In the phalansteries men and women would work with the same enthusiasm with which they presently play and enjoy their favorite passions. That is why Harmony's tasks are so varied. The butterfly-passion—love for change and variety—is one of the ruling principles of Fourier's system. Damnation does not constitute having to work, but to do always the same work. Now, the principle of pleasure is not easily applied to industrial work because, as Fourier never tired of saying, it is *intrinsically* monotonous and unattractive work. This explains why the principal activity in Harmony is agriculture. At the same time, Fourier is quite aware of the fact that it is impossible to do away entirely with industry. What to do? His solution is ingenious and it involves applying his cardinal principle: absolute deviation.

In civilized society the rule is the limitless production of the same product. Mass production is based on the idea of maximum consumption and the product's minimum durability. In Harmony we find the rule inverted: an immense variety of products of great durability and minimum consumption. With his usual exaggeration, Fourier tells us that products in Harmony will be practically eternal. In order to avoid the danger of weariness and also to maintain alive passion attraction, the products would be objects of great beauty and perfection. This is the application of the model of handicraft to industry. The needs of this mode of production would be opposite to those of our factories. There would be no need for an army of workers. A small group of artisan-workers would be occupied in producing a limited number of objects of extraordinary variety and perfect finish. In this way the tedium and horror of industrial work would be reduced to a minimum. The manufacturing of goods, Fourier concludes triumphantly, would require but a fourth of the working day. In Harmony, "true wealth would be based, first, in the greatest possible consumption of different kinds of foods and, second, in the least possible consumption of different kinds of clothes, furniture, things." Exactly the opposite of what happens in our present society in which

handicrafts have disappeared and cooking is already an industry and thus a part of mass production. Fourier's solution may make us smile. However, it outlines—as in inverted symmetry—the central contradiction in North American society and in the whole developed world—Eastern and Western Europe: the opposition between industry and passionate attraction. Industry has brought about abundance, but it has converted Eros into one of its employees.

This article was translated from the Spanish by Sara Klaren.

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ANNIE KRIEDEL

Consistent Misapprehension: European Views of America and Their Logic

“AMERICA IN crisis; decline of America; American revolution”—these were the terms that Europeans habitually used in analyzing the condition of the United States during the period around 1968.¹

These analyses were obviously rather misguided, but it is the origin rather than the actual substance of the error which raises the most disconcerting problems. The European misapprehension was shared by Americans (as was its corollary, an equally mistaken prediction of America’s immediate future), but it nevertheless had its peculiarly European causes.

Indeed, to be mistaken about America is almost a constant of European experience. The acuteness of Tocqueville’s analyses, and the continued life in French political thought which Raymond Aron’s commentaries have assured them, overshadow the fact that *Démocratie en Amérique* encountered a swift and resolute rejection in France.²

This consistent misapprehension results from an unbridgeable gap between the Old World and the New that cannot be closed merely by more and more rapid means of crossing the Atlantic. It is unbridgeable in the same way as are the gaps between members of a family, whose places in the cluster of relationships have been allocated once and for all. The French may no longer be the aristocratic society of the *ancien régime*, nor a mass of peasants brandishing their pitchforks in the name of revolution, but when they choose to sit in judgment on America, they assume again the identities they possessed in the days when Europe brought forth its American offspring.

Any attempt to assess one’s own children with an impartial eye, even when they have grown up, is, we all know, hopeless and futile. It would therefore be unrealistic to expect that Europeans should willingly relinquish their parental relation toward America, a role to which they cling so passionately.³ Conversely, no commentary could do justice to the astonishing revelation of General Patton’s famous piece of military eloquence, addressed to his troops before the Sicilian landing in 1944:

Many of you have in your veins German and Italian blood, but remember that

these ancestors of yours so loved freedom that they gave up home and country to cross the ocean in search of liberty. The ancestors of the people we shall kill lacked the courage to make such a sacrifice and continued as slaves.

The family analogy offers us two observations. First: just as parents create more or less distorted images of their children, images which are in reality projections of their own married life, so Europeans apprehend the state of America not as it is but rather as a mirror which reflects their own strains and conflicts. Second: a favorable or unfavorable attitude toward America depends not so much on American realities, as on one's position vis-à-vis domestic politics in Europe. This was already true in the nineteenth century, when "during the Restoration, opinion in the 'two Frances' roughly corresponded to the division between friends and enemies of America. Though all the 'ultras' were not hostile to the United States, it was rare to find a liberal who was not an avowed admirer of the American government."⁴ It was still true in the 1950's, when the cold war led European Communists to express violent hostility toward the "Amerloks," while the left and the far-left, because of their anti-Stalinism and anti-Sovietism, adopted a vigorous pro-Americanism.⁵ The notion of "American imperialism" received its first doctrinal and political definition when the socialist camp had consolidated itself, in 1947, more or less as a united challenge to the Marshall Plan, "a plan for the economic and political subjugation of Europe by the American imperialists, a plan for war preparations." Among the socialist leaders characterized as "servile apologists for their American master"⁶ was Léon Blum, who in the course of his career had been called first a "social-traitor," and then a "social-fascist," and who was finally branded a "social-American." Blum had not only negotiated the Blum-Byrnes agreements and supported the Monnet and Marshall Plans, he also did not conceal his sympathy for a Democratic and unionized America, which in its turn saw him as a French Roosevelt. This was an America whose political consensus could be readily incorporated within the terms of Blum's political thought—antifascism, anticommunism, and an optimistic idealism.

But despite such divergences resulting from their domestic differences, Europeans have a common basis of agreement, like the majority of parents and their children, which provides a consistent focus for their view of America. Because of its long-standing and passionate fixation, this view is unable both to recognize continuities *and* to adjust to changes. The French in particular, readily falling into the role of skeptical rural landholders, Latin and Catholic (even though they may be born in Paris of a working-class family, of uncertain ethnic origins, and cheerfully irreverent toward the rite of baptism), take it for granted that Americans are callow optimists destined by their naïve restlessness and their fortunate location on the earth's surface for prosperous commerce, for Protestantism, and for a vigorous if unpolished democracy. The following extract could easily have come from the latest issue of *L'Express*:

An American's office is furnished with a perfect touch for the comfortable, and is at the same time superbly equipped for the tremendous feats of organization necessary in the enormous undertakings of a billionaire. Electric heaters and water-cooled ventilators maintain it at a constant and mild temperature all the year round: five telephones and two wireless sets can put it in instant communication with any city in the world; splendid electric filing-systems contain innumerable records about the most varied industrial and scientific matters.⁷

Not quite in the manner of *L'Express*—the level of technological sophistication is rather old-fashioned. In fact, the extract comes from a popular dime novel of sixty years ago, but the stereotype of America is identical. Identical, too, was the attitude of those Frenchmen, Italians, Germans, Englishmen, Dutch, and Norwegians who were asked in 1952 to select the five categories which they thought best described Americans.⁸ It was thought that Americans were “practical” (five countries out of six), “receptive to progress” (five), “generous” (three), “hard-working” (three), and “clever” (one).

It is even open to question whether in the course of time the European attitude has not become less discerning, burdened and restricted as it is by an emotive predisposition which has turned into cliché and stereotype. Certain nineteenth-century accounts reveal a freshness of observation and a verve which would seem out of place today, when only the stance of a prosecuting attorney seems permissible. For example, Baron Regis de Trobriand, writing from New York on Monday, December 11, 1854:

A few years have certainly changed New York. Bloody or peaceful, disastrous or successful, revolutions are afoot in every part of the world; yet without having discarded a president, nor having forced members of Congress to leap out of windows, the United States has all the same undergone extraordinary changes without altering the forms of its institutions. The public mind has altered noticeably, and, if the subject were not outside the intentions of this series, we could specify various surprises which particularly strike the traveler on his return.⁹

Less than ten years later, the spectacle of the Civil War called forth, from provincial France, a flood of conflicting feelings which have the significant merit of being offered for what they are, without being masked by a hypocritical, pseudodoctrinal rhetoric. The Procureur Général of Agen, in Aquitaine, when making his annual report on the state of public opinion in his region, wrote:

For a long time, the presumptuousness of the great republic of the United States, its pretensions to the exclusive domination of half of that great continent, its contempt for Europe and its institutions, have created a quite natural touchiness, and when this alleged superiority in institutions and even in military worth was disproved by events, there was more interest in seeing such a childish and brutal boastfulness justly punished than there was in adhering to a more humane attitude of regret for such immense self-destruction.¹⁰

At the other end of the country, in Lorraine, the Avocat Général of Nancy

also offered a subtle analysis of the various factors which governed the considerations of his fellow citizens:

The North has to its credit the moral advantage of its antislavery, yet it is far from winning sympathy. The arrogant policies of the United States in the years leading up to the present great schism have made serious enemies for the country. Even when split in two, it will still be strong enough for the North, aided by our sea power, to resist England's naval supremacy. Meanwhile, it is gratifying to see the South, poorer in men and material resources, struggling successfully against its opponent, and public opinion looks forward eagerly to the moment when the Emperor's government will be in a position to intervene.¹¹

But at no time has the irritation aroused among nations with longer histories by the "childish boastfulness" been relieved by the sight of the culprit undergoing a well-deserved punishment. They have even found themselves expecting—or hoping for—a resounding American defeat in Vietnam, not on the basis of any global strategy, but because Europeans could then re-assume the deeply satisfying role which history has accorded them. They could generously welcome back and offer solace to the prodigal son who is driven to seek understanding and affection from the very "elders" whom he has so foolishly neglected. Such an attitude is evident in the *Lettre aux Américains*, published by Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber in May 1972:

So your hour of defeat has come. We in Europe have so often felt the bitterness, the personal tensions, and the sometime dramatic political consequences of defeat that we sympathize wholeheartedly with you during the ordeal which your country is now undergoing for the first time.

If you, the New World, have saved Western Europe more than once from terror and darkness, it is now our turn to help you, if we can, to overcome your anguish, to control your natural reactions, and to put an end to the hellish experience of Vietnam without too much diminution of your energies.

The same irritation was the principal motive for the support that the French gave to General de Gaulle's foreign policy at least until 1967. They fully approved the position, taken in their name and reiterated at every opportunity, that they would not let themselves be drawn into conflicts which they liked to see as the predictable outcome of American "arrogance." Even at the end of the Fourth Republic, forty Frenchmen out of a hundred thought the degree of American influence in France "too great"; only twenty-three thought it was "about right." So when the President of the Fifth Republic set a "European Europe" independent of the United States against an "Atlantic Europe" closely linked to it, his arguments commanded a support which lasted throughout his entire term of office. The actual initiatives by which France set about establishing its autonomy were also greeted favorably. In February-March 1960, for every three Frenchmen "strongly" in favor of an American military presence and seventeen "rather" in favor, nineteen declared themselves "very" hostile and thirty-nine "rather" hostile. In May 1966, by a 4-to-3 margin, they approved the French withdrawal from NATO.¹²

But the “lesson” which the Americans had now been taught was not intended to be carried too far—least of all was it to be reciprocated. Even when accused of invading the Continent, Americans were not to neglect their obligations toward Europe or to leave it helpless. In September 1966 more than one Frenchman in two expressed a wish that the Atlantic Alliance be maintained. De Gaulle’s Pnom-Penh speech in 1966 was still acceptable—after all, the least one could demand of America was a defeat in Vietnam like the French defeat ten years earlier—but his position on the Middle East, and especially his performance in Canada, were no longer seen merely as warning shots. President Pompidou seems to have got the point, after his first chaotic contact with America during his 1970 visit; afterwards, he made policy “corrections” which the French Communists duly interpreted as “falling back into the old Atlantic rut.”

Thus, Europe finds itself simultaneously cut adrift and dependent, a situation apparently anomalous, but in fact explicable by the logic of family relations. As the book jacket of a recent French work on the American political system puts it: “Our fate depends on how *they* solve their problems.”¹³ Naturally this dual dissatisfaction, narcissistic in character and growing out of mutually reinforcing feelings of abandonment and dependence, has sought the most common outlet and compensation: disinterest. As a result, the field of American studies in Europe is incredibly barren. Nor does the abundance of information relayed by the press, radio, television, and cinema¹⁴ do anything to fill the emptiness, since their information is based on events which are picked out and magnified because of their “newsworthiness.” This is not necessarily the same thing as genuine significance, since arranging facts to convey even the most strictly “true” information is a different process from formulating an analysis. To take only two examples of neglect, somewhat less unfavorable than most: *Pouvoir, société et politique aux États-Unis* (1970), by François and Claire Masnata, contains an annotated bibliography of 251 titles, of which only 8 are written by French authors (with the exception of Tocqueville) and only 26 works have been translated into French; *La structure du pouvoir aux États-Unis* (1971), by Pierre Birnbaum, supplies a bibliography in which only 1 work out of 44 has a French author. Moreover, although 11 of these works are translated into French, 3 of them appeared before 1914, 1 before 1940, 2 before 1960, and only 5 after 1960—even though we are dealing here with works of political science.

The persistently mistaken observations and predictions about America into which Europeans have fallen, as well as the extreme paucity of their theorizing and research in the area, can legitimately be interpreted as symptoms of a deep-seated conflict that parallels the classic situation within the family. But, between the date of its origin and the present, the conflict has assumed a distinctive theoretical form. Europeans discussing

America have tended to identify their Europocentrism with a Marxist or Marxist-oriented conceptual framework. The imposition of a structure fundamentally inappropriate to the realities of America has done much to aggravate the mutual misunderstanding between the two cultures. The way in which the crisis of the late sixties was treated provides remarkably interesting evidence of this. It becomes apparent that the interpretation of the American crisis was one element of the whole European reassessment of the aim of revolution, an area in which the Communist version had retained its hegemony for half a century. On the other hand, the projection of the European preoccupation onto American events had the specious effect of identifying the European and American crises, a tendency already encouraged because they were taking place at the same time. A more cautious approach to the problem would have considered them separately, at least initially.

America and its crisis provided the opportunity for Communists and leftists in Europe to clarify the origins and the objects of their own agreements and disagreements. They allocated the roles they considered appropriate to the various actors on the American stage, made their own predictions (hence revealing their own programs), and thus defined their positions and the differences among them. *L'Humanité*, the organ of the French Communist party (P.C.F.), acknowledged this fact when it began a seven-part inquiry (January 18-28, 1972) entitled *Realités Américaines*. The editor explained the undertaking in these terms: "One after another, several writers, all of whom take a resolutely anti-Communist position, have chosen to emphasize the activities of certain social groups—hippies, this or that community—have marked them out especially and then designated them as the new revolutionary vanguard."

Let us look first at the Communist position. In their own way, Communists are very fond of America. This assertion is not intended to be paradoxical or provocative. Communists (and not only in the countries where they hold power and are hypnotized by the "mirage" of prosperity symbolized by the dollar) are in sympathy with the aims, the needs, and the hopes implied by the persistent metaphorical description of America as the "New World." The tendency to value the new—the modern—is a cornerstone of revolutionary consciousness.

In the writings of Marx and Engels we already notice a lively and uncharacteristic excitement when they speak about the United States. Here is Marx:

European emigration has made North America a great agricultural producer, a competitor which shakes to its foundations the property of both the great and small landowners of Europe. Further, it enables the United States to exploit its enormous industrial resources with great energy, and on such a scale that the industrial monopoly currently enjoyed by Western Europe and especially by England will soon vanish. These two facts have revolutionary repercussions for America. Little by little, the small and medium-sized landholdings of the farmers,

the foundation of every political system, will succumb to competition with the great farms, while in the industrial regions a numerous proletariat and a fantastic concentration of capital have come into existence for the first time.¹⁵

And Engels says:

On the most favored soil of America, where no medieval ruins bar the way, where history begins with the elements of modern bourgeois society, as evolved in the seventeenth century, the working class passed through these two stages of its development (that is, a national trade-union movement and an independent labour party) within ten months.¹⁶

Striking a still more unusual note, *L'Humanité* toys with "bourgeois objectivism" and states outright that "Americans generally work quickly and industriously. And with efficiency, whether construction workers, waitresses, or bus drivers. There is rarely an excess of personnel" (January 18, 1972). And "the American people remain convinced that they enjoy the highest level of consumption in the world—which is, from a global point of view, still true" (January 28, 1972).

This sympathy is further heightened by the belief that the substance, the provenance, the practitioners, and the style of modernity are as common to each side as is the definition of modernity itself. For example, when American public opinion is defined as encompassing "Puritan thought, the revolutionary era, the role of the West, the rise of the common man, the Civil War, the working class, industrial expansion, and the rise to world power,"¹⁷ each article in the inventory has its equivalent in the mental armory of communism.

Whether entrance to the Promised Land is achieved by migration or conversion, it is necessary to wrest oneself free of the old land of Error and Sin, necessary to make a personal choice about a new way of living. The emigrant and the Communist share the brutal experience of breaking away—whether you get a steamship ticket or a party membership card, you renounce and condemn conditions you accepted before, you choose rebirth. Industrial society, science, technology, prosperity, urbanization, labor, production, factories, workers, informality of manner—through such categories America realizes the dream of the poor from whom the Communists on the Continent obtain their measure of honor and justice.

This favorable and, on the whole, just account of the American epic drives Communists to erect a totem whose very name—"American Imperialism"—indicates its distance from the reality of the United States and, indeed, promotes a vagueness about the connection between the label and the reality. While anti-Americanism proper—directed against American people and American things—is an attitude much flaunted by the European bourgeoisie, the Communists rail against the imperialist entelechy, but enthusiastically enumerate the more positive conditions which make America an exception. To Werner Sombart's famous question—*Warum gibt es in den Vereinigten Staaten keinen Sozialismus?*—William Z. Foster answered by enu-

merating reasons for the delayed development of class consciousness in American workers: The early granting of political rights created a "democratic illusion," the labor force is heterogeneous because it was formed by successive waves of emigrants, the vast reserves of land acted as a safety valve, the rate of industrial expansion and the shortage of labor forced capitalist employers to pay high wages, which led in turn to the creation of a working aristocracy with middle-class attitudes. Once these particular causes of the American "lag" were recognized, the Communists could comfortably run the problems of American society through their usual interpretative mill. The problem of drugs among young black workers?—"a remedy for the pernicious conditions of industrial work" (*L'Humanité*, January 18, 1972). They maintain intact the classic version of their revolutionary scenario, eventually to be acted out on the American stage, although the performance may have to be postponed indefinitely.

In the future the United States must certainly undergo a more and more severe class struggle, as more and more rifts appear in the system. To believe with Sweezy that only the Third World proletariat can lead the struggle is to grant too much efficacy to the workings of capitalism. It is encountering ever greater problems which will certainly intensify the battle for socialism not only among the workers but also among "white-collar" employees. Together they will insure the advent of a workers' republic. It may take a hundred years, but what are a hundred years in the history of the world?¹⁸

Accordingly, "convinced—and the conviction implies a political position—that the future of the United States will long depend on the attitude of the 92 million Americans who today participate directly or indirectly in production,"¹⁹ the reporter assigned by *L'Humanité* to cover the United States for a year trained all his powers of observation on the actors recognized in Leninist social revolutionary theory—workers, black and white; great industrial firms; agricultural workers in California and Tennessee (who must obviously have found support and encouragement by being connected with their "class allies"); employees and administration, students and university professors.

Let us return to the far-left point of view. In the substrata of the protest movement we find a group of Catholic upbringing whose Catholicism takes a curiously Protestant turn in its Old Testament vision of America as the new Babylon. But that group too, behind its onslaught of accusations and curses directed at a rather abstract imperialism, reveals a familiarity and a fascination with the leading characteristics of American culture. It might seem at first that our young far-left is intrigued by the unique and prominent position which youth occupies in the American scheme of things. It has often been noted that emigration introduced a discontinuity between generations which has been sharpened by the rapidity and boldness of technological innovation. As a result, the classic pattern of inheritance has been reversed, according the crucial role of perpetuating and disseminating

values to the young rather than to the old. Young people caught in the tight meshes of a traditional society where authority is still a prerogative of age would naturally be attracted by this reversal. This interpretation, however, implies that the far-left in Europe only aspires to seize power for the benefit of the younger generation. This might have been plausible when the far-left was still limited by its dependence on the Leninist matrix, whose core is the concept of seizing power. But it has lost its force now that the far-left has ceased to be concerned with working out a course of action based on Leninist theory and has begun to look instead for a global plan which could be substituted for Leninism, both as a theory of revolutionary process and as a model for post-revolutionary society.

When members of Europe's far-left contemplate the American scene, they are delighted by the absence of a massive and immovable revolutionary orthodoxy, since their primary historical role has been precisely to destroy the canonical authority of Soviet-based communism. They arrived at this position only gradually. In the five years from 1960 to 1965, in the wake of the dispute over Stalinism which had begun in 1956 with the twentieth CPSU Congress and the "secret report" of Khrushchev, the Sino-Soviet rift became complete, and the break was recognized as a permanent datum, demanding a fundamental realignment in international relations. In 1968, the far-left was by no means a novel phenomenon, since such upheavals regularly throw up a group of "ultras" to the left of the revolutionary center. But even its distinctive traits remained badly formulated and vague. The old-line Communists understood the far-left so poorly that they hoped, under the impact of events, to turn to their own purposes a movement which had grown up outside their control through the irresponsible "infantilism" of the *gauchistes*. Five years were necessary (from 1965 to 1970, with 1968 as the peak) for the transition from a two-power international system to a three- (or five-) power system to be answered by a corresponding realignment of domestic politics in Europe. It was then that the far-left took on a new guise, becoming the vehicle for youthful anticommunism in Europe, assailing the near-monopoly held in revolutionary thinking since 1920 by the form of Leninism preached by the socialist bloc.

Although it has achieved a key objective by disrupting the monopoly held by communism, the European far-left is still constrained by the irksome problems of power. In America, on the other hand, the absence of any orthodox revolutionary center has encouraged the emergence of a multitude of revolutionary minorities. Every group in the society contains such a minority, and this creates a luxuriant and expansive revolutionary palate fully capable of satisfying the youthful taste for the baroque.

The reestablishment of rivalry between revolutionaries has given the European far-left another powerful motive to take an interest in America, whose inhabitants have traditionally preferred the *dur désir* of escaping their society to the other possible course of action, changing it.

The alternative of escape had already been worked out by the nineteenth-century Utopians. Despite the similarity between their paradigm of economic expansion and the American process of industrialization (free enterprise, development of communications, use of credit),²⁰ the followers of Saint-Simon were under the spell of the Eastern mirage. Followers of Fourier and the "Icarians," on the other hand, saw departure, voyage, and resettlement in America as the necessary condition for breaking with the system, and for discovering new dreams which would not be merely dreary repetitions.

How could a great Community be organized in France or in Europe? The prejudices and conventions of the rich, the small and large landowners, the capitalists, manufacturers, and businessmen make it very difficult to transform an old society into a true community. Recognizing this difficulty, we have decided upon a great emigration to a land which is still uninhabited and uncultivated.²¹

Cabet and his disciples had no intention of suggesting that one form of social organization, however appealing, be substituted for another; they were to do away with the very basis of society for the benefit of their form of community—whether called "phalanstery," "commune," or "Icaria." All that was needed was a large enclosed space and an unchanging present exempt from the passage of time. Only isolation and timelessness could allow them to imagine, securely and without fear of contamination, the ideal city of happiness, plenty, and concord.²²

For each branch of the revolutionary movement in Europe, then, there is a different version of revolution in America. For the Communists America is an industrial agglomeration of recent origin, an America of cities, of factories, of a vast labor force, of a prosperity measurable by the quantity of goods produced, distributed, and consumed. For the far-left, the authentic America, though disrupted by its tireless protesting, is resistant to coercion, scornful of material acquisition, unwilling to be confined to any fixed position, ready to overturn prevailing norms and values, marked by a proliferation of sects and minority groups, and possessing a firm belief in salvation by whatever means it might be achieved.

Which of these two versions is "correct," the "true" picture of revolution in America? Neither of them, clearly, since both are partial accounts of a single reality whose complex totality overwhelms the innocent who, in the phrase of a Polish humorist, has come along "to witness the death of capitalism."

The failure to distinguish between the crisis in America and the crisis in Europe severely impaired the accuracy of the predictions circulating in Europe during the late 1960's. The hypothesis that the crisis was a single worldwide phenomenon remains plausible; now that the actual state of crisis, at least, has come to an end, the cycle can be seen to have followed a single universal rhythm. But, whatever its origins, the initial

disturbance, operating in various contexts, splintered into separate dramas which took very distinct forms, followed different courses, and led to different outcomes.

Two points seem decisive in distinguishing the American crisis from the European—the relation which each had, first, to institutions and, second, to politics.

First, the relation to institutions. Raymond Aron has already observed that “if de Tocqueville has not wielded much influence among sociologists, it is because contemporary sociology, as practiced by Durkheim and his followers, derives from the writings of Auguste Comte. Accordingly, French sociologists have emphasized matters of social structure rather than political institutions.”²³ This emphasis has been heightened by Marxism. In Marxist theory, institutions, belonging as they do to the realm of super-structures, are of vague and only secondary importance. They are seen as virtually interchangeable forms which serve the function of translating into other terms, of expressing and analyzing, the true content, which is the means of production. Institutions lack any real ability to affect or alter the shape of history; at most, a more subtle version of this simplistic schema grants them a dialectical interaction with the infrastructures. Since they lack any independent validity, it is pointless to rank one form above another. Trotsky’s famous polemic against Rosa Luxembourg over the dissolution of the Russian Constituent Assembly rejects the idea that “the clumsy mechanism of democratic institutions” could possess any creative force.

Here we see the roots of the fatalistic attitude Europeans take toward institutions—if they perish, it is because they were already moribund, like a dried-out skin which is easily shed. Institutions are moribund by definition, bound as they are to outmoded stages in the ever-changing development of the means of production. This explains how, in a time of crisis, Europeans can discard any institution on which they happen to set their sights in a way which seems almost accidental and involves no moral struggles.

The same attitude, but working in reverse, accounts for the naïve impatience with which European revolutionaries upbraid their American counterparts: a revolutionary movement needs a revolutionary party; a third party must take on the task of unifying, centralizing, organizing, directing, putting into practice, and finally *institutionalizing* the revolutionary impulse.

Now for the respective relations to politics (or to social reality). It has often been said that, while the European struggle was political in character, the American struggle was more existential. This distinction is based on the premise that the European far-left exists in very clearly defined groupings—Trotskyism, Maoism, anarchism—while American groups defy such ideological labels.

Such an analysis is, however, open to question. It tends to ignore the highly significant fact that the crisis in America has been more the outcome

of large and specific political problems, such as the war in Vietnam. The American protest movement, moreover, by enlisting the sympathies of the most liberal elements of opinion, has been able to extend its influence into the decisive centers of political power. And, finally, the American movement has helped to bring about substantial changes in world political structures. For its part, the May uprising in France can claim only some modest changes in domestic politics: the long-expected but hazily visualized advent of Gaullism without de Gaulle, and the consolidation of a far-left force unable to penetrate the institutions of state but sufficiently unified and persistent to participate in tactical maneuverings within the left and in the left's dealings with Gaullism. Although its intent was the exposure of political bankruptcy, the protest movement in Europe was much more of a marginal incursion into the political sphere than it was in the United States, where the original motivation was cultural or existential.

We are now confronted with a paradox: the American far-left, which seems unpolitical in the long term, proves itself politically effective in a particular situation, while the European far-left, politicized to an extreme degree and on a permanent basis, produces negligible political results when put to any real test. The explanation is to be found in the tremendous range of social patterns in America, which assures each sector an autonomy with respect to the state, and an opportunity to deal freely with its own concerns. As a corollary, the sphere of political activity is confined to its own limits in space and time, limits which can be clearly located and defined. So, when the American crisis of the late 1960's finally assumed a specific political form, the Johnson administration, which had become and was seen to have become incapable of improvement, was replaced at the appointed moment and in the classic way by a new administration. In short, political ills received the standard political cure. In Europe, on the contrary—and especially in France—where government has gradually encroached on the social domain, this overlapping of domains makes it difficult for politics to remain free of things which are not its concern. To dwell on politics as one's central preoccupation, though to put it into practice only in militant terms (which are also oddly imprecise terms), to acquire only such theoretical or practical knowledge of it as can be drawn from reading magazines, to drag it in as a governing factor in all sorts of areas which would otherwise seem related to it only in minor and subsidiary ways—far from being a suspect or even a surprising procedure, is still considered praiseworthy and even constructive. Hence that classically European type of thinker and scholar who is untroubled by the speciousness of his telescoping together the elementary perceptions of an amateur politician and the sophisticated awareness of a professional student of culture.

Thus it is understandable that the university crisis had more severe repercussions in Europe, although the storm of protest on American campuses

was at least as violent. Faced with the irresistible political effects of the upheaval of May 1968, Edgar Faure tried to remedy the condition of the universities by a single powerful treatment—he legalized the ailment. It was a rash prescription, since the university as an institution could maintain its triple function—professional training, development of scientific knowledge, and transmission of cultural values—only if it reaffirmed its special status at an equal distance from the political and the social arenas, as an institution whose intrinsic form is exactly the opposite of the principle behind Faure’s plan—namely, the elimination of the political and the social.

But what is understood by the phrase “expulsion of the political”? Is it anything but a reactionary utopian stance? Do we imagine we can eliminate hail, or storms, or cold weather? Now this is the point at which to cut through a tangle of sophistries. Politics is the groundwork of history, but would there ever have been a historical discipline if historians had not formulated for themselves, as a challenge and as a limitation, the obligation to keep at a distance from the original political pressures? This is the law of an objectivity which everyone knows not to exist, but which constitutes all the same the deontological principle without which we would be confronted with meaninglessness.

François Bourricaud,²⁴ recalling Talcott Parsons’ concept of “cognitive rationality,” noted at the same time that all learning and all knowledge can be the object of ideological manipulation, but that the glory of science, its true dignity, is not to yield to that inclination. The scientific mind does not develop its own capacity for manipulation, but rather patiently and determinedly holds back the recurrent tide of ideology.

By a tentative process of approximation, each revolutionary movement has finally come to concentrate its activity on the areas where its particular society reveals its pathological ailments. It is not surprising, for example, that the Women’s Liberation movement in the United States is conspicuous for its vitality and survival, since it has settled upon the area where America has failed most disastrously. If it is true that “the spontaneous, natural, and necessary relation between human beings is fulfilled in the relation between man and woman,”²⁵ then the outlook is bleak for an America in which, despite its Biblical heritage, neither women (feminists) nor men seem to have retained the Scriptural words “You will then be called the man who is mine and not my master.”²⁶ Nor do they seem to have reflected on the role of an Eve “who does not possess her ‘primary significance,’ who is not a symbol of fertility, and who does not stand in a submissive relation. In her essential role, when she appears as necessary to God, she is characterized above all as an interlocutor.”²⁷ Simone de Beauvoir could exhaust all her energies, and the feminist movement would still not possess a similar authenticity in France, where male-female relations are not the most troubled area.

Europe, on the contrary, is most deeply stricken by the disruption of its two oldest and most influential systems of thought, communism and Catholicism. Just as, at the turn of the century, socialist revisionism and Christian modernism contributed to the spiritual crisis which preceded the First World War, so Khrushchev and Pope John XXIII, in the early sixties, were heralds of a new tempest. We can see why the crisis (whose cycle is still not completed) was experienced most intensely in France and in Italy.

We can conclude that, whatever the interconnections, the interferences, and the deleterious contacts facilitated by a highly developed communications network and the ease of international travel, the transference of symptoms is a hazardous procedure, because forces operate only within determinate systems. If commercial interests, constitutionally unable to conceive that the genuine reasons for America's success might reside elsewhere than in techniques of marketing or show business, are capable of suggesting that the Jesus Revolution might also "go over well in Europe," experience immediately proves them wrong. In France and Italy, where the revolutionary tradition is anti-religious and anti-Christian, a Jesus outside the reach of clericalism would not bring with him any of the hoped-for changes, since revolutionary Europe, at its most extreme, is looking not for Jesus but for a new faith.

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OMAR GRINE

America Against Itself: A Case of Democratic Anarchism?

AMERICA HAS long been admired for both its potential and its achievement. Many foreigners now, however, like many Americans, are beginning to ask: Is America really different from other nations? One of America's great assets as a nation—certainly the one that was most admired—was its self-confidence. Over the years, however, a crisis has developed. America's self-confidence appears to be undermined; Americans have less confidence in one another. The American government, losing public support, has become less effective in defining and achieving its objectives. This loss of confidence may be attributed to three causes: the elites are so divided and so confused that they cannot articulate meaningful goals for the society; ethical standards falter and the elites are in danger of losing their moral authority; the elites appear incapable of adapting the national ideologies to change.

Before discussing the current crisis it may be useful to define two concepts: the elites and ideology. The elites are groups of individuals whose legitimate authority is recognized by the community—that is, the recognized leaders and thinkers not only in government, but also in corporations, universities, foundations, trade unions, and similar social collectivities. Ideology is a set of selected or distorted ideas orienting responses about the social system or a class or classes of the social system. It can be safely said that the study of ideology is a study of elites. The reverse is also true. Therefore, the present crisis in America can be attributed to its elites. The political system cannot survive if its most vital element is not only divided but confused. The divisiveness and confusion have led to major disorders.

A remark made four years ago by the Prime Minister of Canada, Pierre Elliot Trudeau, in my view admirably sums up the current situation in the United States: "In a very real sense, civilization and culture in North America are more menaced by internal disorders than by external pressures."¹ These internal disorders are the result of a social and political confusion which goes back at least to the civil rights movement. Certain factors, mainly internal ones, have combined to cause a general sense

of unease, which has been termed a crisis in American purpose and a challenge to the success of the "American experiment." Americans no longer display that spirit which, in Andrew Hacker's phrase, "transforms a people into a citizenry and turns a territory into a nation."² American society appears to be moving toward an impasse. The authorities have so far proved unable to stop the divisiveness and reduce the causes of frustration. Observers have described what is happening as alienation, repression, revolution, helplessness, and the like. Its importance lies in the fact that it is not confined to any one group, but has been expressed by intellectuals, businessmen, "hardhats," "the man in the street," generals, Vice-Presidents, and even Presidents. America is at a threshold: in order to go forward and survive, it must continue to prove adaptable to change in its own society and in the world around it. Change is essential; an inability to change could prove fatal. A profound self-questioning is a healthy first step in the process of change. The need for change has been perceived by certain groups of the population who have taken a fresh and uncluttered look at the world around them and found many of the country's most treasured beliefs to be wanting and many of its institutions archaic. Government, business, religion, education—all have been severely criticized. Many Americans have lost their irrational faith in the eternal stability of their society. The arrogant belief in the uniqueness of America has been reduced to normal proportions: Americans have begun to realize that they are like others; moreover, they are not at all certain about what they want.

Although it is a healthy and even necessary first step, this period of questioning has a number of inherent dangers. If this stage continues for too long, there is a risk of undermining the basic foundations of the society. The task of reconstruction required by such an event would be far more difficult than the task of remodeling.

America has always impressed me as a country that has managed to institutionalize change and make it something of a religion. Unfortunately, most of man's institutions are highly resistant to change. This is as true in America as elsewhere, despite the fact that America was founded on a fundamental belief in change.

If the period between the perception of the need for a change and the arrival at a satisfactory means of effecting that change is prolonged, a crisis of legitimacy will often develop. The longer the internal disorders last, the more legitimate they become in the minds of people.

Radical protest is not new to America. Its history antedates American independence. The 1830's, 1840's, 1880's, and 1930's were all decades of major protest; in each of these instances, the system was sufficiently flexible to be able to adapt. That the current crisis has reached the proportions it has may be partly explained by the fact that this time the traditional ideology and the social system have not been sufficiently responsive to the demands for change made upon them. Because it is self-

regulating and self-maintaining, a social system operates so long as its vital elements are not destroyed. The most important of these elements are the elites.

The elites occupy a key position in the social system because they usually define the system itself—the culture and the ideology—and determine the changes that are to be brought about in the system. Elites define the ideologies that express the values and goals of social action and survival. The elites constitute the determining element in the system; all other elements derive from them. A system becomes stable when most members have internalized the values of the system as defined by the elites and have developed a common civic culture. In complex systems, such as the pluralistic American system, there are several elites incorporated in specialized systems, defining and directing the multiple cultures and ideologies. Thus any search for the causes of America's current crisis must begin with an examination of its elites and their response to change. Like all privileged groups, elites seek to maintain and enhance their positions in relation to other groups in society. Elites survive so long as their own concept of their legitimacy is accepted. This legitimacy involves, as S. M. Lipset noted in his *Political Man*, the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate for the society. The status of the established elites is threatened during a period of change; their legitimacy is maintained as long as they can effectively integrate insurgent groups and induce them to accept the political culture they have defined. If the new groups are not rapidly enough or effectively enough integrated, they may create a crisis of legitimacy to the point where they threaten the disintegration of society.

In America today the legitimacy of established elites has been challenged by new groups who are able, because of felt grievances, whether real or imaginary, to organize around values supposedly other than those of the elites. As they gain a significant following, they become counterelites. In the face of this challenge, the elites have tended to solidify themselves, limiting the access to power. In the process of defending themselves, the elites have perverted the symbolic values idealized by the society, making them instruments which they manipulate to justify their own authority. As this perversion is perceived by the counterelites, they exaggerate and distort further, stressing the elite's failures. The dominant elites tend to rationalize the slowness of change, while the counterelites refer to the "status quo" and emphasize its unchanging nature. The dominant elites distort the ideology of the counterelites, deriding it as "utopian." This ideological distortion is another important factor in the current disaffection and confusion and, as such, warrants further discussion. Harry Johnson has pointed out five general sources of ideological distortion: social strain, vested interests, bitterness in reaction to change, limited social perspective, and the persistence of outmoded traditions of thought.⁸

Among the causes of social strain are dissatisfaction with the functioning of the social system; a failure to achieve its values; cultural change; racism; and the urban crisis. An example from present-day America is the situation created by the ability of blacks to obtain certain jobs and the resulting anxiety and distortion in the minds of certain whites who feel threatened by the access of blacks to the social structure, believing that this may reduce their own chances of "making it." The bitterness of groups, social categories, or individuals who have lost social prestige, wealth, income, or authority is held by Johnson to be an important source of ideological distortion. These persons may think they see a far-reaching conspiracy against them and perceive the value system as decaying when more objective observers may feel that it has been invigorated by the social changes in question. Limited social perspective, resulting from a lack of firsthand knowledge of a situation, is an obvious source of distortion. One of the results of segregation has been a genuine lack of awareness of the extent of black deprivation, with the result that many whites actually believe that the value system has been well implemented.⁴ Finally, there is the persistence of outmoded traditions of thought, which can be summarized as a tendency toward rationalization; unconsciously, the truth is known, but it cannot be faced at the conscious level. This is exemplified in the racist who insists that he is not prejudiced.

For some time, the word "ideology" has had a bad connotation in America, where it is too often equated with totalitarianism and Marxism. This distortion was the result of a misunderstanding of the concept and of its application in America. Ideological politics has always existed, but no one ideology dominated because the operating ideologies were neither doctrinaire nor dogmatic in the traditional sense. Any member of a social movement can subscribe to one or several ideologies. If one ideology does not suffice, then several ideologies are internalized into a system of beliefs to create a sense of participation in a pluralist society. An ideology is necessary because the political system has become too complex to be understood by everybody. An ideology projects "wish fulfillments where knowledge is unavailable: it denies those realities whose existence it would repress; it enhances into ultimates what it prizes. An ideology is a world-system based on one's political and social feelings, an attempt, conscious or unconscious, to impose one's political will upon the nature of the universe."⁵

"Ideology fills the ignorance vacuum which is nothing but the uncertainty that men face in their daily life. Men need ideology particularly when there is a rise of pessimism, a loss of self-confidence, of hope in this life and of faith in normal human effort."⁶ The proponents of the end of ideology, confusing ideology and utopia, failed to see the problem of a lack of ideology. Irving Kristol has noted that they were motivated by the fear of ideology or of the destructive mass emotions that ideology has unleashed.⁷

Raymond Aron has suggested that ideology brings alienation down to human proportions. The force of ideology is the force of passion and commitment to an idea. "An ideology provides its possessor with self-justification and with a claim to action. It is something to believe in and to give orientation to one's life and experience. Ideology has a function analogous to religious commitment. The commitment effects a transformation in the life of the individual and . . . in the lives of those about him."⁸

The need for an ideology which can reduce alienation appears to have been heightened by the nature of modern bureaucratic and technocratic society. "The very shaping of history now outpaces the ability of men to orient themselves in accordance with cherished values. And which values? Even when they do not panic, men often sense that the old ways of thinking and feeling have collapsed and that the newer beginnings are ambiguous to the point of moral stasis. Is it any wonder that ordinary men feel that they cannot cope with the larger world with which they are so suddenly confronted? That they cannot understand the meaning of their epoch for their own lives? . . . What they need, and what they feel they need, is a quality of mind that will help them to use information and to develop reason in order to achieve lucid summations of what is going on in the world and of what may be happening within themselves."⁹

The situation has led certain social scientists studying contemporary social movements to suggest that there is something in the nature of highly industrialized society which encourages a tendency to mass movements. They explain that "in contemporary industrial society traditional groups and institutions have lost control over the loyalties and behavior of the individual. The weakening of primary group attachments and the impersonal character of large-scale organizations alienate men from the sources through which a democratic political process is mediated to its citizens and achieves its legitimacy. Such alienated people are easily mobilized around charismatic leaders and symbolic goals."¹⁰ In America today there is a profound dissatisfaction with the merely managerial and consumer-oriented qualities of the modern state and with a world which seems to generate crises by inertia. As Henry Kissinger has said:

The modern bureaucratic state, for all its panoply of strength, often finds itself shaken to its foundations by seemingly trivial causes. Its brittleness and the worldwide revolution of youth—especially in advanced countries and among the relatively affluent—suggest a spiritual void, an almost metaphysical boredom with a political environment that increasingly emphasizes bureaucratic challenges and is dedicated to no deeper purpose than material comfort.¹¹

The bureaucratic state is more and more dominated by self-perpetuating power concentrated in fewer and fewer hands.

The huge concentrations of economic power which have produced America's affluence have at the same time resulted in a loss of choice, perverting the ideal of an open society, where no one was supposed to be

trapped in one political community or dependent on a single political organization.¹² They also have political repercussions as more and more small businesses and merchants are absorbed by or become dependent on fewer and fewer large conglomerates. Most important of all is the concentration of power in the opinion-making industry—the media. Kingman Brewster has noted that the concentration of economic power creates a sort of closed loop. Politicians must raise money from corporations in order to pay the networks the enormous price of television time. Corporate advertisers call the networks' tunes and the networks are compelled to curry favor with the successful politicians to ensure their franchise.¹³ Therefore, the assumed openness of American society seems to be closing "not by conspiracy, but by the mutual dependence of a very small group of advertisers, media and politicians."¹⁴

Some have argued that there are ways to reopen the closing society and make it pluralistic again. But it can be done only if everybody makes the issue his cause. If "there appears to be no escape from this loop of social control . . . if there seems no easy way to break into the power circle, it is inevitable that 'confrontation' and 'pressure' should increasingly become the instruments of those who are frustrated."¹⁵

The search for an ideology which will resolve this confusion and provide an answer to the self-questioning has led naturally to a reexamination of the ideals on which America was founded and which are defined in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution—freedom, equality, justice, individual opportunity. This is the most fundamental factor in the present unease; it is here that the basic distortion becomes clear: America has been deceiving itself into thinking these ideals had become operative, when in reality its actions were far from the ideals in which its people profoundly believed. This fundamental truth was a basic element in the rise of the radical counterelite who perceived it and articulated it. They do not have new ideas: they are merely taking old ideas seriously and are advocating them as a basis for social change. They have realized what previous generations have chosen to ignore—that America has not lived up to its ideals. They are protesting the Constitution's promise of equality and the society's denial of it.

This is a very important change; concepts which used to be ideals have for the radicals become demands upon which they insist. What is behind the nonnegotiable demands is a belief in an inalienable right: the demands are the promises of the society which the "system" or "establishment" or "power structure" has not delivered. "When the radicals excoriated America in four-letter words, they were talking of more than the war or segregation. They meant that America had lied to them; and in a way that was the original sin."¹⁶ The fact that the society could continue in its hypocrisy has, in their view, deprived it of moral significance.

This brings us to another important element in the current crisis: the

question of moral purpose. The radicals have made the realization of a society with moral direction and moral purpose one of their basic tenets. In so doing they are advocating a fundamental change. "For if there is any single cardinal principle around which the American polity is constructed, it is that it is *not* the function of government to define the moral purpose of American life or provide the social discipline necessary to achieve this moral purpose."¹⁷ The importance of morals in politics is often defined by the radical ideologues as a change from the politics of consensus to the politics of conscience. The politics of conscience was born with the civil rights movement and has since spread to other sectors of American life. Many have been absorbed into the existing elite, becoming part of the "liberal establishment." The aims they profess are similar to those of the radicals, but they support more moderate methods, arguing that too much pressure provokes retaliation. "To ask for too much too soon results in getting nothing. To use vituperative language arouses emotions to a pitch that precludes rational consideration. To set up a clash of extremes precipitates sharp conflict and violence."¹⁸

The radicals have rejected the liberal establishment for its hypocritical maneuvering for self-advancement. They argue that the liberals have been co-opted by the system, and are less willing to put up a struggle for change.¹⁹ In response to this attack,²⁰ some liberals blame themselves for failing to transmit adequately to younger generations that side of the meaning of democracy that calls for logic and discipline.

But as Saint-Simon has noted, "moderation is not an active force. It is essentially timid, and, far from having the power to break long-established habits, it tends simply to confirm us in them."²¹ The main argument the radicals use against the liberal establishment is that it has not succeeded in implementing its professed goals through its methods. The evils which both groups perceive still exist: racism, poverty, war, manipulation, deceit, impersonal bureaucracies, and the hypocrisy that has divided "America's ideals from its actions from Watts to Saigon."²²

The radicals are rejecting American liberalism because it has become, in the words of Staughton Lynd, "corporate liberalism." They are committed to action because they are bored with the irrelevance of "solemn pretentious arguments about what Marx or Machiavelli or Rousseau really meant, about who was right and who was wrong."²³ They are afraid of being tempted by the same theoretical irrelevancies. Moreover, they have realized that "too much of what passes for theoretical discussion of public issues is really a personal dual for honor or privilege."²⁴

To understand better the reactions of the system—of the elites and counterelites—it is useful to examine a specific issue where the need for change has been widely perceived: the position of the blacks in American society. In the development of this issue the symptoms of the present crisis will be evident.

The first significant event in the current crisis may be said to have been the birth of the civil rights movement. The call for freedom brought attention to an area where American democracy had not lived up to its ideals. The movement was moralistic in orientation: it rejected not only racism, injustice, and hypocrisy but a whole life style. The civil rights struggle inspired the blacks to a certain political awareness; moreover, it gave them a voice with which to express their grievances. Since the mid-1950's, the blacks have transformed themselves from a traumatized and apathetic group into an apparently organized one, militant in its demands, though often only rhetorical. The problem, however, was not just knowledge, but the purposes to which knowledge could be put. The existing black establishment had been aware, but it had not organized its people for social contention.²⁵

The black protest grew out of urbanization, alienation, and group consciousness. Birmingham can be considered as a turning point in the movement. It was an eye-opener. Black communities in every city became aware of their potential power, while white communities became uneasy. It was the beginning of what Bayard Rustin called "creative social confusion." The black community moved from submission to protest to activism, increasingly convinced that, as James Weldon Johnson has put it, "the resort to force remains and will doubtless continue to remain the rightful recourse of oppressed people."²⁶ The movement has been limited by its two contradictory imperatives: the need to reject open revolt, coupled with the need to reject acceptance.²⁷ As a result of this contradiction, the four groups that have an explicit approach to resistance often conflict with one another. They are: "the accommodators, who accept segregation and strive for various modes of individual advancement; the moderates, who essay a middle course between accommodation and protest; the activists, who repudiate protest, accommodation and moderation and often seek confrontation; and the militants who express themselves through protest, violent or non-violent."²⁸ In the radicals' view, the commitment to "the system" and to individual advancement made the moderates losers before the start. They could make demands, but had to accept what whites would give. The radicals have argued that the unsuccessful moderate approach led the masses to despair. The radicals repudiated the politics of lobbying and introduced "the idea that every man was responsible for his own freedom and that he could not discharge that responsibility by contributing two dollars to an organization and voting on resolutions once a year."²⁹ They argued against the moderates that "people do not discriminate for the fun of it; that the function of prejudice is to defend interests—social, economic, political and psychological—and that appeals to the fair play of prejudiced people are prayers said to the wind."³⁰ Thus, year after year, demands from moderates as well as radicals grew on the rhetorical level, though actions remained cautious. Moderates, in a way, had

played the game of white segregationist society, in which the cards were stacked against them. They learned how much to ask, asked, and got very little. The unresponsiveness of the society thus created the radicals, who learned to overstate their demands in order to put themselves in a bargaining position.

The moderates have been caught between white insensitivity and the radical black activists who talk about overnight changes, but who compromise to realize moderate results. The radicals, because they moved fast and introduced so many issues into the debate, have also introduced a great deal of confusion—so much so that it is difficult to locate real issues and real leaders. As Lerone Bennett puts it: “It is hard in a revolutionary age to identify the real revolutionaries” because “it is easy to lose one’s way and one’s purpose in a revolutionary time.”³¹ This confusion has led people to question what the revolution is all about.

Bennett tried to explain it first by the theory of seven veils, a theory which suggests that the black rebellion is the product of the ripping away of successive veils of illusion. For example, black people believed for a long time that they would be admitted to the inner sanctums of power on their individual merits if they would only wash, dress up, and educate themselves. Nobody believes that anymore. Nor does anyone believe that litigation alone is the answer. And so the theory of veils—the ripping away of successive veils of illusion—the veil of education, the veil of litigation, the veil of integration.³² Another way of looking at the same issue is the theory of stages. Bennett sees four of them: (1) a passion stage, a pioneer period of subdued conflict marked by suffering and the problem of maintaining identity, under great pain and hardship, without being overcome; (2) an integration stage, where there are insufficient means for smashing the system; the oppressed demand only that they be integrated into the society that rejects them; (3) a stage of mass direct action; (4) a stage of nationalist rebellion.³³ In the fourth stage, people tend to become separatist because separatism is forced upon them.

The tactics of the black “establishment” can best be understood by comparing them to those of the radicals. Radicals seek a showdown; the establishment seeks an accommodation. The establishment says it is necessary to reduce racial tensions; radicals say it is necessary to raise them to the highest pitch. Radicals denounce white people; the establishment appeals to their sense of fair play. Radicals call for a revolt; the establishment calls for a conference. Radicals appeal to the masses; the establishment to the “better people.” Radicals march; the establishment confers. Radicals demonstrate; the establishment negotiates. Radicals demand; the establishment resolves.³⁴ The issue of leadership is also crucial in the comparison. The leaders of the black establishment are often chosen by whites, while the radicals are often self-appointed spokesmen.

Moderates are challenged for the changes they have not brought about.

Moderate leadership, because it is committed to "the system," functions as a buffer, almost a brake to social change. "Being neither 'in' nor without hope of getting 'in,' moderate Negro leadership encounters the difficulty of fighting and protesting against the very social system it wants to join. This means, in effect, that Negro leadership is not really fighting against the system, but against being left out of it."³⁵ The new awareness and impatience with the slow and ineffective efforts of the established black elites led blacks to move in greater and greater numbers to support the radical black power advocates, who thus became an almost full-fledged counterelite.

The radicals are trying to organize the black community. In fact, they have "organizations" all over the place. The names are resounding, but unfortunately a comment of Franz Fanon appears to be applicable: "If one takes the trouble to investigate what is behind the façade, if one goes to the inner room, one will be shocked by the emptiness, the blank space and the bluff."³⁶ The black radicals, like some leaders of developing countries, often give the impression of sensationalism. They have to have their crises, revolutions, press conferences, and strategy meetings. These men are at the head of empty organizations; Fanon spoke of Third World leaders of "empty" countries, "who talk too loud, are most irritating. You would like to shut them up. But on the contrary, they are in great demand. They are given bouquets, they are invited to dinner. In fact, we quarrel over who shall have them."³⁷ They fly from city to city, from conference to conference, talking about the black revolution, while trying to change the protest movement which cannot be revolutionary even with arms. It is obvious that in the creation of such leaders, the media have a powerful role. As Malcolm X noted: "It can make a criminal look like he's the victim, and make the victim look like he's the criminal. . . . If you aren't careful, the newspapers will have you hating the people who are being oppressed and loving the people who are doing the oppressing."³⁸

In the final analysis, however, it appears that the only thing revolutionary about the militants is their appearance and their rhetoric. They, like the moderates, have failed to come up with any really effective means of erasing racism. In fact, they have adopted it, in reverse, as they have realized how racist white America is.

The train of events outlined above involves not one but a number of similar issues where, following the perception of the need for change, the system has so far been unable to provide a workable means of effecting this change. The thrust of the protest movement was aimed at inclusion in the system. Rather than respond to empty rhetoric, the blacks wanted to fulfill the proclaimed values of American society. There was much talk about revolution, but the revolutionary mood of blacks did not constitute a danger to American society so long as the society offered a certain level of rewards at the same time that it asked

to repress the more radical elements. But the pseudo-revolutionary upheavals of the last few years have shown the confused state of society. It is unable either to concede meaningfully to demands or to repress the frustrations sparked by its responses to such demands.³⁹

Having brought large segments of the population to a general awareness of the need for change along a broad spectrum of areas, the counter-elites have proved unable to take the necessary next step and provide a solution. Meanwhile, the existing elite, unable any longer to ignore or deny the need, has proved equally unable to do anything meaningful about it; it is this impotence on the part of all the elites which is the factor that is most fundamental in the present confusion and crisis of confidence within America. The radicals have within their organization individuals who espouse the philosophies of revolution, adventurism, anarchism, socialism, existentialism, humanism, populism, black nationalism, separatism, mandarinism, and nihilism. An overview of the radical movement shows none have provided viable alternatives to the society they are rejecting; they are highly romantic.⁴⁰ The hard core of white radicals is made up of students organized around a major misconception: they believe that the university is a microcosm of the society. They reject the "bourgeois" system and its values—including materialism, puritanism, gain, individual competition. They reject reform because, as Aron said, "reform, once accomplished, changes something. A revolution seems capable of changing everything, since no one knows precisely what it will change Revolution provides a welcome break with the everyday course of events, encourages the belief that all things are possible."⁴¹

The radical movement says what it does not want, but it does not know what it does want. Radical leaders seem to have abandoned the idea of rethinking American society. Because that is too difficult, they confine themselves to condemning it. They are full of decent humanitarian exhortations, but quite empty in their political analyses. They reject the language of the experts, but have not developed an alternative language. They concentrate on tactics, seeking confrontation. They think in slogans and communicate in invectives.

As the late Professor Hofstadter pointed out, there is not much dialogue left in the intellectual community between those who are alienated from the society and those who are supposed to make an intelligent defense of it. Anyone with an idea on the subject has rushed to publish it. The accumulation of writings had grown geometrically, while dissent has grown arithmetically. This situation has been aptly described by Professor Hofstadter when he said that if he had to write a chapter on the 1960's he would call it "The Age of Rubbish."⁴²

The intellectual elites who are supposed to help develop ideologies to guide the social system have given up. In the name of "facts," they approach all major problems as though they were problems of technical

manipulation; they have not provided ideologies to interpret the "facts" of a social situation and to suggest meaningful solutions in terms of a particular reading of these self-same "facts."⁴³ The intellectual elites busy themselves studying the concepts and developing a new language in which criticisms could be formulated without a serious concern for the real questions around which the passionate political debates are taking place. The continuation of this state of affairs holds great dangers for the political and social system.

General discontent and demand for more change are not sufficient to organize and maintain a movement in a hostile environment. Agitation may help to focus general discontent, but it has little effect on the stability of the system. As Harold Cruse has observed, as long as uprisings are sporadic, the welfare state will absorb them; more than that, it will pay for the damage in the same way that the government pays for the destruction caused by hurricanes and floods. Uprisings are merely another form of extreme protest action soon to be included under the headings of "natural calamities."⁴⁴

This is too sanguine. If violence persists, authority is challenged and its legitimacy weakened. This tends to create a pseudo-revolutionary situation where the most important aspect is the split within the elites; this tends to reduce their control. The oppressed, black and white, see their suffering aggravated, which increases their activity. The established authorities, confused as a result of misunderstanding the nature of change, are willing to make concessions; the radicals use several crisis issues to revolutionize or radicalize the dissatisfied and the uncommitted in order to mobilize them against the established authorities; "limited claims begin to be translated into more fundamental claims. Expedient escalationism of demands is typically a revolutionary tactic designed deliberately to aggravate the situation and to compensate for initial revolutionary weakness."⁴⁵

The scope of a revolutionary situation can be increased by forcing the established authorities to overreact, an event which brings their legitimacy into question. Aware of this danger, the authorities seek to avoid a head-on confrontation on fundamental issues.

There is no doubt that one can find in the American political system all the "multiple dysfunctions" that are prerequisites for a revolutionary situation. The question to ask is whether America will deal with its domestic problems in the same way that it has dealt with Vietnam: that is, through the impotence of violence. No answer can be offered here. It is simply noted that in the current crisis American institutions have failed to respond to needs. People have had to adjust to rapid changes; institutions have resisted and often opposed change. America can show great economic achievement. America may have the best political system, but it needs reevaluation. It seems unable to adjust its values to changing

situations, and it cannot preserve them by violence without destroying what it seeks to maintain.

American values persist as ideals, not always fulfilled, and over the years the discrepancies between the proclaimed and the realized have resulted in unprecedented violence in cities, annulling the whole previous American attempt to achieve justice, social progress, and democracy. America, failing at home, cannot command great respect abroad. The crisis in values is shown by the protest of young Americans who seek to reify the principles they were brought up to believe. They are protesting violently because institutions were not responsive to their nonviolent protest. In many ways the recent violence is an escalation of tactics that did not succeed in the first phases. Legal redress, picketing, marches, sit-ins, strikes, and civil disobedience were not successful enough; institutions became obsolete and hence irrelevant to the problems.

An analysis of the political system indicates that it is not equipped for the exigencies of a great national crisis. As Clinton Rossiter has said, three types of crises are recognized as justifying governmental resort to dictatorial institutions and power: war, rebellion, and economic depression.⁴⁶ In such conditions there may be a voluntary transfer of authority and power to the executive, which assumes broader prerogatives, resulting in a reduction of the citizen's freedom. One can speculate whether the problems confronting America have now reached the stage where they are perceived by the people as constituting a crisis of one or more of these types and thus to warrant, in their minds, the exercise of dictatorial power.

The American people have always impressed me with their inner optimism. They can react greatly to a great crisis. They can again combine moral autonomy and legitimate authority to secure effective government.

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CELSO LAFER

The United States: A View from Brazil

THE UNITED STATES is today a global power, and even though it is not paramount in every area or region, it is the focus on which the world system is defined. This so-called “unifocalization”—the term is George Liska’s—implies that the definition of any state with respect to the United States is the key definition for the operational role and status of that state in the present world system. In a period of linkage politics, when behavior that originates in the United States can affect other people and institutions, the problem is not simply one of international relations, but of self-identification as well. For Brazil, the question, quite clearly, is what can we do and what is our situation vis-à-vis the United States.¹

This question is a real one for Brazilians and for many others outside the United States. It legitimates the study of the United States by those who are subject to American influence and who—like myself—have had an opportunity to live and study in the United States. The observations I offer are tentative; they are something more than impressions and something less than a systematic analysis.

The United States has long perceived itself as embracing a liberal consensus; the absence of a feudal past—recalling Louis Hartz’s well-known thesis—is supposed to have contributed to a tendency for pragmatic compromise and adjustments among divergent groups and interests, this being the consequence of the full development of an egalitarian and pluralistic society. The origin of the society is said to reside in the historical pattern of independent and autonomous colonies, of different religious persuasions, which contributed to religious, political, and economic tolerance within a Lockean framework.² The complexities of industrialized mass society are thought to have brought about the development of a particular formula within this framework, the special brand of American pluralism. The political solution in modern complex societies, given the impossibility of a direct relationship between the individual and the State, depends on the conciliation of new needs with classic aims in order to have a system of representa-

tion that can operate effectively. According to the pluralist view, the members of American society try and succeed in defending their interests through spontaneous private associations that are coordinated, regulated, contained, and stimulated by the apparatus of the federal government which, in the process, is supposed to protect the public interest. These private associations channel specific demands and supplement the deficiencies of the classic system of formal representation. American pluralism, as described above, probably reached its apex with the New Deal when the Democratic Party was able to form a majority coalition through uniting several minority groups.

The formula, however, has its difficulties and is far from perfect. To begin with, it makes little provision for the problem of the control and responsibility of the bureaucracy that is a central mechanism of the federal government. Who judges if the federal government really expresses the public interest through policies which are a result of its interaction with disjointed segments of the society? An evaluation of several approaches to administrative responsibility—control through the rule of law, executive supremacy, legislative supremacy, corporate objectivity of the scientific standards of a technical peer group—to mention only a few of the approaches critically analyzed by Arch Dotson, shows that they are unfeasible, principally because those who would or do have formal authority to control do not have the comprehensive ability to assess the complexities of the policies they would control. Moreover, policies that are a result of pluralism are not and probably cannot be comprehensive in scope, since there are cognitive limits to a synoptic ideal. They thus derive from the perception of certain isolated facts and values; these establish the premises on which decisions are taken. The intelligence network of pluralism that is supposed to provide the feedback, that in its turn leads to evaluation and change under these premises, has proved unsatisfactory in the contemporary American crisis. It has thereby hampered the implicit or explicit assumption that if everything else fails, the “hidden hand” will furnish decentralized and self-regulating elements of control and responsibility. One is forced to conclude that pluralism is not a utilitarian felicific calculus of the public interest; this conclusion is the link with the second imperfection of the formula. In fact, as such critics of pluralism as Robert Paul Wolff and Peter Bachrach have pointed out, not all members of American society are able to organize themselves in private associations and consequently reach the political plateau where demands are considered and examined. There is, moreover, a certain similarity between feudalism and pluralism; interest groups that arrive at the plateau of the American political system are like medieval “states”; their weight is not proportional to their numbers. Hence, another inequalitarian feature of the formula: “labor” and “business,” for example, while considered as equivalent, are not always such. The end result of these imperfections has been that important sectors

of American society have been organized out of its political system; their demands and values do not reach it. Pluralism provides an only partial intelligence system, since it has ignored injustice, tolerated privilege, and seized the "public interest" in a restricted way.³

The political mobilization of certain sectors of American society, previously ignored, which is now occurring, is producing a dramatic impasse. Negroes, chicanos, and the so-called "pockets of poverty" were not significant participants in the pluralist process. One of the major effects of these developments is the general recognition of what can best be described as a legitimacy crisis. The crisis expresses itself in acute outbreaks of violence. Those who demonstrate denounce the pluralistic formula; it is viewed by many marginal elements as a club with limited membership. The hypocrisy that is felt to exist causes some to experience what Hannah Arendt implied when she spoke of *engagés* being turned into *enragés*. This legitimacy crisis is also expressed by the otherness of "dropouts"—the "hippies," the drug-addicts, and all the other members of the counterculture. It is conspicuously present in the critique made of the American system by the universities, the intelligentsia, and the liberal press. This critique of men and women troubled by the horrors of the Vietnam war and concerned over the deliberate manipulation of information to suit the image-making needs of those who hold power reinforces the credibility gap that has developed with respect to the pluralist formula. I do not think it would be an exaggeration to suggest that this is clear evidence of a certain incongruity between important sectors and segments of American culture and politics. This incongruity in the relationship of the government and the civil society has produced doubts about America's "manifest destiny"; these doubts have served to undermine the hegemonic belief of the United States. According to many Americans, their system's internal and external exercise of power carries no moral enlightenment in its wake. So serious is the shattering of the "American dream" that some, like Andrew Hacker, have viewed the present crisis as a time of decline, the first large step toward the end of the American Era.⁴ But is it so?

The incongruity in the relationship between State and civil society is not exclusively an American dilemma. It is a worldwide phenomenon. The irresponsibility and lack of control of the bureaucracy—the rule of nobody—and the impasse of participation are overriding issues in many places. France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Japan, Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, the whole of Latin America, China—just to mention a few countries, regimes, and regions—have all been cursed with the problem. In this sense, as Octavio Paz has wisely pointed out, 1968 was an axial year. The crux of the question is not whether a crisis exists, but what the chances are of overcoming it in a constructive manner. This, I submit, is a distinct possibility in the United States. In fact, if the Gordian knot of the dilemma is the absence of an

adequate responsiveness by the State toward civil society, it is worth pointing out that the American civil society is perhaps the least helpless of all, for reasons that are intimately tied to the political development of the United States.⁵

J. P. Nettl, in characterizing the State as an independent conceptual variable, examined it from an international point of view. The degree of autonomy and the primacy of the State—as a distinct sector or arena of society—will vary from country to country.⁶ The establishment of boundaries, responsible for the existence of a political system—what is sometimes defined as the common experience of a national memory—may be preponderantly organized around the State. Such, for example, is the case in most of Europe; it is obviously true of the historical experience of France and is no less important in the cultural tradition of Italy and Germany. One needs only to recall, for the sake of argument, the development of the “General Theory of the State” by authors such as Bluntschli, Jellineck, Herman Heller, Hans Kelsen, Giorgio del Vecchio, Felice Battaglia, Carré de Malber, and Jean Dabin, or the autonomous existence and jurisdiction of administrative law, as revealed in France, Germany, and Italy in the works of Gaston Jèze, Marcel Walline, Otto Meyer, V. E. Orlando, Santi-Romano, and Guido Zanobini.⁷ Such is also, and most obviously, the case in Latin America, which from its very beginning was the deliberate creation of the Spanish and Portuguese States. If one looks at Brazil, for example, the country’s whole political development may be defined with some exaggeration as a conflict between a private order and the State, in which the State has gradually come to control, by cooptation but also by force, the whole of civil society, so much so that today all that is left of political life are the intrabureaucratic disputes over which the citizenry has precious little control and almost no information.⁸ Such political systems may be characterized as having a high degree of “stateness.”

Other political systems have had their common experiences organized in different ways by kings, leaders, churches, parties, and armies. The extent of State authority is intimately related to such factors. In England, for example, the degree of “stateness” is reduced by the importance of the monarchy and the political parties in the country’s national memory. The consequence, inevitably, has been a more autonomous civil society, as may be seen, for example, in the independence of such organized interests as industry and the trade unions from the State. This is particularly evident when comparisons are made with such countries as France or Brazil.⁹ The United States’ pattern, from its colonial inception to the present, is more analogous to the English situation than it is to many others, in spite of the original fear of “big government” and the fact that such government exists today. Federalism, the rule of law, and the separation of powers, have led, as Richard Neustadt and Samuel Huntington have argued, to “a government of separated institutions sharing power” with “a fusion of functions and a division

of power.”¹⁰ This particular situation, which expresses the “stateness” variable, explains why civil society in the United States is not so helpless as it might be. It is also fundamentally important in understanding the extraordinary vitality that exists beneath the surface of the American crisis.¹¹

As is generally known, political systems are dynamic systems. They change as they perform, and their vitality over time is linked to their capacity to respond to change through partial or total rearrangement of their institutions and of the sets of criteria on the basis of which decisions are made within these institutions. In other words, their viability is linked to their learning capacity.¹² The challenge to the learning capacity of the American political system is in no sense negligible; beneath the present crisis there is an obvious need for a democratic rearrangement of the State to cope with the new and difficult functions that affect everything, including the transition from welfare to economic abundance. The obstacles to a rearrangement of institutions and a modification of criteria are formidable indeed. The tendency for the executive power to grow will probably be increased as the regulative functions of the State are enlarged to cope with factors like automation. As machines come to replace men in the economic sphere, and as the power of management vis-à-vis labor develops, there will be a corresponding crisis in the political sphere. Many more will depend on the State’s capacity to arbitrate differences; the formulation of equitable redistributive policies will become critical. Consequently, given the present situation and the trend toward a greater concentration of political and economic power, the prospects for participation and for a politically responsible State are not encouraging. This can only occur as the result of a conscious effort by the civil society.¹³

What I would like to suggest, as a working hypothesis, is that the present crisis in the United States is, in part, the result of such an effort being made by the civil society. This effort has been possible only because the particular political development of the United States has made American civil society less helpless than it might otherwise have been. That is why it is important to try to evaluate the ways in which American civil society is capable of expressing its discontent with the decline in the performance of the pluralist formula—a decline that is at the heart of the political aspects of the present crisis.

Albert O. Hirschman has recently shown in his study of the relationship between politics and economics how the decline in firms, organizations, and States can be curbed by a combination of market and political articulation mechanisms. The first Hirschman calls *exit*. It includes not only switching to other products, but also abandoning an organization. The second Hirschman designates as *voice*. Both are balanced by *loyalty* and provide in certain conditions new and indispensable feedback that is capable of rousing the learning capacity of a system in a process of crisis and decline. The interplay of exit, voice, and loyalty will vary from place

to place, depending as it does on the environment and the past history of firms, organizations, and States. Their optimal mix is, of course, elusive. If one makes use of these categories in the political study of the present impasse involving participation and responsibility, one can demonstrate that in most political systems, where the "stateness" variable is predominant, civil society is without an adequate voice because it is helplessly incapable of autonomous organization. It is thus disqualified from political action and is in a certain sense "locked in." The only internal possibility of exit is inner-withdrawal, a woefully inadequate solution as demonstrated, most tragically, by the German experience under Nazism. The light that "men in dark times" can shed, though positive, is indeed very limited, as Hannah Arendt has reminded us. In the United States, however, the public realm remains vital; as a consequence, politics has not been reduced, as in so many other places, to squabbles within an almost predominant and autonomous arena of the State.

In fact, in an era of almost worldwide censorship and restrictions, the First Amendment has guaranteed in the United States not only freedom of speech and of the press and the right to petition (the institutional possibility of voice) but also the right to assemble (the institutional conditions for an autonomous civil society). That is why a combination of mechanisms of exit and voice can have such great impact. Examples abound: Ellsberg's withdrawal from government employment (exit) and the subsequent publication by the *New York Times* of the secret Pentagon papers (voice); the institutionalization of the consumer's voice, through Ralph Nader; civil disobedience; the possibility and practice of voluntary associations for the pursuit of certain goals—which Tocqueville discerned so clearly in his analysis of American democracy and which are evident in the peace demonstrations; the political radicalization of dissenters, including blacks and women, who are out of the mainstream of American life and therefore out of power, but whose shrill voice is a constant reminder of the deterioration of the quality of life and politics.¹⁴ All these, and many other illustrations, show that in the United States the restoring mechanisms of exit and voice are truly at work. What their ultimate impact will be is, of course, an open question. The important thing to emphasize is that in the United States the possibility of effective action remains; in many other places, where the State has overwhelmed civil society, there is not an equivalent hope.

I personally find encouraging the largely independent and truly extraordinary amount of experimentation that takes place in American civil society. From experiments in personal relations to major cultural innovations, many of them pervaded by a questioning of the prevailing values of a consumer society, there is a perpetuation of the romantic and utopian strain that is in a way part of the American tradition. The stakes are immensely high, not only because the United States may eventually set an important

example of how the State and civil society can be made more compatible, but also because such a compatibility and congruency, were they to occur, would have a worldwide impact.

In the introduction to this article, reference was made to the preponderant role of the United States in the international system and to the importance of linkage politics in present-day political processes. This situation has helped to transform the study of the United States by some non-Americans into a question involving their own identification, since the study of the United States inevitably entails an assessment of the autonomous viability of their own political systems. What, then, are the possible external impacts of a positive internal rearrangement in the United States that could be one of the results of the American crisis?

Until recently, the American Empire was a functional empire, with an adequate synchronization of its own internal culture, economy, politics, and society. It was an empire without frontiers, a natural outcome of the internal development of the American economy which was linked in its external expansion to a search for raw materials and markets. The power of the empire was exercised to a considerable extent in an indirect manner: decentralized manipulation by American corporate interests, using incentives and disincentives that involved investments, disinvestments, and the like. The internal access of these corporate interests to the American government was, of course, guaranteed by the pluralist formula.

The crude realities of the Vietnam war brought to the forefront an awareness that if empire-building had not been an explicit American goal, empire-maintenance had been a deliberate policy aim. The war suggested also that in extreme situations the subtleties of indirect power could be replaced by the brutality of naked, military might, with most unfortunate consequences. This new awareness, which is central to the present crisis in the United States, is leading to a serious questioning of whether the American external exercise of indirect power, internally supported by the pluralist formula, is desirable or not. If the answer is no, and if it can be demonstrated that an alternative policy, more compatible both with greater autonomy in the international system for other countries—and I am thinking principally of Latin America—and with a more comprehensive American point of view, the advantages of this new outlook could be very substantial. However, such a policy would almost certainly harm the specific interests of certain large corporations, which would stand to lose advantages and privileges. Since the public interest, by the pluralist formula, is not always the result of the interactions of particular interests being mediated by the federal government, the chances are good that the “public interest” can be defeated by the strength of particular interests, thereby jeopardizing not only a better internal functioning of the American political system, but also its external relations. Everything suggests, as Hélio Jaguar-

ribe has pointed out, that only a major redistribution of income and power within the American society—as proposed by the critics of pluralism—will bring about, simultaneously, the development of a real and effective democracy, together with a more balanced internal growth of the economy, which is today too dependent on the oligopolistic control of international markets. In other words, the comprehensive functional requirements of the American system suggest that there is a real need for a new way to make American culture, politics, economy, and society more compatible and congruent. If this new way is found, as a result of the stimulus to the learning capacity of the American system that the present crisis has produced, this could have a beneficial effect on the international relations of the United States. They could become more communitarian and less imperial, with greater reciprocity and responsiveness than exist in today's predominantly one-way interactions. America's "public interest" might be made, as a consequence of this possible favorable internal rearrangement, more compatible with the "public interest" of other countries.¹⁵ Non-Americans, especially Latin Americans, are not casual bystanders who have no interest in these developments. On the contrary, it is our hope that the potentialities of the United States—its *virtù*—will set ajar its *fortuna*, permitting us to realize our own autonomous potentialities. But hope is no certainty. Do I correctly hear Whitman's opening line ". . . America singing the varied carols"?

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JOHN MADDOX

American Science: Endless Search for Objectives

NOBODY FROM Europe (to which Britain now nearly belongs) can easily shake off a sense of wonder at the success of American science and technology in the past few decades. In spite of giants such as Willard Gibbs and G. N. Lewis, it appears to be the next best thing to a fact that Robert Oppenheimer's most important contribution to American science was to bring back from Europe the tale of how the Copenhagen school succeeded, in the late 1920's and early 1930's, in turning quantum mechanics from a theoretical explanation of some obscure phenomena in physics into a scientific tool of immense power. To be sure, Oppenheimer's return from Europe to America was quickly followed by the involuntary emigration of such people as Enrico Fermi, Edward Teller, and Eugene Wigner, but with Ernest Rutherford and Niels Bohr to keep the European flag flying, it was entirely understandable that European science in the 1930's should have regarded American science as a derivative culture. And in any case, were not the first observations of nuclear fission made in the Old World, not the New?

What puzzles Europeans is that by the end of the 1940's, it had become apparent that American science was at once more healthy and more self-confident than the scientific culture from which it appeared to have sprung. It is true, of course, that in the years immediately after the Second World War British scientists were busily laying the foundations of many currently exciting fields of scientific research. With the experience of the development of wartime radar sets to help them, two still influential groups of British scientists were building the first radio telescopes, the consequences of which have been a broadening of the cosmological problem. At Cambridge University, the foundations were being laid for what is now called molecular biology, and in several different ways, small teams of British scientists were paving the way for the doctrine of continental drift: Patrick Blackett at Manchester was measuring the magnetism of ancient rocks so as to provide a kind of history of the magnetism of the earth and the movement of the continents about it, oceanographers such as Maurice Hill (now dead) and Bryan Matthews were puzzling away at the unexpected prop-

erties of the sea bed, while the old tradition of Cambridge nineteenth-century physics prepared people's minds for the view that the earth may not be a rigid entity at all, but a malleable, almost plastic entity. And then there were the sparkling cosmologists, with their notions of continuous creation and with their outrageous dedication to the unthinkable. How can such promise have brought so much less than might have been expected?

Among British scientists in particular, but especially among the politicians who support them, it is customary to say that British science is good at innovation and that American science and particularly American technology are good at exploitation. In retrospect, of course, it is a puzzle and something of a scandal that a country such as Britain, which contributed in important ways in the 1930's to understanding the movement of electrons in solids, had been surprised to read in the newspapers in 1949 about the invention of the transistor. Might not many of the economic difficulties which have plagued Britain since the Second World War have been avoided if only British industry had been more perceptive and more energetic? And is it not cruelly disappointing that contributions to the understanding of computers as important as those which Hans Thuring made in the years immediately after the war should still have left a situation in which IBM could outsell the British computer industry with one hand tied behind its back? No attempt by a European, especially one from Britain, to describe the quality of American science can be entirely free from the common belief that American science owes more than it is willing to admit to the doings of the Old World before and immediately after the Second World War.

This, however, is a chauvinistic illusion. British science, and most of the science on the European mainland, is still informed by the sense of string and sealing wax which made the Cavendish Laboratory a mecca for physicists in the two decades before the Second World War. There was and there still persists a sense that a scientific discovery is somehow more desirable if it has been made with slender resources. The rudimentary bits of pieces of glass and brass that had been good enough for Rutherford's laboratory technician, a genius in his own right, were surely the most that British scientists could aspire to. And is it not, in any case, not merely perceptive but clever to make a discovery with pieces of apparatus which could be bought for two and sixpence in any hardware store? That tradition is now much weaker than it used to be, but it has not yet been entirely exorcised.

Europeans are now impressed and much changed by recognizing that scientific discovery is indeed an occupation for professionals and not amateurs. The most spectacular proof of this remains the Manhattan Project. Nuclear fission was first recognized in Berlin, and its significance was appreciated in Copenhagen. Niels Bohr was carried uncomfortably to Britain and Walter Halban and Léon Kowarski spirited five liters of heavy water

out of France in much the same way, but most people in Europe will acknowledge that even if there had not been a war to fight, no European organization could have made a nuclear explosive out of uranium in the astonishing interval of four years. By European standards, the Manhattan Project was at once too big a gamble (although \$2,000,000,000 now seems an almost trivial sum for such an outcome) and too great a commitment of valuable resources to putting flesh on the bones of a theoretical proposal. Although European communities are proud of their science, they are not often daring enough to think that bright ideas can be made realities except in the fullness of time. The partnership between the arrogant assertions of the laboratory scientists and the dutiful but driving energy of American industry that produced the first nuclear explosives remains the most striking illustration of how the United States has made science into an ingredient of economic life.

Why, then, was the Manhattan Project so successful? In retrospect, there is no doubt that the success of the program to make the first nuclear explosive sprang directly from the partnership between essentially academic scientists, convinced that the job could be done, American industry, certain that it knew how, and the American military, buoyed up with the conviction that nuclear explosives would spell not merely the end of the Second World War, but also a radical transformation of military technology as a result of which the United States would gain a permanent advantage over its rivals. Although there were other occasions during the war when governments and their armed forces were prepared to back what was in effect little more than a piece of scientific ingenuity—the British government's support for military radar in the years immediately before the war began is another example—the sense of equality between the scientists engaged in the Manhattan Project and their military customers was at once unprecedented and a portent for what was to happen to the public place of science in the United States in the decades after the war. The fact that Oppenheimer at Los Alamos could be at loggerheads with the military over security, and that there should have been not merely rivalry but tension between the laboratories at Los Alamos, Chicago, and Ottawa (not to mention outright discord between Oak Ridge and Lawrence's laboratory at Berkeley) is not, in retrospect, a sign that the scientific establishment was unsure of its ground but, rather, a measure of its self-confidence. Mere pensioners would not be nearly so free to quarrel among themselves or with their patrons.

It is ironic that President Eisenhower, of all people, should have been the one who, in 1960, coined the term "military-industrial complex." Although it is now common among American scientists to suspect not merely the motives of this partnership between industry and the military, but also the occasions on which scientific activity is sponsored by it, the fact remains that for fifteen years after the Second World War, the most

characteristic feature of American science was the closeness of its relationship with this now frequently reviled institution. In the 1940's and 1950's, American science was often the innovator of grand projects and, at the same time, one of the government's chief sources of advice about the advantages and disadvantages of innovations. The methods worked out, originally in the field of military technology, for channeling money to apparently worthwhile groups of scientists were adapted for use elsewhere, in biomedical research, for example. The habit of consulting scientists on government business became so strongly entrenched in the United States immediately after the war that, for a time at least, American scientists were envied by their colleagues elsewhere for their influence on public policy and, so it seemed, for being placed so near the center of power that they could expect to defend scientific activity from the parsimony of public officials. The present alienation of American science from the military-industrial complex, incomplete though it may be, is therefore a great turnabout which is, perhaps, to be compared with the post-oedipal hostility of a spoilt child for his once indulgent parent.

In the years immediately after the Second World War, American science was lavishly endowed by the standards which applied elsewhere. As with Marshall Plan aid, so with the activities of organizations such as the United States Office of Naval Research, and a good deal of American money found its way to Europe. Nobody knows how many European scientists made their first crossing of the Atlantic in some air transport operated by the Military Air Transport Service (MATS), with simulations of military orders made out in octuplet as if meant for real soldiers, but with an invitation to some scientific conference to make their journey necessary; the proportion must be very large. The Office of Naval Research had made its reputation as an enlightened sponsor of scientific research even before the war was over. Thanks to Vannevar Bush, the principle was quickly accepted elsewhere—and wholeheartedly endorsed by the scientific community—that scientific research was a powerful and even essential long-term guarantee of a nation's capacity to look after its own interests, not merely in military affairs, but in economic competition as well. The result was that the Office of Naval Research became itself an important sponsor of a great variety of academic research, from radio astronomy to molecular biology. Without asking whether high energy physics could ever be seriously considered relevant to the practical problems of nuclear weapons and nuclear reactors, the United States Atomic Energy Commission became the principal constructor of machines for accelerating nuclear particles and the fairy god-mother to those who danced attendance on them.

Vannevar Bush's doctrine of the strategic importance of research and development led naturally enough to the institutionalization of science in Washington. The President's Science Advisory Committee was a natural step (but would Roosevelt have been as receptive as was Truman?). And

the host of potential grant-giving agencies—the armed services, the Atomic Energy Commission, and eventually the National Institutes of Health—required that there should be an army of scientists willing to travel to Washington (and few were not) to consult, to give advice, to decide to whom grants should go, and even to tell Congress what they thought it should do or, sometimes, simply what they thought. This involvement of working scientists with the government machine is without precedent and without parallel. For most of the interval since the Second World War, it has been a model for scientific establishments elsewhere. And although the representation of American science in Washington has been diminishing ever since the assassination of President Kennedy, this coziness in the relationship between American science and the American government has left its mark on the present.

It is only fair to say that the sponsorship of American science by the government would have been much less easy if it were not for the willingness of American universities and colleges to devote an increasing part of their energy at faculty level to scientific research. Although the launching of the first sputnik in 1957 was a great shock to everybody, and although the National Academy of Sciences then pleaded for (and got) public recognition that high school science must be improved, the growth of American science in universities and colleges in the years immediately after the war was in its way a revolution in the sociology of higher education. To be sure, it was lucky for all concerned that this was also a period during which American families had come to regard university education as a kind of necessity for the young, like plenty of milk to drink in infancy and driving lessons later on, with the result that states were willing and indeed proud to provide the funds needed to let the state universities grow. It is also, in retrospect, lucky for the American universities that there was at the time a plentiful supply of trained people in Europe who could be persuaded to follow the emigrants of the 1930's to the United States not merely by the availability of equipment for research (which was the respectable excuse), but also by the promise of higher pay and better prospects. Britain was so convenient for the headhunters that at least a part of the intimacy which still exists between British and American science stems from the great brain drain of the 1950's. The recruiting sergeants are no longer calling at British universities, and many American visitors now shyly let it be known that they would not be entirely averse to the offer of a good job. But times have only just changed in that intriguing sense, and it is too soon to know what the outcome will be.

The sudden availability of money for research from government agencies created the present temper of American science, which disaffection with the military-industrial complex has not removed. First, it brought individual prosperity, or at least the expectation of individual prosperity. There are still those teaching in American universities who explain that in the 1930's

they had to earn their Ph.D.'s while working as half-time assistants, half-salary for half-time teaching. What graduate student would now suffer such an indignity without complaint? And, for that matter, what university would think of staffing its science departments with young men and women without a Ph.D. and several years of postdoctoral experience as well? The trouble, of course, is that the slavish attachment to the marks of attainment which now characterizes the American scientific academic may in the long run be an impediment to spontaneous innovation. Where was your Ph.D.? Who was your teacher? How long did it take to get? What are your publications? How many are they? And are they in reputable journals? These are the kinds of questions which professionals ask each other or of each other as often as ordinary mortals ask each other where they met their wives (or husbands). Although nobody would for a moment deny that the profession of science in the United States has succeeded in attracting an army of the brightest people ever to have worked as scientists, it is a surprise to many people outside to see how solemn so many of them are. Is there just a chance that in converting science from a pursuit for enlightened amateurs into a way of life, much of the spontaneity that there might have been has been ironed out? Time, perhaps, will tell.

A second consequence of the transformation of American science by the Second World War, and by far the most important, was the development of the grant-giving system. The Office of Naval Research, preaching what was enlightenment in the 1940's, took the view that the national interest required it to back the brightest people. Yet public propriety (and the requirements of the budgetary process) required that there should be applications for grants of money to carry out particular tasks. So the patron and the researcher would agree on a contract for carrying out some piece of research, the outcome of which was often in the nature of things unknowable, and the researcher's institution would collect an overhead payment which, with careful husbandry, might be a great help with the building of a library or for paying salaries in the classics department. And, of course, given the budgetary system, contracts and outright grants for research were necessarily limited in time. Three years might for many agencies with money to spend on research seem to imply a confession to Congress that no practical objective would be attained. Certainly, again to outsiders, it is something of a mystery that academic scientists in the United States have been able for so long to live with short-term research grants and contracts, many of which have endured for eighteen months or even less.

The consequences, still apparent, are mixed, but are, on balance, probably unfortunate. It is true that the willingness of grant-giving agencies to consider applications for money from all kinds of sources and not simply from heads of university departments was an influence on the side of the angels, an assurance that young men and women at American uni-

versities would not be perpetually oppressed by their seniors (even if a successful application might occasionally have meant that they would have to pack their bags and move elsewhere). In any case, university administrations were from the start sufficiently aware of the advantages of overhead payments as a contribution to the general cost of running the university for them to have favored expansion at somebody else's expense, whatever the direction. The same institutions for awarding grants to deserving applicants, often on a short-term basis, have helped to ensure that senior academics would have to find other ways of occupying themselves, in teaching perhaps or even in scholarship, once their credit with the grant-giving agencies ran out.

These are valuable and even enviable side effects. The trouble with the grant and contract system, at least in the pure way in which it has been pursued in the United States, is that it has also created an entirely unnecessary degree of competitiveness among colleagues and between institutions, that it has—against the odds—sometimes trivialized research, and that it has frequently made a monkey of the grant-giving institutions as well. For me, all these consequences were nicely embodied in the occasion not so long ago when the distinguished head of a distinguished laboratory kept us all waiting for dinner while he and his two assistants “roughed out” a grant application to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration to finance the development of an instrument for an exotic spacecraft. The deadline for grant applications was only ten days away (there had originally been thirty days, but some of the participants had been away). Nobody knew for sure whether the laboratory would have the staff or even the inclination to carry out the contract, but somebody had recognized, late in the day, that it would be a splendid carrot with which to induce a departed colleague to return. One practical trouble was that the man concerned was leaving that weekend for abroad and would be required to provide not merely enthusiasm, but one or two pages of detailed work on the instrument. The roughing out took half an hour and the application was in on time. The departed colleague eventually came back, and nobody was much downcast when, two years later, the whole project was canceled. For is it not the case that all these years NASA has been saying that none of the money that it spends is sent to the moon—it stays behind on earth, to fill the pockets of terrestrial beings? And plainly many canceled projects are in this sense well worthwhile.

As grants have become harder to come by, American scientists appear to have become increasingly preoccupied with the competition for what seems to be a diminishing pot of gold. Earlier this year (1972), a distinguished scientist on sabbatical leave in London from his university in the Midwest was explaining how hard he found it to reconcile his academic interest in photochemistry, in which he had been luxuriating for more than six months, and the need to read up on cancer so that, on his return to the

United States in midsummer, he would be able to go straight to Washington and bring back (with luck) a share of the pot of gold to keep him and his students busily at work during the hard winter. The good photochemist acknowledged that if Congress wanted cancer research, and if the support for photochemistry pure and simple had diminished, then he would do his best to oblige. This is a practical illustration of how the grant-giving system can be used deliberately to change the pattern of university research, and in that sense it is a device which many other countries envy. The snag is that not even the photochemists can be sure that the Congress which has just willed more cancer research will keep on willing cancer research. Will it be heart disease next? And although it is right and proper to ask that scientists should be more intellectually flexible, there are limits to the extent to which they can change their interests to suit the public will. Too much flexibility is intellectually unseemly.

In the past, but especially in the early 1960's, the system also made possible the emergence of the research grant barons—people of distinction who were so consistently able to attract generous support from government agencies that they were able to include on their payrolls not just a handful of assistants but dozens of them. To be sure, the cost of being so successful was often very high, not merely in air travel to and from Washington, but also in the time spent waiting for the grant-giving committees. Although many aspects of these goings-on (less easy now than in the past) are distasteful, it is in retrospect fair to acknowledge that a good many academic institutions in the United States owe the strength of their present contribution to scientific research to the efforts of intellectual entrepreneurs in the days when grants and contracts were much easier to come by.

Quite understandably, this system for financing scientific research has been a powerful source of diversity. Much current research in American colleges, universities, and research institutes has the dash and flair of the Manhattan Project. Throughout the United States and in all branches of science, there are young men and women pursuing new ideas with zeal and a sense of scholarship quite untainted by the need to think of next year's grant. And, of course, there are always the institutions which are either so well endowed or so well equipped that good research people can pursue distinguished careers with hardly a thought for where the next grant is coming from. At the other end of the scale, however, are the more marginal of the grant holders, painfully aware that if their first few thousand dollars does not quickly lead to the publication of a handful of scientific papers, there may never be another installment. The result is that much of the output from the research laboratories has a breathless and even trivial appearance. The authors have often not had the time, or even the inclination, to ask what it is for.

The strong points in American science are impressively strong. One vivid illustration of this is the course of events that followed the discovery

of pulsating radio stars in 1968. The first experimental observations were made at Cambridge, England, at a time when the United States was even more scandalously short of radio telescopes than it is at present. There remained, however, the question of how it is to be explained that a star of any kind can act as a source of regular and rapidly repeated bursts of radio energy. Within weeks, at least three plausible lines of argument were opened up by American astrophysicists. It so happens that the community of astronomers in the United States has all the intimacy of scientific disciplines elsewhere, but it is at once better connected with other disciplines such as theoretical physics and much larger than the astronomical community in the rest of the world put together. Indeed, in the past few years, while astronomy as a whole has become even more interesting than ever, American astronomy has been able to recreate a sense of the exciting interplay between observation and theory that must have made the early years of the twentieth century a memorable experience for physicists.

Exactly the same has happened in molecular biology. In the late 1950's, when the importance of the discovery of the genetic role of DNA was being widely appreciated, it was commonplace to hear scientists at Cambridge, England, explain that they would concentrate on principles and let the Americans do the donkey work. And true to their prediction, there followed a few years in which American university laboratories produced a great deal of somewhat pedestrian molecular biology. But this was only a short spell, for what tended to have been forgotten in Cambridge, England, was that the interest among scientists of all disciplines in the molecular basis of biology could be traced back even further in the United States than in Britain, and that there was already a powerful tradition of interdisciplinary research in the field, with electrical engineers working in genetics and physicists in cell biology. The result is that even though Cambridge, England, retains its place as an international center of high repute, the pace of development in molecular biology at American institutions and the quality as well as quantity of the work which they produce have now given them a dominating share of the credit for the still spectacular advances of the late 1960's and afterwards. The big battalions are strong not merely in numbers but in enterprise.

The same is true in geophysics, but that tale is larded with irony. It is, of course, one of the most remarkable events in the history of scientific ideas that within a decade, between 1958 and 1968, the notion that the surface of the earth consists of movable pieces of crustal rocks, which can slide over and under each other as well as sideways and which are sometimes pushed one way or another by material forced upwards from beneath, was turned from a speculation into an almost universally accepted explanation. The origins of this work were humble enough. In Britain, Blackett did wonders with his early measurements of the magnetism of ancient rocks, a technique now widely used in reconstructing the past history of the earth's crust.

Oceanographers from Cambridge, England, and from the oceanographic institutions on the east and west coasts of the United States did much to describe not merely the shape of the floor of the deep oceans but also its characteristics. By the late 1950's, it was plain that an understanding of how the earth as a whole is constructed, possibly from layers of different materials, would be a great boon.

This was the spirit in which the National Science Foundation in the United States was induced to sponsor the now forgotten Mohole Project, a scheme for drilling a hole through the bottom of some deep ocean into the underlying material of which the earth as a whole may be composed, perhaps ten miles or more below. The project was lent some extra urgency by the appearance of the first Russian sputniks in the sky, but the scientific community elsewhere was puzzled that so much should be spent on such an ambitious scheme which was technologically risky and which could not be counted on to yield much of scientific benefit. This skepticism was in due course shared by the National Science Foundation, when eventually the Mohole Project had cost it close to \$100,000,000 without there being much hope that a ten-mile hole would ever be drilled in the earth's crust and when (in the early 1960's) it was clear to all concerned that several widely scattered small holes would be much more valuable than one large one. For a time at least, it looked as if American science had fallen flat on its face. But by the late 1960's, a program for drilling smaller holes in the deep ocean floor had been mounted, and now the first deep-sea drilling ship, the *Glomar Challenger*, is busily scurrying about the world, confirming the new radical theories of how the earth is constructed, testing more detailed but more controversial hypotheses, and serving as yet another reminder that when American science is so minded, it can move more quickly and more convincingly than science elsewhere. As in the Manhattan Project, so even now, American science can move quickly when it sees an opportunity and when the stars are right and Congress, more often by luck than by design or forethought, is willing.

In the long run, in other words, the prospect is exceedingly cheerful. American science has more than its share of the sprinkling of men and women who are as bright as paint, habituated to the old academic practices of discovery and teaching and at the same time able to survive without taint in the competition for resources. If American science seems also sometimes to have more than its fair share of pedestrian research, who elsewhere can complain or snobbishly assert that that and not the excellence is what matters? In fact, the fierce dedication of the innovators—many of them alarmingly young—to the intellectual cause has already put a lasting stamp on science elsewhere. For these are the people who insist that the scientific journals should be run democratically, who say that learned societies should pursue excellence as well as issues such as the Vietnam war, and who have made science departments in American universities more egalitarian

(as between people) than university departments in the Old World and yet more sure than others that attainment is the goal.

Why, in circumstances like these, is the pattern of American science at once so dependent on Congress and, as a result, so patchy? In the past decade, much has been written of the science policy of the United States, and much has been done to strengthen the institutions responsible for science policy—the Office of Science and Technology in the White House and the National Science Foundation in particular. Yet, in reality, the United States has no science policy at all. Instead, it has a remarkably efficient mechanism for public and congressional wish fulfillment or would-be fulfillment. In this sense, and in retrospect, it is a kind of historical accident that the coming of the sputniks so alarmed Congress that the National Science Foundation was given the money with which to finance projects for the improvement of high school teaching in science which in the early 1960's enlivened the American high school curriculum and gave the United States a reputation for educational innovation which it had not previously enjoyed. But now these funds have dried up. Similarly, the notion that it should be a federal responsibility to strengthen undergraduate and graduate teaching at the universities, especially outside the Ivy League, has tended to evaporate, and who will fail to see some causal relationship between Congress's new-found stinginess and the alienation of the administration from the academic world and the disaffection of students for their elders and betters? The practical result, however, is that no part of the administration has ever taken seriously the eloquent document in which the National Science Board in 1969 argued for the institutionalization of the federal responsibility for scientific research in a system of grants to institutions, not people. At the same time, over the whole of its history but most cruelly in the past few years, the National Science Foundation has been denied the money needed to support important fields of research. Perhaps the most glaring irony has been the way in which (until fiscal year 1972) the National Aeronautics and Space Administration was spending more than \$58,000,000 a year on direct support for university research and several times as much again on essentially academic research in its own establishments, when the National Science Foundation was unable for lack of money to build the radio telescopes needed not merely to replace the few instruments already in existence, but also to provide radio astronomers in the United States with the more advanced instruments needed to keep abreast of work elsewhere. Thus, the pattern of spending has been made to seem perverse and arbitrary.

But this is yet another illustration of how the best approximation to a science policy in the United States is again a product of the spell cast by the Manhattan Project. Ever since nuclear explosives ceased to be an urgent preoccupation, in the mid-1950's, the administrators of American science and, to some extent, the scientific community as well have been hunting for goals which might be worthy replacements. This, after all, is the spirit

in which the space program and especially the Apollo program were conceived. If science is worth having, then surely it must be possible to do something with it—go to the moon, cure cancer, prevent earthquakes, make people more prosperous or at least more law-abiding. And, of course, there are few who will deny that, in due course, science can play a part in the attainment of all these objectives. The awkward questions are whether it is possible to concentrate so firmly on objectives without taking explicit steps to safeguard the welfare of the intellectual institutions from which potentially important discoveries will spring and whether the fickle air of fashion which comes from the constant redefinitions of socially palatable objectives for the scientific community (in which the scientific community plays very little part) is not in itself an unwelcome feature of the present system.

The chemistry professor from the Midwest now learning quickly about cancer is but one of the small army of researchers who will do their best to see that there is at least some spin-off for the academic institutions, but who can be sure that their energies will be sufficient? The truth is that the cancer program is dangerously distorted and there is always a danger that when Congress's first billion dollars has been spent and when, as is most probable, it becomes apparent that people still die of cancer, the taxpayers may feel cheated and the fashion may switch again. It would be far better if Congress had been forced by intellectual opinion to recognize that more spending on basic research at universities, not necessarily directed toward the treatment of cancer, might in the long run be more profitable.

The recent attempts of the National Science Foundation to direct science to fashionable social goals are even more suspect. The program announced in 1970 under the banner of Interdisciplinary Research into Problems of Our Society seemed from the beginning to be an opportunity for all kinds of soft options, from surveys of pollution of various kinds throughout the United States to surveys of news about pollution undertaken by students without special qualifications. IRPOS, with all its faults, was in 1971 subsumed in the still larger program called Research Applied to National Needs, but this fell foul of Congress as much for technical as for intellectual reasons. So now, instead, there is the Technological Initiatives program, in which, no doubt, the administrators will set objectives and hope that somehow they can persuade the academic community of scientists to strive after them, husbanding as much as they can of their grant money for the more distant and more scholarly objectives to which they are devoted.

On the performance of the past few years, the chances are that they will succeed and that American science will remain as intellectually exciting as it has become, as productive of useful innovation as Congress hopes, and as liberal a community of scholars as that which still fills scientists elsewhere with a mixture of wonder and envy. Yet nobody can be sure, which is why it seems to outsiders so remarkable that the United States can be as feckless as it is in caring for what should be its proudest possession.

MICHAEL BURRAGE

Democracy and the Mystery of the Crafts: Observations on Work Relationships in America and Britain

WHAT IS distinctive about the way Americans work? About the structure of their organizations? What is the likelihood of radical change in the future? To answer these questions one must first recall some major events in the history of the crafts and the professions in the colonial and post-revolutionary period since they mark, sociologically speaking, the end of the British rule and the beginning of Americanization.

The American colonists initially sought to imitate the work relationships that had obtained in England; in particular, to reproduce the basic English work institution, apart from the family—namely, the craft guild. For a brief period it appeared that this might be possible, especially in Philadelphia, but from the late seventeenth century on, the fundamental characteristics of the craft guild system altered radically or disappeared entirely. The traditional seven-year apprenticeship could not be maintained; by 1731 it was altogether abandoned. Three years became the maximum; many apprentices did not serve for even that long. Masters could no longer insist on a premium, though such payments sometimes survived in a modest form until the middle of the eighteenth century. Since masters had difficulty retaining apprentices, they came to rely heavily on the compulsory apprenticeship of orphans, bastards, the poor, indentured immigrants (who thereby repaid the cost of their passage), and, in the South, of slaves. The distinctions between masters, journeymen, and apprentices were unsettled. Moreover, the boundaries between crafts could no longer be defended against entrepreneurial enterprise. Paul Revere, apart from being a silversmith, at times also made copperplate engravings, clocks, hatters' irons, spatulas, probes for surgeons, cannons, and bells.

The moral aspect of the craft could hardly survive such changes; masters abandoned their diffuse moral responsibilities; apprentices, in turn, refused to accept their masters' authority over them. The education of apprentices was transferred to formal educational institutions. The first evening school specifically designed for apprentices was established in New York in 1690.

Lacking ties of personal sentiment and obligation, the sense of belonging to a corporate body also weakened. The last attempt to set up a recognizable guild organization was made in 1718 by the Philadelphia cordwainers and tailors, but their organization quickly collapsed. After this, there were intermittent instances of collective action, to fix payments or control prices, but no evidence of any permanent collective organization. In the mid-eighteenth century some effort was made to protect craftsmen against "half-way journeymen" or "two-thirders," but cities were unwilling to give anything more than temporary protection, and in any case their laws were easily evaded.¹

Apart from communities that were isolated from the rest of the population by language or religious conviction, the history of the craft guilds in America is largely the record of their disintegration.² Apprenticeship became simply a form of technical training or a mode of employment. Some attempts were made to revive the system in the late nineteenth century; several states passed laws to this end. These, however, had as little success as the earlier attempts to uphold the system by law; neither employers, parents, minors, nor the apprentices themselves were prepared to enforce them.³ The crafts had lost their mystery.

In a sense, the American professions suffered a similar experience. The problem of reproducing English forms of collective organization was made even more difficult by the fact that few professionals emigrated to the colonies. Thus, for example, in the early colonial period there was no system of medical licensing; medicine was practiced by anyone who had a mind to do so.⁴ Though there was a small number of trained doctors, there was certainly no medical profession. Until the middle of the eighteenth century there were few signs of concerted, professional action. However, in 1751 Pennsylvania Hospital was founded; in the sixties some medical societies were established, and in 1766 the first American medical school was started, again in Philadelphia. In the same year a group of Edinburgh-trained doctors in Virginia attempted to persuade the House of Burgesses to initiate a form of licensing. They failed, but six years later a group of doctors in New Jersey successfully petitioned for licensing restrictions. Before the turn of the century, several other states followed suit. It is not known how effectively such licensing regulations were enforced; they do, however, indicate an emerging professional consciousness and organization. The public treated these attempts to establish a professional monopoly with a certain amount of suspicion and hostility. In the 1830's and 1840's such feelings found organized political expression, and the patiently constructed defenses of professional medical organizations were rapidly overturned. Most of the laws passed to limit practice to orthodox M.D.'s went unenforced; ten states repealed their legislation. The sentiment behind these attacks may be summarized in the words of a state senator of New York, who, in introducing a repeal bill in 1844, declared: "A people accustomed

to governing themselves, and boasting of their intelligence, are impatient of restraint. They want no protection but freedom of enquiry and freedom of action.”⁵

The corporate structure of the law, which had so impressed Alexis de Tocqueville in 1828, fared no better. The early New England settlers had a particular dislike of lawyers, perhaps, as Roscoe Pound has suggested, because they, like utopians and revolutionaries, believed that their new society required no law. Hostility toward lawyers was common throughout the colonial period; despite this, there were systems of prescribed qualifications for barristers that followed the English pattern, meetings of bar societies to take action against pettifoggers, to decide on the admission of clerks, and to discuss the law itself.⁶

The first setback to the development of the legal professional organization was the Revolution, since many of the best and most learned of the lawyers were loyalists. Also, the early prejudice against lawyers was given added justification, since lawyers, more than any other group, were identified with England. The profession was suspected of being un-American and undemocratic; certain states threw the practice of law open to anyone; the rest eased admission requirements. Alexander Hamilton's preparation for the bar involved three months' reading. Regulatory bar associations gave way to voluntary associations of interested lawyers. Worse was yet to come. From 1836, the remnants of the professional organizations were subject to new attack. Critics cited the openness of the medical profession to justify the abolition of any remaining admission requirements to the practice of law, and the legal profession became an occupation like any other.

The way in which the American civil service repeated the experience of the medical and legal professions is well known, perhaps because the reform of public administration had a more structured ideology and a notable protagonist—Andrew Jackson (though the changes antedated Jackson and extended far beyond the federal government). Once again, an embryo profession, in many respects more advanced than its British counterpart, was found to be inconsistent with American democracy. Every man, it was claimed, should have an equal opportunity to enter the public service. Life tenure, or property in office, had made the public service unresponsive to popular opinion and could not be justified by the advantages of training and experience, since, in Jackson's well-known words: “The duties of all public officers are, or admit of being made, so plain and simple that men of intelligence may readily qualify themselves for their performance.”⁷ By such arguments the rotation or spoils system was legitimized.

There are few parallels to these events in English experience, and it appears that attitudes toward work, and relationships at work, were henceforth decisively American. Craftsmen and skilled workers, in time, established collective organizations; though civil servants seem to have recovered

only a minimal sense of belonging to a service, doctors and lawyers were able, in the late nineteenth century, to rebuild their professional structures. They rarely recaptured all the distinctive moral attributes of collective forms of work organization that they had known before and that continued to govern the relationships of their counterparts in Britain.

The reaction against the spoils system in the American civil service did not lead to attempts to create a self-regulating, autonomous profession of public administration. Indeed, the possibility of such a development was seen as the threat of a "ruling class," an "academic elite," a "kingly autocratic power." What opportunity would there be, one senator asked during the Pendleton debate, for "a surfman from Hatteras against some timid man, a real good scholar, in a wholly competitive service?"⁸ The "mystery" of public administration that Jackson derided was not to be restored. The reformers of 1883, influenced though they were by the British example, did not adopt the various stratagems that Northcote and Trevelyan used to encourage esprit within the British service—entry at an early age, in-service training, and the comprehensive pension system. Furthermore, they did not intend to convert the entire service to the merit system, and like everyone else, the reformers assumed that Congress would have a continuing responsibility in legislating the internal affairs of the service. Legislative regulation of the service has in fact grown enormously; there are few limitations on the regulatory powers of Congress over the civil service. No country, Bryce observed, has given its legislature such great influence over the conduct of its administration.⁹ The surveillance is today conducted through a vast number of committees and subcommittees, which, through their assistants and aides, gather information from individuals in the service—often dissatisfied employees—while also holding more formal congressional hearings. The power of these committees is such that they sometimes appear to have detached a number of bureaux from their primary allegiance to the executive branch.¹⁰

The proposals of Northcote and Trevelyan for the reform of the British service began by recognizing the arduous and responsible duties that civil servants were called on to perform, and the high level of education and experience that these necessarily required. Their proposals sought to reform entry into the service and thereby to create a civil service profession, which would then be left to govern itself. The British Civil Service Commission has remained more a gatekeeper and less a policeman or personnel manager than its American counterpart. A British minister has little control over the personnel of his department, though he accepts responsibility for all the activities of his department in Parliament. In doing this, he protects his civil servants from being individually responsible for their actions or being answerable to the public. Civil servants thereby preserve their collective anonymity and are insulated from public criticism. The only investigations

of the internal administration of the service are conducted by royal commissions, every twenty years or so.

The Fulton Commission, which reported in 1968, found the internal structure of the service made up of dozens of "classes," differentiated from one another, both vertically and horizontally. Each had its own entry requirements, pay scales, titles, and career structures; while mobility from one class to another was not impossible, it was by no means normal.¹¹ The British civil servant was expected to complete his career within his class of entry. The structure of the service therefore resembles a honeycomb of occupational groups, each of which has a high degree of collective solidarity. Significantly, the service is wholly unionized, and the boundaries of the unions and associations correspond almost exactly with the formal class divisions of the service.

The American civil service, by comparison, is much closer to a rational administrative pyramid and is made up of individuals rather than groups. Individuals cannot *belong* to their class in the same sense as the British do. A class in the American service is not a lifetime attachment; it cannot promote the feeling of belonging. Union and association membership, which by British standards is very low, does not coincide with the classes of the service.¹² Since the American service lacks the group sanctions on individual behavior, and since it makes no effort to promote early occupational socialization, it cannot depend on the same degree of normative coordination of behavior as the British; behavior is therefore rule-governed, or imperatively coordinated. The British service, one may say, is occupationally based, and the American more bureaucratic, in the neutral sense of the word. Observation of other occupations suggests that these differences are not confined to the civil service; they are, in fact, the basic features of two quite distinct patterns of work relationships.

Naturally, the form that the limitation of professional autonomy will take will vary according to the nature of the occupation. The election of certain judges and the public debate over the appointment of others suggest that in the United States judges require a degree of public acceptance—of democratic legitimation—that they do not require in Britain. In this sense, the legal profession is less autonomous in the United States than in Britain. Furthermore, the authority of the judge in an American court is more restricted than that of his British counterpart; "not only is a jury far more common in the United States, but where a jury exists, the role of the judge is far less important than in a British case heard with a jury. In Britain the judge's summation is not limited to observations on the law, but reviews the whole of the evidence. Such a wide-ranging summation would be regarded as highly improper in the United States."¹³ Entry to the profession also differs, the Americans having replaced the British apprenticeship system by the law school. This, one may suggest, is an indication of, and a contribution to, the weakening of professional solidarity. It is an indication of a lesser degree of collective solidarity because American law schools were

pioneered by practicing lawyers who turned apprenticeship into a profit-making enterprise and thereby entirely changed the nature of this crucial professional relationship.¹⁴ The schools themselves contribute to the weakening of professional solidarity because law professors do not belong to the profession in quite the same way as practicing lawyers. They are, to varying degrees, marginal members of the profession. The personal ties that link one generation of British lawyers to another via "pupilage" or "articles" are considerably weakened. Law schools give courses in professional ethics; for the pupil and the practicing barrister in Britain, professional ethics are inextricably bound up with their personal relationship. One may suggest, therefore, that critics and reformers of the law are disproportionately found among academic lawyers, because they are, to some extent, disconnected from the personal ties that restrain their practicing colleagues. There have been suggestions that lawyers are more bureaucratically organized in America than in Britain, but so far, at any rate, this has not been demonstrated.

At first sight doctors may appear to be an anomalous case, since the British, in providing a National Health Service, have imposed central funding, coordination, and control over the profession, thereby restricting the autonomy of the profession to a greater degree than have the Americans. This may indeed be the situation, but it should be noted that the British have allowed their doctors a very high degree of autonomy. The National Health Service legislation was, as one American observer put it, "skeletal"; doctors were left to work out the arrangements through private negotiations with the health minister and his civil servants.¹⁵ One indication of the fact that the establishment of the health service did not introduce rigorous administrative rationalization is that the guild-like division within the profession—between consultants based in the hospital and the general practitioner based in his own surgery and oriented to the patient at home—remained completely undisturbed.¹⁶ Moreover, the British have retained elements of apprenticeship in their hospital training. The Americans decisively broke with this system in colonial times, when the first American medical school was established at the College of Philadelphia (University of Pennsylvania) rather than at the Pennsylvania Hospital. The Americans, then and since, seem to have preferred the formal and scientific aspect of medical training to its moral and personal aspect. Without wishing to assess all the other factors that may explain the difference, one may note that the diffuse sense of obligation toward a patient and his family of the British general practitioner has not given way to the more specific, contractual type of relationship that obtains between the American specialist and his patient.¹⁷ Hospitals, of course, require administrative controls, and here, also, the Americans have created far more elaborate bureaucratic systems than the British.¹⁸

If, in certain respects, doctors are anomalous, the work situation of

teachers shows the differences between the two countries in an almost pure form.¹⁹ American teachers, of course, did not form a corporate body that had to be destroyed to conform to the democratic principles of Jacksonian America. They never exercised sovereign authority over the central element of their professional role—the content of the curriculum. In the early colonies, largely as a result of the decline of the crafts, they were *given* a task by their financial masters, the church or private donors. The change in the method of financing schools merely meant that the community or its representatives became responsible for the schools. This altered the nature of their task, but the belief that the proper conduct of the school is something that could not be left to the teachers alone remained.

Teachers in Britain have, in the past, also had to submit to various forms of external control, particularly from the church. For a brief period in the late nineteenth century the electorate was able to vote directly on educational policy. The present mixed system of local authority and national government controls, however, allows teachers (though they would probably be the last to admit it) a high degree of autonomy, and is the result not only of early and virtually complete union organization, but also of minimal public pressure to intervene in school affairs. The standard strategy of the teachers' unions in Britain was to enlist central government support against local pressures—a strategy which led, of course, to a certain amount of national regulation. Central government control, however, has not become oppressive; indeed, it has seemed to American observers to be remarkably mild. In any case, the teachers' unions and associations are able to exert enormous pressure against central government decisions which they dislike.²⁰

Once again, the two countries vary in the extension of bureaucratic controls, a curious contrast since one would not expect the national educational system of Great Britain to require *less* administration than the locally controlled American system. But so it is; one observer has pointed out that the entire national educational administration of the United Kingdom is no larger than that of New York or California.²¹ More important, educational administrators have less control over the schools in Britain. The domains of the teacher and the administrator are more distinct; administrators service the schools and are totally excluded from matters of educational policy. By contrast, the American superintendent is "expected to give leadership in purely educational topics, such as curriculum building and the evolution of appropriate teaching methods."²² The American school principal is a subordinate in an administrative hierarchy; the British headmaster is considered, and considers himself, a teacher—a member of the profession.

One can document parallel differences in the two university systems. The British have insulated their universities from lay interference—as with the schools—by a gentle system of national finance and control. Likewise, British faculty have retained greater collective control over their affairs. University administrations are small—at Oxford and Cambridge they are

almost nonexistent—and have little or no initiative with respect to the curriculum. British academics have also restricted student influence over the curriculum; until recently, courses were not elective. Faculty alone determined the structure of the curriculum.²³

Enough evidence has been offered to identify certain of the major distinguishing features of American organizations, at least as they appear to an English observer. The most important case—industry—remains to be considered. It is important not only in numerical terms, but also because it is often thought to require or impose a uniform pattern on work relationships. This assumption—it is nothing more than that—seems to have inhibited research into the cultural variations of industrial organizations. The evidence of the peculiarities of the Americans is therefore in this instance thinner and more ambiguous, and leaves greater scope for misinterpretation. We may begin, however, on reasonably safe ground and say something of labor unions.

Since the decline of the craft guilds, labor unions have become, in both societies, the principal form of collective organization of manual workers; they are the most visible index of the degree to which manual workers recognize themselves as having collective interests as well as purely individual ones. It is not surprising, given the preceding argument, that American labor unions have recruited a lower proportion of the labor force than have the British; in 1965, the percentages were 28.5 per cent in the United States and 38.7 per cent in Britain.²⁴ This is perhaps not so marked a difference as one might have predicted; however, in Britain, membership is voluntary; in the United States, there is a degree of legal compulsion. Total membership, however, is only part of the matter. The fight for labor recognition in the United States has been a protracted, violent, and deadly struggle. It has been estimated that from the beginning of 1902 to the middle of 1904 some 198 persons were killed and 1,966 injured in strikes and lockouts in the United States; the most important single cause of violence in these labor disputes was trade union recognition.²⁵ American employers, it seems, have been far more determined than the British to resist union organization and have adopted various techniques in the process—using spies, goons, yellow dog and sweetheart contracts—devices that have rarely been adopted in Great Britain. They have been, in short, less willing than the British to accept the legitimacy of collective organization and bargaining, and were finally compelled to do so by law (which was never necessary in Britain). One suspects that they still do not accept labor unions as wholly legitimate. Even Franklin D. Roosevelt had certain reservations and was reluctant to accept collective bargaining in the federal executive, although the British civil service, which he knew well, had achieved virtually complete unionization more than thirty years previously.

In a sense, American unions themselves shared some of these doubts,

which is not to say that they ever questioned the legitimacy of collective bargaining, but they have been bitterly divided over the legitimate criterion for collective organization. From the early nineteenth century to the present day, many American labor unions have recruited with little recognition of the boundaries between different occupations. The Knights of Labor in the 1880's and '90's, for example, though initially composed of trade assemblies, subsequently recruited members without regard to occupational distinctions, and indeed became profoundly hostile to what they conceived to be "craft exclusiveness."²⁶ This type of labor organization, often with universalist aspirations, was found in Britain only in the first half of the nineteenth century; it ended with Chartism. In the United States, however, it survived, and through the CIO, eventually recruited a substantial part of the labor force.

American unions, it seems, have visualized workers as a vast undifferentiated mass of individuals—who happen to be employed in a particular industry but have no permanent occupational identity. British unions have seen workers as "naturally" divided into occupational groups, a view that seems to have been shared by *both* sides of British industry. American unions today are free to organize wherever they wish; workers are free to vote for whatever union they please; they are not naturally, or permanently, members of any union. That may seem proper and right to an American; it is not to an Englishman. Britain has retained, perhaps more than any other country, a craft- or trade-structured union movement.²⁷ Even the "general" unions of Great Britain tend to be organized on trade rather than local or industrial groupings. The best evidence of this is the persistence, at least until 1964, of a traditional apprenticeship system in England, with maximum age limits on entry (fifteen or sixteen), a fixed duration of five years irrespective of individual merit, a permanent demarcation between crafts, and an emphasis on the personal "training" of apprentices by skilled workers rather than by formal educational institutions.²⁸

In internal union affairs, British union members have resisted bureaucratic domination to a greater extent than have the Americans. British unions not only employ fewer officials than American unions, but the power of those they do employ is severely restricted. They are often excluded from the annual general meeting, the sovereign body of the union.²⁹ Perhaps the main historical variation between the two societies is that the occupational group was organized first in Britain and then reluctantly created an administration; on many occasions in the United States it was exactly the reverse: officials set out to find and organize members. In any event, union bureaucracies in Britain do not sit neatly atop the membership of the union. There is a certain disjunction between the officials and members, much as between British teachers or professors and their administrators. This disjunction has achieved some notoriety in recent times; the new National Industrial Relations Court has tried to compel lay members of the union and their shop

stewards to "obey" their full-time officials. The latter have protested that they are powerless to "order" their members. The British have only attempted to legislate industrial relations in very recent days, and it is not yet certain that they will continue to do so. The relations between unions, between members and their unions, and between employers and unions in Britain have hitherto depended wholly on implicit understandings and oral agreements. These relationships, in other words, have been normatively coordinated.

To some sociologists this is a controversial conclusion, since it implies that the interaction between employers and unions is governed by certain shared beliefs, whatever the conflicts between them may be. The evidence, however, hardly admits of any other interpretation. Since British collective bargaining is not typically concluded by a contract, specifying in detail the future rights and duties of either side but by an understanding, it must depend on personal relationships and customary usages. Even written agreements are seldom implemented in the form laid down: both sides have resisted precise legal definition and enforcement of their agreements.³⁰ Such a system could hardly survive without shared beliefs. Moreover, the survival of apprenticeship depended, and still depends, on managerial collusion, on some sort of common ideal as to what constitutes a proper, natural, and just form of industrial organization. Even when, in the late nineteenth century, American and German competition first began seriously to affect the profits and markets of British companies, and many observers pointed out that the main reason was the British system of industrial training, British employers took no determined action to change the system. Nor did they try to force the schools to serve their purposes and increase vocational training. They, like the trade unions, wanted young, untrained recruits, a preference which applied as much to their managerial as to their manual employees.³¹

One may infer that these attitudes will promote a distinctive form of industrial organization, one whose structure is adapted to the groups of which it is composed, not unlike the "honeycomb" of the British civil service, and since occupational groups are often themselves responsible for the occupational socialization of their members, one that can rely to a great extent on the normative coordination of behavior, at least within the group. The management of such an organization—and it is not supposed that any industrial organization can dispense entirely with imperative forms of coordination—will therefore have to concern itself more with the relationships between groups, with boundary or demarcation disputes, than with the close regulation of individual behavior. In support of this argument, it may be noted that British corporations have, until recent years, been comparatively indifferent to personnel management,³² and in this context the reason for their indifference is plain. Occupational groups, like the professions, have their own traditional, informal methods of personnel management; they do not want or need counselors, rating devices, reports, and all

the other paraphernalia of formal personnel management. Similarly, British management was, with few exceptions, wholly unimpressed by the scientific management movement despite its immense popularity in the United States. This is another indication of the common British view of the just and proper work relationship, since British unions were also, of course, hostile to this and subsequent attempts to measure and rate the performance of individual workers, and to design new forms of work relationship.³³

Dwight MacDonald once described what he called "the great American reservoir of howtoism," those books which tell their readers "how to do, be, become, make, or cope with something."³⁴ They had, he thought, a peculiar appeal for Americans; though his examples refer mainly to leisure activities, he might have found as many examples involving industrial behavior, for there is almost as much "howtoism" in management theory and industrial sociology as in Benjamin Spock or Emily Post. Whatever the European beginnings of these subjects may be, they have become distinctively American, and have returned to Europe largely through American influence. Americans are, it seems, more inclined than the British to analyze relationships, define them, invent new forms, and measure their effectiveness. And this habit inevitably carries a threat to inherited, traditional occupational relationships within any organization.

The "great organizers" of American industry have always been hostile to groups within their enterprises when they were organized and indifferent to them when they were not. In Detroit, at the turn of the century, there were several craft unions, but these were overwhelmed by the flood of immigrants, as well as by the efforts of the Detroit Employers Association. For nearly forty years, Henry Ford did not have to engage in collective bargaining. He was able to arrange and rearrange his employees exactly as he wished, without recognition or sympathy for the structure of craft groups among his work force. Ironically, he himself had undergone a half-way apprenticeship, but his attempts to establish "village industries" were inspired not so much by the hope that he might create a more human, cooperative environment than that to be found in his factories, but because he thought, rather strangely, that with "automatic machinery and widespread power the manufacture of some articles may be carried on in the home." Ford always had a certain contempt for specialists within his company. He was reluctant to employ engineers with professional training and preferred that those who had been professionally trained be kept busy in the details of production. The company's research department was given little autonomy.³⁵ Du Pont, at the turn of the century, is another instance.³⁶ Their senior executives spent much time and effort attempting to discover the ideal form of organizational structure. They defined positions within the enterprises without regard to the persons who happened at the moment to occupy them—an approach which might be reckoned a landmark in organizational planning—and then proceeded to make reality conform to the ideal. Having minutely defined

the duties of every position, they imposed uniform statistical measures on operations which had previously regarded themselves as separate and unique, as having "their own peculiar problems." The system introduced by Sloan at General Motors bears a certain resemblance to the Du Pont innovations. Sloan, of course, prided himself on his scientific approach to management. He was an engineer who forgot that he was an engineer, and he might be said to have liberated the line from staff authority. The staff remained to develop the criteria and the statistics by which the line might be judged. One of Sloan's most notable achievements was to extend the managerial techniques (in other words, bureaucratic controls) of the large corporation to the thousands of small entrepreneurs in his dealer network. IBM, under its founder, might be considered an exception to this pattern, in that it promoted a certain sense of collective loyalty, even community, among its employees. In fact, however, it was a forced sense of community—of white shirts, moderate religious observance, clean-shaven men—and not an acceptance of occupational groups within the company. Moreover, it coexisted with a "Black Jacobin" personnel policy of getting rid of every tenth man. The one occupational group that IBM did acknowledge, indeed honor, was their salesmen, but of all occupational groups, they were, one imagines, the ones least inclined to hold deep collective sentiments.³⁷

The classic example of the differences between the countries is to be found in their response to the processes of standardized, interchangeable parts and the assembly line—the two key innovations of modern industrial production. Both processes necessarily involve the rearrangement, even the fragmentation, of traditional occupational roles. Both were known in Britain and were used to a limited extent in British industry before they came to be widely employed in the United States. Both, however, have been repeatedly reintroduced into Britain by Americans: interchangeable parts by the elder Brunel, by Colonel Colt, and by Cadillac Motors; the assembly line, most dramatically, by Henry Ford.³⁸ After World War II, English visitors to the United States discovered a host of new products that had been standardized and processes that had been arranged on assembly lines.³⁹ The British, it appears, could never quite make these practices a part of their industrial way of life and had to be continually persuaded of their merits by American example.

For reasons that are not entirely clear, and are certainly not logical, some of the autonomy granted occupations in Britain has been passed on also to industrial organizations. A study of the great era of mergers, 1870-1914, shows that where mergers in the United States meant the reorganization of the existing companies, in Britain there was a tendency to leave the existing units precisely as they were. The suggested explanation of this phenomenon is that British organizations were usually without a "Napoleon in organization."⁴⁰ It is also consistent with the view that the British were unwilling to disturb preexisting relations within the individual companies.

A similar variation may be found in the relation between the state and private enterprise in the two countries. From Wolfgang Friedman's comparative study,⁴¹ the United States emerges as the best example of the "principled and comprehensive" prohibition of all restrictive actions and agreements; it is said to be "the only country that has consistently enforced anti-trust legislation for sixty-five years." To an American, this will probably seem a bizarre judgment; indeed, it is intelligible only in a comparative context, more specifically, by comparison with the British. For Britain is, in this respect as in others, the polar opposite of the United States. It is the best example of the "do-nothings," though in recent years even Britain has moved toward an "empirical"—which is to say, study and then decide—approach. More significantly, American legislation is directed against corporate power as such and is not the result of what Galbraith calls the theology of the market. The economic consequences were a minor consideration in American anti-trust legislation. The British, on the other hand, have not sought to curb corporate power. As interpreted by the English courts, the common law "did not seriously limit or discourage the formation of monopoly power or the use of restrictive practices,"⁴² and the legislation since World War II has been less concerned with private power than with economic efficiency.⁴³ Far from seeking to restrict private economic power, British governments (of both parties) have frequently aimed to *increase* the concentration of private economic power through the support of trade associations, combinations, and mergers. Nationalization is not the striking exception that it may appear to be. Labour and Conservative arguments in defense of public enterprise have both referred to the crafts and the professions as the ideal form of work relationship; consistent with this preference, they have granted all the state monopolies a high degree of autonomy. The major problems of power—will it be abused?—and of efficiency—will it be increased?—have been largely entrusted to the public corporations themselves.⁴⁴

The closest American parallel to these attitudes is the aberration of the National Industrial Recovery Administration from 1933 to 1935, but even there a significant contrast with the British experience is to be noted. The NRA sought to establish a set of industry codes, which, when approved, would govern every firm in an industry; these would have coercive and legal sanctions, both criminal and civil. The NRA sought, in other words, to coordinate behavior imperatively; even in abandoning, temporarily, the free enterprise system, the Roosevelt administration did it in a quintessentially American manner. The British by contrast, in all their social relationships, are less likely to articulate norms and to raise them to the level of conscious thought. Professor Kahn-Freund concluded his essay on the law of the two countries by saying that English law "intervenes only when it cannot help doing so. . . . It has always been and it is today a substitute for insufficient mechanisms of adjustments in society itself. . . . Whether we look at the

world of industry, at the world of finance, or at the legal profession itself, everywhere we find the strength of extra-legal customs, etiquette, norms and sanctions with the law itself in the background rather than in action.”⁴⁵

While much of the evidence presented in support of this argument has been historical, the variations remain today, in my view, the crucial differentiating characteristics in the two countries. Where, in England, one is always aware of groups which confront and exclude the outsider, of boundaries that must be recognized and crossed, and of shared memories which constrain individual action, organizations in the United States seem to have less abrupt and less permanent horizontal and vertical barriers; the individual is therefore freer to move or to contemplate moving along his self-designed career path. My interviews give dozens of examples. The teacher was previously an insurance salesman, but teaching is just a job, since he really aspires to be an anthropologist; the banker was formerly a professor of public administration; the company lawyer secretly planned to be an executive vice-president—and hence to threaten the secure pattern of succession that the line managers had sketched for themselves. It is difficult for occupational loyalties to survive in the face of continued deflections of this kind. Teachers fill in their forms and perform their other bureaucratic tasks, some with enthusiasm, for they themselves hope to become administrators so they “can do more for the kids”; the company lawyers accept their subordination to a production executive; and bankers abandon their old ways of doing things in favor of the ex-professor’s new techniques. Groups of manual workers who are not disturbed to the same extent by a high rate of mobility also have difficulty in defining their collective interests. I found skilled leatherworkers arguing among themselves over union representation, but even if they had agreed on that, they would have continued to argue over which union should represent them. A small faction wanted the Teamsters. Why? “Because they’re the roughest, toughest, meanest bunch of bastards you ever met.” The street crews of a public utility were loyal to their union, but their local had only a tenuous attachment to its national union and was in fact thinking of moving to another.

The same structure and the same distinctive pattern of work relationships that one can piece together by laboriously recording the trivia of the everyday working life in anonymous organizations can be observed on a larger public scale in the moon program. The internal organization of NASA and of the private corporations associated with it have not yet been precisely documented, but since the program grew at such a rapid pace in a situation where traditional ways of doing things provided little guidance, it is unlikely to have given much opportunity for occupational groups to establish their sovereignty. In any case, it was not an enterprise that could be organized on trust, and so the groups of specialists within it must, it seems safe to say, have been minutely and rigorously controlled. They must, in short, have been part of a massive bureaucratic system. This, however, is merely to point

out that the task itself set certain organizational requirements; one cannot know if the British would be less adept at establishing this form of organization. Some of its characteristics, however, seem strikingly American. The program had, for instance, its share of political scandals. It became a public spectacle; strenuous efforts were made to explain and simplify the mysteries of space flight for the common man; its heroes were presented as "ordinary guys"; little sense of wonder and of awe was left to restrain the skeptical and the critical. The astronauts themselves were deliberately interchangeable. They were not above using the program for personal advantage and, like other corporate executives, were soon anxious to find other careers for themselves as motel managers, public relations men, professors, and politicians. Above all, the entire enterprise had a temporary mandate and depended for its survival on popular support.⁴⁶

Economists have offered a number of explanations to account for the differences in work organization in the two countries; the most popular being the shortage of labor, particularly of skilled labor. American industrialists are said to have put the craft mystery into the machine because they were encouraged or compelled to do so for good economic reasons. In defending this and other explanations, however, economists have had their attention fixed firmly on industrial organizations; they have not inquired into analogous changes elsewhere. Few, for example, have considered Jackson's reforms of the civil service or the organizational innovations of school and university. When one does so, the economic argument is considerably weakened, for, while one may, by stretching the facts, link the spoils system to labor shortage (though no one to date has attempted to do this), such an account would not touch the heart of the matter. Americans did not respond to Jackson's reforms as to a useful, labor-saving administrative reorganization; on the contrary, they were emphatically, vociferously moral about them. It was believed that they would make America more democratic, and they were defended on the grounds that they were consistent with American democratic ideals. The same may be said of other occupations; the reason they have been able to establish what by English standards is an attenuated form of professional autonomy becomes intelligible only by reference to democratic ideals. The same may also be said of the crafts. If the moral arguments against this form of work relationship are not clearly distinguishable from economic pressures in the early colonial period, one can recognize them in the resistance to their reintroduction late in the nineteenth century.⁴⁷ Moreover, if one turns the question around, and asks if the existence of a labor pool can account for the autonomy of teachers, lawyers, and others in Britain, the economic explanation is wholly implausible.

There appear to be two distinct problems. The historical problem is to explain why a particular form of organization changed at a specific time and

place. Among the possible explanations for the decline of the American crafts we may certainly include the shortage of skilled labor. The second sociological problem concerns the pattern itself: What, we may ask, explains the endurance and pervasiveness of these culturally distinct forms of organization? Why have the Americans legitimated more rational, individualistic, and bureaucratic work relationships than the British? The *only* plausible answer to this question, at the present time, is the one suggested by Tocqueville: the democratic ethic of the Americans.⁴⁸

Americans themselves would probably be inclined to explain their organizational structures as a play of interests; in fact, Americans are no more able than anyone else to conduct their lives in a wholly amoral manner. They are required to justify their actions, even their self-interested actions, to others and to themselves. They also have to legitimize their institutions by reference to some sort of morality; the one appeal that they, unlike the British, consistently make is to democracy. Whether the appeals are genuine or false, whether those who make them are *really* democratic, apart from being indeterminable, is beside the point. The democratic ethic existed, has been widely shared and demonstrably effective. Why else would the Americans so constantly repeat it?

This argument is perhaps acceptable with respect to the American civil service and the schools; the democratic arguments for their present structure are obvious enough. In industry, however, it is more problematic, and even astonishing. However, when conflicts arise in industrial organizations, over the proper way to behave toward colleagues, superiors, or subordinates, over promotion, dismissal, or transfer, there is a moral code to which the disputants appeal. There are moral beliefs to justify scientific management, MBO and Theory Y, personnel counseling, IBM's Hundred Percent Club, even if outsiders find it a little difficult to recognize them.

The British have tended to explain their relatively inefficient industry as resulting from complacency, amateurism, and conservatism. However, any attempt to change existing work arrangements would threaten obligations and loyalties—to one's fellows, obviously, but also to one's predecessors and successors; in other words, there are moral grounds for British industrial conservatism. They are not very elegantly formulated, but they are not unlike the arguments used to justify the autonomy of doctors, teachers, and academics.

As soon as one begins to speculate on the probable consequences of these two distinctive patterns of work relationships, it is apparent that there can be no easy judgment of their relative merits. The weaker group loyalties characteristic of American organizations appear to permit them to innovate at a faster rate than the British; in an industrial setting that may not appear, at the present time, to be an unequivocal good, but in other organizations, including schools and universities, a high capacity for change would

seem to be a desirable thing, if only because the capacity to change increases the range of choice.

The lack of constraints that encourages a high rate of innovation may, however, also encourage a high rate of deviance. Innovation, in fact, is often a form of deviance. If the United States appears to an English observer to be an innovative society, it also appears, even more markedly, to be a society with a high rate of occupational deviance. Among policemen, judges, civil servants, ambulance drivers, prison guards, businessmen, trade unionists—indeed, in every occupation—it seems that the rate of criminal deviance is higher in the United States than in Great Britain.

The British can never be sure whether the difference between the two societies is not less in the actual prevalence of deviance than in the publicity given to it. The occupational loyalties of the British tend to protect and hide the wrongdoer in their midst, since his crime can affect the honor of the whole group. The most plausible conclusion is that both propositions are true; the British have fewer deviants, but also know less about the ones they do have. The Americans are probably more criminal, but not so much as their own publicity suggests. One is led to this conclusion because the occupational group membership in Britain appears to constrain personal interactions with outsiders. Michael Banton⁴⁹ has described how the British policeman retains at all times a sense of being a member of a police force: he rarely removes his helmet and so maintains his official identity; he does not introduce himself by name; he does not speak to the public as an individual. The American patrolman, by contrast, will talk about *his* wishes or threaten what *he* individually might do; he is free to interact with the public quite independently of his official role; he may, for example, eat in a public restaurant or accept employment as a company guard. A certain distance, therefore, separates the policeman from the public in Britain, and a similar phenomenon has been observed in a study of the attitudes of the public toward judges in Britain. Personal impression suggests that it is found in a great many other relationships in Britain; insofar as it does exist, it tends to inhibit the intimate, personal, and corrupt transaction.

Even if this argument is correct, however, it is not at all certain that the collective restraints are in all circumstances desirable. Daniel Ellsberg may or may not have broken his contract, but he most assuredly betrayed his occupational loyalties; his action is necessarily a reflection on his colleagues' silence. In any case, this was a decision that he alone took, a matter of his conscience, and not a group decision. There are many precedents for his action, if never on a matter of such import. Muckraking journalists in the United States have always relied on informants and leaks to learn the grubby facts of federal and state administration. An ex-Washington correspondent of a London paper recently sought to pioneer this kind of journalism in Britain, to establish himself as a Whitehall (as distinct from a Westminster) correspondent, and to report the internal affairs of the administration, in

much the same way as American newspapers do. After one article, official doors were firmly shut against him, and there were apparently no civil service informants to keep him supplied with copy.⁵⁰

The defense of the form of organization to which the British incline would probably base itself on equality within the group; one might see occupational groups, as the Webbs saw the trade clubs, as a pure form of democracy. This democracy, however, is largely an illusion. The equality of the collectivity is most evident when dealing with outsiders. In this type of interaction, group membership tends to override distinctions within the group. This does not mean that there is no internal stratification. On the contrary, each of the British collectivities mentioned seems to have rigid internal stratification, as, for example, between consultants and general practitioners, or between barristers and solicitors, and various kinds of teachers or manual workers. No doubt, within each of these groups one could discover still further forms of stratification. The larger occupational collectivity seems to be composed of many, hierarchically arranged, smaller groups. Significantly, the Americans have not only weaker external boundaries, but have eliminated much of the internal differentiation characteristic of the professions in Britain.⁵¹

This type of stratification is different, however, from that found within bureaucracies; it tends to be less individual and less meritocratic, and hence to give less opportunity for individual ambition. In the bureaucratic pyramid of the American civil service—leaving aside the professional enclaves described by Frederic Mosher⁵²—careers and ambition are less bounded by class. The British civil servant is able to complete a wholly satisfactory career *within* his class; there is, so to speak, more honor and less failure built into the British system. Similarly, American teachers aspire to become deans or professors, an ambition which, though not unknown in Britain, seems a little absurd.

It might also be argued that a strong group structure enables individuals to counter an oppressive bureaucracy, to resist industrial tyrants, whether they be General Du Pont, Thomas Watson, or Henry Ford. This is no doubt true, but the occupational groups may themselves become oppressive. In their quiet, normative manner, they may exact a higher degree of conformity than any rational administrative structure could ever do. Nor is it certain that they are the best defenders of *individual* rights. British trade unions have a rather poor record of defending individual rights within the union—that is, in allowing individuals to join the union of their choice or to change from one union to another.⁵³ The extensive collective bargaining within the British civil service is more concerned with group than with individual rights.⁵⁴ The American civil service, while having a rather undeveloped system of collective bargaining, has developed a quasi-judicial system for the protection of individual rights which enables a civil servant to appeal not only the failure of the agency to apply existing rules properly,

but also the sufficiency of the agency's reasons for taking a specific action. In the United States, the rules themselves are subject to appeal.⁵⁵

No doubt, these brief comments tend to exaggerate the differences between the two societies. The significant fact, however, is that the British do not merely observe the United States, as they might observe France or Germany. They, almost invariably, also judge America and evaluate their own institutions by reference to it. Whatever advantages they might claim for the group attachments and loyalties of British society, they are compelled to recognize that the elements of community they have preserved among lawyers, professors, skilled workers, and others are integral parts of an elitist, traditional society. The sense of belonging, of honor, that one finds in British occupational groups is, in other words, reinforced by the stratification of British society.

Conversely, the more competitive, individualist, and bureaucratic character of American organizations seems to be a consequence of the more democratic nature of American society. And nothing in contemporary America suggests that these characteristics will be altered in any radical way. On the contrary, the efforts to provide equal opportunity for all Americans will necessarily increase the imperative regulation of behavior in schools, universities, labor unions, and industry. Moreover, insofar as these efforts are successful the competitiveness of American life will also necessarily increase. The counter-culture may aspire to increase the sense of community, but an English observer must conclude that its members will have to be content with the fleeting demonstrations, rock concerts, teach-ins, trip communities, and manufactured group encounters. To establish any enduring form of community Americans would have to sacrifice some of their egalitarian and individualist ideals. There is not the slightest sign that they intend to do so.

Although the British still adhere to some traditional, aristocratic ideals—and hence respect the mystery and the autonomy of occupational groups more than Americans—they are, of course, also committed to the same democratic ideals. It is this ambivalence, in fact, which goes a long way to explain why the British so frequently evaluate their institutions by reference to the United States. Such comparisons are often another way of stating their own moral dilemmas.

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40. P. L. Payne, *The Emergence of the Large Scale Company in Great Britain, 1870-1914*, *Economic History Review*, XX (1967), pp. 534-536.
41. Wolfgang Friedman, ed. *Anti Trust Laws: A comparative symposium* (London, 1956).
42. *Ibid.*, pp. 340, 352-360.

43. A. D. Neale, *The Anti Trust Laws of the United States of America* (Cambridge, 1970), pp. 427-434, 478-479.
44. W. Friedmann and J. F. Garner, eds. *Government Enterprise: A Comparative Study* (London, 1970).
45. Otto Kahn-Freund, *English and American Law. Some Comparative Reflections*. Essays in honor of Roscoe Pound, ed. Ralph Newman (Indianapolis, 1962).
46. All of which features emerge clearly from Norman Mailer's, *A Fire on the Moon* (London, 1970).
47. Bridenbaugh, *The Colonial Craftsman*, p. 165; Douglas, *American Apprenticeship and Industrial Education*, pp. 72-100.
48. Tocqueville thought that the United States came closest to his ideal type democratic society despite the institution of slavery in its midst. His democratic ethic may be briefly defined as the belief that differences between men, in status, wealth or authority *ought* to be based on merit or performance, and that whatever groups an individual might belong to, he alone *ought* to decide what he should think or believe, what career he should follow, whom he should marry and so forth. An aristocratic society like England was, in his view, more likely to accept inherited inequality as good, proper, just and to affirm the obligations of the individual toward the various groups to which he belongs.
49. In *The Policeman in the Community* (New York, 1964).
50. The episode is described in Colin Seymour Ure, *The Press, Politics and the Public* (London, 1968).
51. Gower and Price, *The Profession and Practice of the Law in England and America*; Stevens, *American Medicine and the Public Interest*.
52. Frederick C. Mosher, *Democracy and the Public Service* (New York, 1968), pp. 99-132.
53. Shirley W. Lerner, *Breakaway Unions and the Small Trade Union* (London, 1961), pp. 66-81, 187-204.
54. An attitude that was especially marked in the early days of collective bargaining. See Leonard White, *Whitley Councils in the British Civil Service* (Chicago, 1933); and B. V. Humphreys, *Clerical Unions in the Civil Service* (London, 1953).
55. W. G. Scott, *The Management of Conflict* (Homewood, Illinois, 1965).

C. A. DOXIADIS

Three Letters to an American

Dear American:

I hate you.

You have asked me to justify this statement which has shocked you so much. All right, I will give you my opinion in as polite a way as I can.

I hate you for economic reasons. You are the richest nation on earth and you don't care about the others, or at least about the poorest ones. The proof is that you do not pay any taxes which can be of benefit to our global community. You told me once that you are seriously discussing—but have not yet approved—paying 1 per cent of your income for this purpose; but even this proves why I hate you. Though the richest citizens pay a higher percentage than the next income group, you discuss paying merely the same percentage as that proposed for western Europeans, who have much lower incomes than you do.

I hate you because you have more concessions outside your country than any other nation. You exploit our resources and you pay very little for doing so. Once this was limited to exploiting natural resources, but now you exploit every sector of our economies. Your large corporations invade our countries and underbid our own firms on small jobs, causing them to lose money until they are driven out of business and you have a monopoly. You have told me that such an invasion speeds technological progress in our countries, but I don't think this is worth losing our own enterprises. I don't believe that teaching a young girl how to make love means that one is entitled to monopolize her for the rest of her life and eliminate her chances for a good marriage. Teaching is one thing and exploiting is another.

You rape not only with technology, but also with money. You organize great financial concerns and you eliminate traditional family industries. We had fifty-five companies producing beautiful champagne in Catalonia, but all have been bought by you. Now there are only three or four and they are yours. You said that one of them is controlled by

a French concern. When I said that it also was under your control, you laughed and called me naïve.

I hate you for social reasons. The greatest income gaps in the world are between your rich and your poor. You have told me that in some countries there are still feudal lords exploiting peasants, but in those countries there is real hope for revolution, while in your country, despite the rhetoric of your so-called political extremists, there is no such hope.

I hate you because you are a racist and a segregationist. You have told me that in India there are millions of people completely ignored by their countrymen, that blacks are against Indians and Pakistanis in East Africa, and that blacks are even more violently against other blacks in countries like Burundi, where great racial and tribal massacres have taken place. This is true, but you are rich and educated and have the means to overcome these problems first.

I hate you because you began the revolutionary youth movement, which has now come to influence my children, who turn against me. You told me that I am a liberal when I speak against you and a conservative when I speak of my family, but that is my business. "Don't try to tell me what I should do," I said—and you smiled.

I hate you because you do not have basic good manners. Again and again I have seen you, inside a confined public space like an airplane, slamming cards on the small tables and laughing loudly. This is pollution. When I told you that this is like the adolescent revving the motor of his car just to show off his presence, you got angry and said that I must be an Italian peasant woman or a Levantine merchant who always speaks and does not allow anyone to rest and sleep. All right, it is clear you cannot stand me and I cannot stand you. By the way, don't speak to me again about pollution (which is such a fashionable subject with you) and asphyxiate me with the smoke from your cigar.

I hate you for political reasons. You say you are a liberal, but you oppose all liberal nations. You carry out wars against people. You feign abhorrence of the Russian actions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, but these actions did not kill so many people as have been killed in Vietnam. When you lose in Vietnam, you are going to abandon all the middle-class people in Asia who have helped you, and some day you are going to withdraw only to the countries from which you receive oil and other resources. I am inconsistent, you said, but I am not, although it is my right. If you are going to exploit people, you at least ought to support them for good. Otherwise, the middle class and your friends are going to hate you as a traitor.

Your press is autocratic. Do not mention again with a smile the Chinese and Russian cases. They fight for the people; yours fight for the capital. You have two strong political parties but no good Communist or anarchist party. You promote a few leaders and their wives, and thus

you help a Greek shipowner to make front-page news and defeat my Norwegian compatriots who are his competitors. What about the people who have not married into your family?

I hate you for military reasons. You are so strong that I cannot hope to defeat you, you and your ubiquitous CIA. Don't remind me again of the time you were able to prove that one of my best liberal friends was a Russian agent. That was only an accident.

I hate you for technological reasons. You are ahead of all of us and you are exploiting us. Yes, you have told me repeatedly of Dutch and, lately, Japanese companies. I particularly remember what you said about Japanese "tourists" posing a friend in front of a shop window in the Champs-Élysées in order to photograph the new exhibits. You are right: everybody is stealing ideas and goods. We always have some people in our meetings who run back to publish as their own any new idea we exhibit. You, however, also steal our people, making it harder for us to produce new ideas.

I hate you for cultural reasons. You have created the Hollywood culture which is imposed upon us. When I told you this you laughed and said that you do not like Hollywood and it has lost its values, but you still control the film distribution. You are pushing us toward a dangerous standardization in all our expressions. To hear taxi-drivers and shop assistants in my country answer with "okay" is disgusting. "Okay" is the least of the cultural standardizations you have brought us. You have said that you do not force such things on us, but it is a virus of your making.

If you do not believe what I say about cultural standardization, you should see the reactions in airplanes when the passengers have to hear repeated asinine announcements in several languages, supposedly expressing the crew's wish that everybody enjoy the flight, describing the airplane, and giving the names of the officers and stewardesses, who smile their corporation smile and display, they think, enough of their bodies to titillate. On a Christmas day flight from Athens to New York people had to hear wishes for a Merry Christmas eight times in English alone. Even Christians got angry, let alone the Jews, Moslems, and Hindus who were on board. The formula even required a captain on another flight to describe the "beautiful city" of Buffalo, New York, which was hidden beneath the clouds. Nobody listens to this drivel, though we are forced to hear it. When I hear the same things in your big hotels and restaurants, I will go underground. You asked me why I blame you for all these things which are becoming common to other nations' airlines. You started it, and you are its most avid practitioner.

Speaking of your hotels, don't think that they are not also denying our rights. A big American hotel corporation, in order to show off, managed to break the regulations in Athens and double the height allowed

for its hotel. Thus Athens had two tall monuments—the Acropolis and the hotel. This which you began was continued by the Greeks, who added their own office building, the “tower of Athens.” Now the city has several such monuments being built. You have brought free license to rape. Today “American meat” is produced in the north of Greece to supply the big hotel with “American” food.

I hate you because no matter what we think about you, you are ahead of us, exploiting us and blocking our own chances, while not doing anything for us.

You still haven’t figured out who I am. I am the poor citizen of every country on this earth. I am the poor black of America, the leftist of every country, the small businessman of the areas you have invaded, the political leader you ignore, the university professor or civil servant who never received an invitation from an American university or annual convention, the technician whose ideas you have stolen, the Spanish peasant who sees everybody profit from American tourists but himself, the European artist whose works you don’t buy because you say that in pop art you are ahead, the intellectual who believes that you are wrong, the student who has not been admitted to your universities, and . . . and . . . so many more.

I am a simple, complex man. I hate you.

Dear American:

I love you.

I have told you so many times. I have kissed you, bowed to you in my traditional way, and you were amazed. You asked me, my very dear friend, to tell you why I love you so much and why I tell you so repeatedly. Here is my reply which is objective, as you requested, dear friend, but also warm, for I cannot be neutral in my great affection for you.

I love you because you fed me and my family when we were starving. You supplied UNRRA immediately after the war. As soon as my country was liberated from the Nazis, great trucks entered our warehouses and everybody ran there to get food—the foundation of survival. I loved you then so much that when the government of Greece sent one of its young civil servants, a girl architect, to the island of Chios in order to define the damages and needs and then to assign to every village the proper amount of supplies, everybody came out of a village with flags and flowers to welcome and kiss her. She was the beloved American “Madame UNRRA.”

I love you because you had the imagination and courage to conceive and carry out the Marshall Plan for aid to the war-stricken countries. It gave me a good loan to rebuild my industry. Your people were very generous and agreed that I could pay back in local currency that passed through many inflation crises. It would have been wonderful, had it not been for that damned countryman of mine who insisted that we pay back in dollars so that the benefits would reach not only the industrialists but also spread to the people. You were pure, for you had not lived through an inflation, and you defended the right approach: lend dollars and accept repayment in local currency.

I love you because you continue applying your principles of aiding other nations. You contribute a great deal to international lending agencies like the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Inter-American Bank, and you put some of your best people at the top of them. Thank you, thank you very much.

I love you for social reasons also. You are the one big country that receives people and ideas from everywhere without prejudice. This does not happen in western and northern Europe, where you must be well estab-

lished in order to be accepted. Not all, but most of your newspapers are open to the views of outsiders, and even a simple family from a small American Midwestern town will invite me into their home.

I love you because, as I have learned from all people, you do not make any distinction among races and social classes. My Jewish friends, whose community has the highest percentage of well-educated people, tell me that they do not have difficulty in rising to powerful positions. You have said that I forget the blacks, Puerto Ricans, Mexicans, and Jews whom many clubs will not accept nor corporations hire; but I still see greater chances for me, as a member of a minority group, to join an American club or work for an American corporation. Even in countries like Australia, absorbing and depending on immigrants, people laughed when I assumed that a person with two university degrees from two European countries could be recognized as a professional. He would not be allowed to pass their examinations, they said, and he would have to take courses in their universities for four years.

I love you because you have a strong labor class and no aristocracy. You said that I forget the elite of big cities like New York, an elite whose youth seems not to be living in our time. You mentioned the episode on a big Atlantic ship, where aristocratic young American men entered the tourist class restaurant at night wearing evening clothes to impress the young Mediterranean girls and the girls abandoned them in protest. I remember all your remarks, but when I visit your country I do not see the aristocrats. You smile and you say how could I, they have never set foot on any street, while I am accustomed to walking.

I love you because you can find an ignored scholar like Marshall McLuhan, praise him very much, and make him a symbol. You said that this is done because his theories strengthen the mass communication media, which has the power to elevate or sink anyone, including intellectuals. I accept your remark, but this is also a reason why I love you. It is better to praise somebody in a free economy, even if in the interest of capitalist forces, than to let the power reside in a government-controlled press. I prefer Madison Avenue to Goebbels.

I love you for military reasons. Without your military, Europe would have been under the Nazis, and you would have been a weak power in contrast to the unified continents of Europe-Asia-Africa, with Berlin the capital. Many people would have been believing, as do Fascists, that George Orwell was not trying to warn us, but to show us the future we all need. By now the "Three Continents" would have been preparing to celebrate the realization of 1984.

I love you because without your initiative to create organizations like NATO, the "Three-Continents" would have been under Stalin and the preparations for the celebration of 1984 would have been decided at the Kremlin. Thank you, my dear American. Keep your fleet in the Mediterranean

and the Persian Gulf. I must confess that I do not like the pollution it leaves behind, but I still prefer its pollution to the sole presence of the Russian fleet. I prefer two flags in the Mediterranean, and between the two I prefer the one with three interwoven colors; it is more democratic. The problem is not new; it is an age-old one. The Mediterranean has been either a challenge to many peoples—the Phoenicians, Greeks, Arabs—or it has been controlled by one, such as the Romans, who imposed their Pax Romana but also had people like Nero at the top.

I love you for political reasons also. You have a wonderful congress which speaks much about democracy and always defends the liberal regimes. You said then: "But what happens? At the end the Pentagon decides." I answered: my dear much beloved American. This is what always happens. We speak of all freedoms and we permit only those that are not detrimental to our real interests. It appears to be a bitter truth, but it is better at least to speak for democracy and defend it occasionally than never to support it at all. I remember my old friend Pericles speaking beautifully about democracy in Athens but not always applying his principles in the Athenian League, which had all types of member states subservient to Athens. This is life.

I love you because your country offers the greatest number of choices. For me this is the most practical definition of democracy because, to tell the truth, I am fed up with declarations for democracy. Reality demands that we believe not in what is said, but in what is practiced. I remember a three-hour meeting at a big corporation in Chicago where people were speaking about political democracy at coffee break, but nobody even smiled when I presented some jokes because the boss was stern. When the boss started laughing, the whole audience found that I was indeed joking and exploded with laughter. This is not an indication of democracy in practice, but it is nevertheless a good lesson for other corporations that are more human. If we have no extreme cases, we do not appreciate the values of the balanced ones, which serve as a democratic example.

I love your political system in spite of what you so often have told me about mafias in city halls and police departments. It is still a better system than the autocratic regimes of left and right or the aristocratic traditions which permit in positions of power only those people whose forebears were financially successful.

I love you for scientific and technical reasons. Your medicine, for example, helps me more than the medicine of any other country. Yes, you did inherit many ideas and people from Europe, as you so often say, but your present-day contribution is great. It is great in individual fields, but also because you collect huge amounts of information and classify it and make it available to all of us through your National Institutes of Health.

I love you for the great progress you are making in so many fields of knowledge. You are contributing immeasurably to the advancement of Man.

I remember how angry you were when I first mentioned this, and how you started speaking against physics because it led to the atomic bomb, but you forget that nobody now blames the inventors of dynamite in the nineteenth century. When we look from a distance, we know, for example, that Constantinople eventually would have fallen to the Ottoman Turks, even if they had not been using the most advanced cannons of the time. The barbarian invasions of Europe were no better than the wars fought with the aid of gunpowder, and they may well have been much worse.

I love you also for your support of culture. You are helping many artists by buying their works or inviting them to perform in your country. You always remind me that you stole them from Europe and the Indian subcontinent, but you must remember that many of them would have had a difficult time in their own countries, where for economic or political reasons they would never have risen to prominence. Do not forget, my dear friend, that you give people more opportunities and allow them freedom to express themselves. Even when they cannot leave their countries, you often support them there through your foundations.

And here we come to your greatest contribution: education at the university level. No other country has encouraged so many young men and women to teach in their own ways. No other country has helped so many people to be trained in so many fields, old and new. When, far in the future, the history of education will be written, you will be recognized as the nation that began the change from the education of a few to the education of all. You have told me that the Russians educate many more people, but are they doing so in as many fields? Are they really educating or merely training in highly specialized fields? In any case, I doubt if they would have opened their schools to more students if you had not broken the aristocratic traditions in education and helped us all.

You need a conclusion, you said, about my motives for this love affair. Here it is: I cannot forget that you have helped and inspired me in so many ways—from the purely economic and military to the cultural ones. I admit it to few people, even only rarely to myself, but I always hope that in a moment of crisis in my personal life, profession, social class, nation, or global region, that you are going to do it again. I hope you will always be great and strong so that I can come and place my head on your knees, my very, very, beloved American.

And now—I breathe because I have been crying from pleasure feeling your hand on my head—I can tell you who I am. I am the Frenchman who was starving for the first time in his life and received food from you. I am the inhabitant of Rio de Janeiro who had water piped to his home because of your aid. I am the Southeast Asian farmer (not Vietnamese) who learned to use a better strain of rice to increase his food and income. I am a Vietnamese bourgeois from the south and (do not reveal it) from the north also. I am a European laborer who hopes to be admitted to your country next

year, a democrat from Argentina or Spain or Greece who still hopes that you will intervene, a Polish nationalist who hopes that our love affair may some day enable him to divorce Russia (age-old unhappy affair), an African scientist who expects to get his Ph.D. in an American university, an author, a poet, an archaeologist who received your support. I am a young man from everywhere who hopes to enter one of your universities and learn, learn, learn, gain prestige in my own country, and, when angry, be free to form a new group—left side of my face bearded, right side shaved—and express all my age-old grievances against you and see my photograph on the front page of your newspapers.

I am a complex, simple man. I hope that all my dreams will come true and in the meantime I always, assuming at least some dreams come true, will love you my very beloved American.

Dear American:

I have read the two letters you have sent me for my reactions. They did not persuade me. I tried first to hate and then to love you, and I could not manage either. This probably happened for two reasons. First, when I started hating all of you, I encountered some extraordinary kindnesses, and when I started loving all of you, I was robbed. Second, when I tried to hate or love all of you, it was spread so thin over your more than 200 million people that it became meaningless. I wished I could be as naïve as the writers of your hate and love letters and simplify things. It would have solved many of my psychological problems.

I suggest that you just note the contents of both letters for your own studies of yourself. I have heard many such statements throughout my life, but to take them seriously is to agree with the American journalist who disembarked at Le Havre, saw a fat Frenchwoman eating an apple, and cabled his paper: "Frenchwomen are fat and eat apples."

I think that my reaction will be more meaningful if I give you my personal impressions following two generations of learning about you and one generation of visiting you about a hundred times and seeing many parts of your country and many leaders of your 200 million. Your home varies from mountains to desert, from palaces to slums, and yourself from a native in the country for generations to a recent legal or illegal immigrant. You vary from the best minds for humanity to the worst. Remember that you not only attracted Albert Einstein but also Al Capone. Only the low-level mafia remain in Sicily.

The most characteristic phenomenon I have observed in you is the total explosion in everything about you, from the very good (like knowledge) to the very bad (like pollution), which is, however, completely ignored in its entirety. It is true that you noticed the population explosion after the war, then the pollution explosion, and then the energy explosion, but all of them are only small parts of the overall explosion. There are also the explosions in education and knowledge, the explosions of minority groups, students, women, and so on, ad infinitum. Incidentally, I believe that these last ex-


plosions are all justified. Minorities have been ignored. The blacks are not the urban poor, but the eternal poor who were ignored on the farms of the South until you were exposed to them downtown. Students may revolt because they too have been abandoned—although the usual expression is “left free to grow”—by working mothers and fathers. Women revolt for many reasons, of which a very important one is the fact that they have to work much harder to keep house than their European counterparts; they have no help.

I am certain about one thing when looking at you: the overall explosion is your main phenomenon, but it has so many expressions and creates so many partial pressures on you that you ignore it. I am so sorry to see you participating in so many things, getting overloaded and pessimistic. You speak to me of being “at the top of the pyramid,” and you even express this subconsciously. When, recently, an important international movement started, the American citizens were listed first, and behind them everybody else, from citizens of Argentina to Yugoslavia. I don't believe that you are at the top of any pyramid. No pyramid exists. Instead, you are in the middle of the greatest explosion humanity has ever seen. This is creating many situations that have thrown you off balance.

If total explosion is the characteristic phenomenon of your life, we should try to understand it properly. First, we should see that the explosion takes you not only far out but also far apart (fig. 1). If a system grows without explosions, then all parts adhere and continuity is not lost. But it is lost if some people go to the moon—a great human achievement—some fly airplanes, some drive cars, and some only walk, forgetting for the moment those who do not even walk. Distances between people have in-

Fig.1


Explosion takes us far out but also far apart



Cohesion is lost, distances between people have increased and everybody feels more isolated

Fig.2

Cohesion and people are lost in an explosion



Some people are hiding in fortresses and others follow the tunnels. The system breaks even more

Explosion weakens the heart and therefore the whole system




Fig. 3

creased enormously and all feel more isolated than before.

As a result of the explosion, some people begin to feel the need for protection and hide in small fortresses. Others prefer to follow some tunnels which easily take them far out but isolate them even more (fig. 2). This is, for example, what happens with the tunnels of knowledge, where some disciplines make great progress, but do not make the necessary connections to other disciplines. In a prestigious American university I heard several speakers dealing with pollution speak against the political leadership, but none of them spoke of the total urban system with which all mayors have to deal every day.

As a result of these phenomena the explosion weakens the heart. The whole system is getting larger and weaker every day (fig. 3).

In the last few years you have entered a new phase. Everybody was frightened by the explosion, and they started putting up "stop" signs. The concept began some decades ago, when red stoplights were put up on street corners. When one generation has grown up in this type of city, it

Stop the explosion!




Fig. 4

reaches the conclusion that we must stop the population, stop the growth of cities, stop the energy, and stop everything else (figs. 4 and 5). What such advice ignores is that no explosion can be stopped overnight, and much more disastrous explosions are ahead (fig. 6).

I can see you smiling at these last statements and asking yourself why I am entitled to form such opinions. My answer is simple. You are in the middle of the explosion, but I see it from a distance. Your view is of confusion (fig. 7), but mine is much more clear. I see not only problems and disasters, but also the progress you make (fig. 8). When I first visited you twenty-seven years ago the explosion

The signs are not enough thus we build walls

was smaller, but so were you. You are now much more advanced, in terms of income, trips to the moon, Nobel Prizes, as well as suffering, highjacking, political unrest, crime. Isn't it natural to expect an increase in the one to accompany an increase in the other?

A view from the distance helps also in another way. I can see not only your star and its continuous explosions, but many others as well: the Europeans who, having been left behind, now try to unite; the USSR, Japan, all moving ahead at different speeds with different explosions, although individuals within them are squeezed politically or socially (fig. 9).


The problems are universal, but you, as the pioneer ahead of the others, suffer more. The people who follow you successfully love you; those who cannot, hate you. It is natural, is it not?

We can now pose the difficult question: What can we do with this great explosion? Many people are confused, but when you can see it from the proper distance, you can trace its course. You can behave like the two-headed Byzantine eagle, looking in two directions at the same time. You can understand that any stop sign will destroy the system. You can understand that the next steps already have been decided from the forces of the past. Therefore, we reach the natural answer: no stop signs, but proper guidance to overcome the difficulties and diseases in order to benefit from the energy and speed (fig. 10). Is this not what we advise adolescents when, because of their great vitality, their system gets out of balance? You will ask if you are an adolescent. You certainly are. You are the strongest and most lively adolescent in human history. Are you not celebrating your 20(0)th birthday in 1976?

Do you doubt that you are an adolescent? If so, you must remember

Fig.5


Stop the explosion!



One wall is not enough thus we build many but the forces continue to build up

Fig.6

The great explosion



Is the result of the fact that we surround a system and it cannot grow

Explosion is very confusing when seen from inside




Fig 7


that you suffer because your system is out of balance, and this happens on many occasions in our life as our human system develops its parts with different rhythms, some ahead of others. Let me mention a common adolescent mistake. You call yourself a developed nation, but you are not, my friend. This can be shown in many ways, of which I will mention only two. First, if you are developed, you may not develop further; a developed body does not grow and it must be prepared for decline. Second, the fact that you are ahead of others in economy and technology does not mean that you are ahead in fields such as culture. When I saw an Indian group play music and perform the Tehra-

Taal dance, when I heard the Cretans play and sing ritzitika, and when I saw the most godlike woman of my life coming out of the jungle in Ghana under heavy rain and standing erect like a statue, I knew that in terms of culture you are much behind many other nations.

As such ideas and statements may be too vague for you, let me take for a moment the more specific case of the American city, which can be seen more easily. If you look at it from the air, you can see the same phenomenon as with the nation: the old continuous, cohesive, and orderly section breaking into pieces and spreading far out (fig. 11).

Fig 8


The American explosion seen from a distance



Why has this happened? Because you did not understand the explosion. You ignored it and tried to deny the imperative needs of growth. The very fact that your city boundaries remain the same as two centuries ago (an average township is thirty-six square miles), although you really live in an urban area three hundred times larger, proves how wrong you were and are. You are not unique in this. Man is often slow to recognize the results of the changes he himself has caused.

You asked what could be done about your cities. The same thing as with everything else: try to understand the causes of the changes and crises. Do not concentrate on symptoms, sometimes building only highways, sometimes concentrating only on the racial issue, or building monumental towers to show off, or, as is happening now, speaking only of pollution. When you consider the city as a system of life, you will see that it is immense beyond your definitions, that it is out of balance. You will bring it back into balance not by ignoring or stopping, but by properly guiding its growth for the benefit of Nature, Man, and Society as a whole (fig. 12).

Several international explosions




You insisted that I clarify issues like the creation of "new cities." My position is this: if you see it as an escape, I am definitely against it, because escapism will lead to social disaster. But if you see it as a part of a better system, you can then be very successful. The same is the case with the downtown areas. If you want to rebuild them just for some big corporation headquarters which function only forty hours—that is, less than 25 per cent of the week—then you lead the city to disaster. If you rebuild them not only for buildings, but for proper human interaction, then you will win the battle. What matters in cities is human life, not luxurious elevations or impressive highways. Transportation has to go underground so that Man can be free to move on this earth, so the child can grow without danger, without red stoplights. How do we know that all the protests of youth are not because it has grown in a world dominated for the first time in history by the storsign?

I think that I can now return from my example of cities to our most important subject, to the whole system


Fig. 10

The American course from past to future



The explosion has taken the forces far out
The challenge is to let the explosion go further out but solidify the system

The American city



The old part is cohesive and orderly
The new parts are the result of the explosion which breaks the system

Fig. 11

of your life, and try to express an opinion. I do this because you insisted that if I speak of your character, problems, strength, and weaknesses, I should also indicate how I would like you to overcome what is bad and develop what is good. Although I work as a consultant for cities, I was not asked to advise either Pericles or Caesar or the Italian Renaissance leaders about their rising and exploding nations. You, therefore, are the first client to ask about your nation at this stage of growth, and you cannot be at all sure of what I say—we both are gambling.


I start with economic considerations because I firmly believe them to be the key to the solution of many other problems and because we can measure them better than others.

Please, dear American, remember that because you are the richest nation you must help the poor ones rise, and this cannot be done as charity any longer.

I remember clearly from my childhood a very poor man who begged every Sunday from people walking out of our church. One day he explained to me how he hated the fact that his survival depended on the mood of

Fig. 12

The future of the American city: guided growth



well-dressed merchants with great bellies. "If they are in trouble with their wives I have to die," he said. In our modern society to help the poor is an obligation, and it should be done by taxing the rich. You can begin. You can lay foundations for a new world.

The same has to happen within your nation, where I think the biggest problem is not racial but economic. Visiting your slums, inhabited mainly by blacks, I learned that mothers and fathers, young and old, the lively and the lame, were all interested in one thing: money. "If I had the money that I need for my children," one black mother and local leader told

me, "I would never discuss races. I could not care less. I dream of my children talking business and not welfare."

In the same way, I think that you can solve many problems, including those of cities, by calculating who benefits from what and therefore who has to pay for what. Your progress in modern technology has opened the road to more rational action. A computer with a good mind behind it can tell you easily that increased traffic on your downtown avenue is a result of the new, much advertised high-rise apartment complex, which uses not only the common sky but also all your facilities. The computer can easily tell you how much the high-rise should pay for the increased city costs.

Changes are also needed in many social fields. Too much talk is wasted about changing Man. I have not yet met an American whose counterpart I had not met in every other country I have visited: honest and dishonest, realist and dreamer, and any other type I could imagine. People are the same everywhere. The only difference is that many new phenomena (not people) first appear in your country. Let me take the case of the blue people. If we assume that one out of five hundred persons on this earth is "different" from the others, let us say a blue person, this means that in the era of villages with green, "normal," rural people there would be one blue person per village who was sometimes called crazy by the others, even if he was a genius. This blue person was isolated and, more often than not, declined whatever positive aspects he may have had. In the big city the same blue people are many. They can congregate and express their own interests, which can be either good or bad for the majority. In the same way we can understand that an urban system of 10 million people has 20,000 blue people who can create many new movements. A country with 200 million people can easily assemble 400,000 of any color for any movement. Woodstock, then, was a normal phenomenon. There will be many such congregations of "colored" people, endorsing liberation movements or political parties. If we remember that we have not only blue people but also orange and violet and many other colors, we see better the new formations that come into life in an urban era.

You will say that all the people at Woodstock were hippies, and that there were none before. However, the best examples of hippies I have seen were in my hometown in 1932 when I was invited by a student friend of mine, a Communist, to see their theater. It was in an old storehouse and the people I saw there were the best hippies in the world. What happened to them? They were lost. They were too few and the press did not promote them. I am sure that many such people have always existed, but it was only the city of millions that provided the critical mass for their survival.

I now come to a very delicate subject, segregation and integration. Segregation is an age-old phenomenon and civilized humanity has always been against it. In most cases people succeeded in eliminating it, but nowhere was this done by force. Are you certain that busing is not going to harm

many children of all colors by emphasizing that they are different and that they must be together? I do not know.

When I was speaking of computers I thought of reminding you that we could clarify some confusing phenomena that are harmful to us—for example, the claim that your country is first in sports. It is not true. If we take the achievements not by nation—for how can you compare an elephant and a mouse?—but by achievements per capita, you will find that some small countries are doing better than the United States. This matters only because we should not live with wrong messages. It is true that the United States led the way to greater achievements in many sports, but once this was done, others have done better. You are the pioneers, but you don't control everything you started.

I am always asked in your country what I think of politics. I believe that because of your four-level organization (federal, state, county, city) you allow more opportunity for your people to express themselves, and that therefore your system is more democratic than any other. I only object that the same forces—the two major parties—are everywhere in control. Therefore, if 10 per cent of your population desires some kind of radical change, it has no chance to implement it. Would it not be worth devising a system which would allow such a group to be represented at the highest level? Wouldn't this permit the testing of radical ideas without first having a revolution in the streets? If one of your states could be run by anarchists and one by Fascists, wouldn't they be useful examples?

In terms of internal organization, I think that you must soon recognize the need to adjust your administrative units to the reality of the late twentieth century. You badly need a new level of government which corresponds to the real city of Man, the huge urban systems in which you live. On the other hand, you also need to revive the unit of the small neighborhood. You cannot build the city only for adults who drive cars. You also have children who make up more than one third of your population and condition your future. All this means a new administrative organization: the elimination of old and the creation of new units. You ask why—but are you not the ones who now live in a different way? It is because of this that the change is natural and imperative.

Although your cities suffer more, in terms of explosion and confusion, it is also in your country that the first signs appeared for the proper organization of the new city of Man. It was one of your great leaders in energy who conceived the idea and laid the foundations for the new Urban Detroit Area.

And now, about your military role all over the world. I think that everybody has to be thankful to you because without you we would be dominated by either Fascists or Communists. Europeans, I am afraid, would still be fighting one another if you had not taken the initiative. I know that it is fashionable to speak against the military, but I cannot play with fashions.

I am proud that I joined the Greek army in 1940 and fought the Fascists and Nazis. With the guns of the regiment in which I was a sergeant, we killed many. It is cruel, but without such cruelty I would have been today, if still alive, a slave of Nazi Germany. Please keep your army strong and help us all keep peace the world over.

If we turn to your technology we see that you are far ahead of other countries, but you are weak in several points of which I can mention here only two. The first does not seem to be so important, but it may eventually do you much harm. It is that you still refuse to use the decimal system for all measurements. How can we speak of One Earth without agreeing on one common system of measurements?

The second point, I think, is more substantial. As you are ahead in the explosion, you make the most of inventions in almost every field, but not in the whole. You may have the best skyscrapers and highways, but you also have the worst cities in the world. Progression by sectors intensifies the explosion and breaks the system of life. By necessity I turn to you as the pioneer for what we need most: a new concept for the whole system of life. Today, all societies, with yours in the lead, reward those people who make improvements in small ways, such as the faucet attachment that prevents water from splashing in the kitchen sink. But there is little reward for those who are trying to improve the whole system. As a result, very few try to do so; most protest and destroy, when what we need are builders.

*Speaking of your political organization and its weaknesses, and the lack of overall concepts in your technology, reminds me of an interesting phenomenon in your newspapers. Some European newspapers like *Le Monde* in France and the better British newspapers skillfully organize the messages they transmit. They concentrate one subject on one page or a few pages, with no, or only a few, advertisements. Your papers do not do this, although a few newspapers like the *New York Times* do show the first attempts at rational order of presentation: international, national, metropolitan. Order of a broader system is beginning to appear, but not yet in government action.*

As you asked me to clarify which aspect I consider the most difficult, I want to express myself strongly on it: the cultural one. I think that you have a difficult road ahead. It will take a long time to recreate both your own national culture and the local ones that are disappearing. You are the one who has created the huge networks through which some fads are virtually imposed throughout the world. How can you recreate your own individual culture while the trend toward a universal culture is increasing? I think there is only one road: to encourage the new physical structure of cities in such a way that local cultures will be protected and stimulated. The highway should not be the axis but the periphery, so that any group, old or young, conservative or radical, will be encouraged to express itself in its own way. The rise and fall of Greenwich Village as a cultural center illustrates the need for local expression and the destruction of it if too great numbers of

people are drawn to enter the area. Our survival depends on our ability both to unite and to feel free to express ourselves.

One more point: Why don't you stop advertising negative forces? I would have stopped printing any photograph of a criminal, as I know very well how much negative action is caused by the psychological need to show off. The way in which your newspapers and television present criminals in action is highly dangerous. Cultural progress requires freedom of expression, but also the ability to select what is better. Why do you have so many films in which a suffering youth is the hero, rather than the more numerous young men and women who create a new culture by impressive progress in the university and workshop?

Once I spent ten days lecturing at Swarthmore College. One night as I returned very late to my room, I saw the library full of young women and men dedicated to serious work. Nearby I heard some singing and through a window I could see a group being trained in a quite dedicated way in very refined singing. These are the young people who open new roads for all of us as they prove their deep belief in intellectual and cultural progress. This is a great nation, I said to myself that night, and I still believe it.

This last statement of mine tells you, I hope, why I have bothered to write you all these things. You are a great nation. You are ahead of all others. You are the first to go so far out, to have such benefits, and to suffer so much. Many of your problems and solutions are now universal.

You are an adolescent who moves ahead, opens new territories, conquers the world, and makes mistakes. It is so natural. Every promising adolescent makes mistakes. You were isolated until the age of 16(4), when the Second World War woke you up. You opened your eyes and saw the whole world at once. It was a shock for you, but you did assist democracy and you did help everybody afterwards, including Germany and Japan, your former enemies. Such a thing had not happened before.

I see you, therefore, my dear American, as a promising adolescent who is lost among many dreams and disappointments. Why don't you select your road, set your goals (one world or many, with starving people or not, and so on), and then direct all your actions toward achieving them? Why don't you organize an annual checkup on everything, not only on your GNP?

This is certainly the most difficult aspect of all: to set the goal and choose the road. Will you proceed through education and training, through complete freedom, through command? I believe that every individual should have freedom of decision, but this does not mean that society is not obligated to guide. I also have an obligation to tell you the truth, and you are free to accept or reject it. You are a very good and promising adolescent so, now that I have spoken, I will sit back and . . .

Don't worry, I won't retreat. I do take a position. I am on your side. You are ahead, you are a most promising adolescent. When in crisis, I will turn to you. If I ever have to flee, which I always have refused to do, I would

turn to you for refuge. If I have to take a position in the world game of our times, I will be with you. Why? Because if you succeed we all will, and if you fail, the shock will be universal for Man.

You insisted that I clarify who really wrote this letter, so as not to confuse you as did the writers of the hate and love letters. It was written by a Greek peasant born high up on a mountain, who came to Athens and with the help of his parents became a brick layer wanting only to build—that is, by me,

Constantinos A. Doxiadis

RICHARD LLEWELYN-DAVIES

The American City Through English Eyes

LETTER TO THE EDITOR

Dear Sir:

You have asked me to write to you about the American city. First, perhaps, I should explain under what circumstances I, an English planner and architect, have been exposed to cities in the U.S.A. Before working personally in the U.S.A., I was concerned, in England, to establish a strong institutional base for action-oriented research into urban problems. While getting this institution, the Centre for Environmental Studies, set up, I had long discussions with the Ford Foundation, and later, in planning its work, with Martin Meyerson, who became and still is its international governor. I soon came to appreciate that the U.S.A. was well ahead of Britain, and indeed the rest of the world, in studying, documenting, and analyzing the urban situation. There is not much credible theory in urban studies, but most of what exists was, until very recently, American. Meyerson, Harris, Perloff, Chapin, and Webber, among others, are founding the subject.

Conversely, however, American cities have had little political will or ability to act, and the practical skill and experience that grew from a history of consistent public action in England are simply not there. So I was struck by the possible value of Anglo-American interaction. It seemed to me that the experience and achievement of the two countries were complementary, and that great benefit would flow from welding them together. This is now happening at many levels, both academic and operational. It is symbolized by a recent agreement to exchange ideas and personnel made by the two central government agencies, the Department of the Environment (DOE) in Britain and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) in the U.S.A.

With this view, I was eager to engage personally in planning work in the U.S.A., and I seized the first opportunity to do so, which was a classic urban renewal project in Toledo, Ohio. My reactions on first arriving in an American city were perhaps typical of the reaction that European

visitors to America often feel. The inner slum area of an American city, through which I drove between the airport and my downtown hotel, shocked me deeply. For most Europeans it is hardly believable that a society as wealthy as America could tolerate the physical squalor of the inner-city slums, let alone accept the human degradation that they represent. Of course, the more sophisticated visitor will have read of American urban problems, but the first exposure to their reality is astonishing.

The second surprise I encountered was the American suburb. When I went out to visit friends in the white suburbs, I was surprised and delighted by the charm, efficiency, and often the beauty of American suburban life. I had read many criticisms of the suburban sprawl and of the social consequences of suburban life, often by American writers. But my first impression was certainly that suburban life in the U.S.A. offers greater convenience and amenities than can usually be found around European cities—for those who can afford it. The houses are well designed and well built; landscaping is attractive and well maintained. High quality shops, schools, and a wide range of social and cultural amenities are easily accessible. Even on the journey to work by car, I found the roads less congested and uncomfortable than they would be in Europe.

Clearly these initial reactions to American cities were generalized, and since my first arrival in America I have had some opportunities to refine and revise my impressions. Following the project in Toledo, and after the riots in Detroit and Los Angeles, I was involved with black communities in projects for rehousing and urban development in Detroit and in Watts, Los Angeles. These projects led to others: a study of urban decay and revitalization in Racine, Wisconsin; a study of urban poverty in Nassau County, New York; and work for the Mexican American community in East Los Angeles. More recently I was involved in planning new communities at the edge of cities in Georgia, Illinois, Texas, California, Ohio, and New York.

Although my experience of American cities has therefore widened since those days when I first came to work in Toledo, I find now that my generalized views are not much different than they were. Of course, America's size and diversity render most generalizations dubious, and I am aware that my experience in America remains limited. But I was given such a warm and generous welcome in the U.S.A., and was showered with so many exciting opportunities to act and think in an American context, that I feel it a duty to respond to your invitation to put down my general ideas, even though they may be incomplete. In general, then, I still find the situation in American inner-city areas shocking, and I have become aware of some problems within the white suburbs. My conclusion is that the slum-suburb pattern can only be changed by more positive planning of metropolitan growth as a whole, so that the current balance of classes and races is altered in the inner city and the suburbs.

Let me begin by asking why so little progress is being made in the poverty areas, despite a great outpouring of human effort. The failure of both public and private programs is especially apparent in the big cities. In Detroit, after the riots, there was a real effort to tackle the housing problems in the inner areas. Many business, industry, and labor leaders were personally involved, and they made a great effort to bring in new thinking in social and economic planning, design, and technology. Several black inner-city community groups were hopeful and became involved. I, among others, worked with them to get new houses built at prices that black residents could afford. We did build a few hundred houses, but today the steam has gone out of the program, and the inner areas, as a whole, are no better than before. Similarly, in Watts, despite heroic exertions by the local community, with massive public and private support, the total achievement does not even begin to approach what we all hoped for when we began to work there.

Within my experience the small city of Racine is the only case where some real social and economic turnaround in an inner area seems likely. No doubt there are others, but I would guess they are mainly in small cities. There are certainly many reasons for the failure of these poverty programs, and I will not attempt to discuss them all. But to an English eye one or two are particularly visible.

First, the political weakness of public agencies, at all levels, is certainly a major factor. Starting at the top, HUD, unlike its British counterpart DOE, which has real power, has to operate mainly by making public funding available to lower agencies and communities, if they wish to use it. HUD has only very limited powers to ensure that states or cities will implement its policies. Worse still, its financial resources are in no way sufficient to meet the bill, should all, or even most, communities choose to carry out its recommendations. The model cities program was a clear example of this gap between goals and resources.

Of course, this limitation in power is a necessary consequence of the American federal structure and might work perfectly well if each state had effective agencies to act on urban problems. But they do not, with one exception: New York State. In combining the necessary state authority—including the power of eminent domain—with access to adequate financial resources, Governor Rockefeller's Urban Development Corporation is unique. New York is the only state to have grasped the nettle and to have set up an adequate political agency to handle urban problems. (Ed Logue, heading the Corporation, has seen, and stated with great clarity, the political roots of the urban problem.) But even the New York agency faces some political opposition, and its constitution and activities are under continuous attack. I hope it survives, and that other states copy it.

At city level, as well, an English planner is astonished to find how weak the government often is vis-à-vis local communities, local institutions,

and local business interests. After little experience, however, and after recovering from cultural shock, I learned that this pluralism has real benefits, although it also imposes costs. The benefits are a direct responsiveness to local power—financial, institutional, or political—and a flexibility to act in an emergency. The costs are lack of consistency and follow-through, and poor city-wide morale and policy.

In my own work I have seen the benefits in several cases. In Racine a local industry—the Johnson Wax Company—was able to sponsor, finance, and set in motion a major study of an inner area and thus to initiate a chain of actions leading to real achievement. Further, an ad hoc local community organization was formed during the study to execute the plans and programs, and is now doing so vigorously, with money from federal sources. The city government was a vital ally in all this, but did not feel any need to dominate or dictate policy or action. Nothing of this kind could happen very easily in England, where the entrenched power of local government would have been in control and would have been unable to take such unorthodox initiatives itself or to permit others to do so.

Again, in Richmond, Virginia, I was involved in planning a new university. The Virginia Commonwealth University wisely decided not to move out of the downtown area. It also decided not to acquire and seal off a compact, separate campus site. Instead, it proposes to develop a diffused university, through which the city would penetrate and flow. These decisions may well preserve downtown Richmond as a viable central area. They were taken partly because the university felt real concern and responsibility for the city's future. In practice they were made possible by the readiness of the city government to accept the lead given by one of its major institutions, the university, and to modify its own plans to make university growth possible.

In England, local government assumption of all power and responsibility for planning tends to polarize the city's concerns away from those of its institutions and industries. The latter may therefore pursue their own goals with less concern for the city's future, since they feel it will be taken care of by others. In England, as in the U.S.A., we have seen a flight by vital institutions from the city centers, which will bring serious consequences.

A third example of the benefits and costs inherent in American city government was Detroit. No British city could have reacted so swiftly and powerfully to crisis as Detroit did, led by Walter Reuther and the heads of the great corporations, after the riots. But, of course, an urban disaster such as Detroit need never have occurred had local government planning over the previous years been strong and effective. Again I must point out that the ad hoc, one-shot actions that are possible in the U.S.A. thanks to the diffusion of power very often fail in achievement through lack of follow-through.

Inadequate staffing, a second reason for the failure of poverty pro-

grams, is in fact a consequence of the political weakness of central and local government in city planning. At HUD, in some states, and in some cities, there are a few brilliant and dedicated men in planning agencies. But the support they receive is pitifully small. Often vital agencies are staffed less well than similar agencies in Europe dealing with relatively tiny populations and geographical areas.

For example, in the HUD department responsible for new communities a handful of men is struggling with a program of major historical importance; meanwhile, in Britain, a smaller program is being managed by a team many times as strong. British and European agencies may sometimes be overstaffed and perhaps should use outside consultants more frequently. But nearly all American public planning agencies need more staff if they are to discharge their stated responsibilities.

Finally, to an English eye, the fractionalization of urban government in American cities is grotesque. To find that what appears to be a single city—Chicago or Los Angeles, for example—has no metropolitan government, but is an agglomeration of thirty, fifty, or a hundred independently incorporated areas, each with its own independent taxes, schools, and police, is almost incredible. The problems and injustices that flow from this situation are too well known for me to discuss them here. But one vivid example from my own work is worth describing. There is a compact area in East Los Angeles now inhabited by Mexican Americans. A poor area, without a large tax base and with much poverty, it has not been incorporated by the city and remains administratively part of Los Angeles County, although it is wholly surrounded by the city and other incorporated townships. Next to it is an independent city: the city of Commerce. This city has only a handful of residents, but includes industry, shops, and businesses where many of the Mexican Americans work and spend their money. Since the city of Commerce is politically independent, it makes no tax contribution to the housing, education, or health care of the population on which it depends for labor and from which it earns its income. This is a dramatic case, where a jurisdictional boundary makes an urban problem practically insoluble. American history shows the original reasons for strong local autonomy, and present-day politics explain its persistence. But it is certainly a negative influence in urban affairs.

The failure of most poverty programs and the causes for their failure raise the following question: Are urban problems insoluble? Until recently, most American writers on the city have taken an optimistic position, and urban problems have been regarded as soluble, given appropriate study, analysis, and action. Lately, however, this hopeful tone has been challenged, rather as I once heard Margaree Mead challenge a conference on the problems of old age. She pointed out, after three days of discussion, that old age had been discussed as a problem to be “solved”—whereas, in fact, it is a condition that gets steadily worse and eventually kills the patient.

Using very different arguments, Banfield and Forrester have attacked the accepted concepts that social action can reduce urban poverty and its attendant ills. Both conclude that attempts to deal with urban poverty by providing subsidized services such as housing, transportation, and health care are mistaken and futile. Banfield suggests that a poor minority is probably a permanent feature of society, best looked after by direct payments, such as negative income tax. Forrester argues for nineteenth-century-style economic measures: investment in industry to support new jobs, rather than investment in social services. I do not find Forrester's mathematical model, nor even the broader and wider sweep of Banfield's argument, by any means theoretically convincing. But on even broader grounds, a European finds these arguments hard to swallow. Our experience seems to contradict them, and we believe that social welfare policies, based on redistributive taxation, are on the whole effective in preventing urban catastrophe. We do not accept that there must always be a very poor minority, nor that urban problems are permanently insoluble.

But the situation in many American cities is really bad and will not yield to present methods. Critics such as Banfield are right in pointing out that the present mix of public policies and private initiative is failing to reach the really bad urban areas, particularly in large cities. So, what ought to be done? Here society is faced with a choice. We can allow the inner cities to decline and decay, and accept the social consequences. Or we can try to put even more into saving them. Such attempts can be made in many ways, since the problems they address are various and complex. But for me they boil down to three main issues:

- (1) More resources will have to be allocated to the poverty areas. Present resources, though sometimes substantial, are just not enough. This means, of course, using taxation or other fiscal means to divert wealth from other areas.
- (2) Some reorganization of government, particularly at local levels, and innovation in the creation of new institutions, will be necessary. These steps will involve some sacrifice of present power and privilege.
- (3) Theoretical analysis and prediction, planning, and follow-through will have to be improved. Such changes will require engaging more people in the problems.

None of these things will happen unless American society as a whole judges the urban problem important enough to warrant a real diversion of material and human resources. I cannot guess whether it will or not. But if it does not, the problems will not go away. There are no painless solutions.

Turning from the inner city to the outer areas—suburbia and exurbia—the other face of the American city raises a new set of questions, although some of these are really the obverse of inner-city difficulties. Both the

inner city and suburbia are the logical results of the current balance in America between public control and market forces; they are two parts of the same, interconnected system. The success of the suburbs is linked to the failure of the inner city.

In the suburbs, the system, within its limits, works effectively. Roads and sewers get built, land is assembled and subdivided, and houses are built. The process is largely funded from public sources through the federal mortgage system, but public money is channeled through private entrepreneurs, who are fairly free to respond to the market.

Thus, suburbia appears to offer a good life to its inhabitants. Webber, Gans, and others have discussed the social and historical implications of suburban dispersal in some depth, and I am inclined to accept their rather hesitant and qualified approval. But there are some problems in the way suburbs have developed. Much suburban housing built so far takes the form of very large subdivisions containing nothing but houses, and indeed houses nearly identical in price. Employment and social services are often fairly remote from the houses they serve. Public transport is often nonexistent, with dire effects on poor residents, as we found in Nassau County. Most communities have made few attempts to conserve natural beauty or historic buildings, and reservations of farmland or forest within suburban developments are very few.

All these circumstances tend to make American suburbs a good deal less satisfactory an environment than they might be, although there are signs of change. Some of the more far-sighted and public-spirited developers now plan and build comprehensive developments. For example, Klutznick in Chicago is building what amounts to the nucleus of a new town at Century City, and he has other similar projects in train. His method is to use a new shopping center as the focus for a new community. He assembles about a square mile of land around a shopping center location, and plans and builds shops, hotels, offices, factories, and houses, sufficient to create the central core of a new community. He is able, by virtue of the scale of his operation, to provide golf courses, boating lakes, parks, schools, and health clinics in a comprehensive, planned development. Market forces later bring added population, by peripheral growth. Thus, the central development crystallizes the economic growth of the area.

New community developments built by private enterprise, like Century City, will vastly improve the suburban environment, but they will not help the inner city unless they can offer "below-market" housing to the poor. Logue has pointed out that if even a very small percentage of those moving out into each new suburban location were poor and black, then inner-city ghetto problems would be soon solved. But private investment through the market, even as influenced by the Federal Housing Agency, does not permit such movement. In most places and at most times, new suburban houses are too expensive.

Hence the need for a publicly supported new-town program. The goals of the American program, as established under Title VII of the Housing Act, are very similar to those of the British program begun in 1948 under the New Towns Act. In both countries new towns are seen as tools in the management of metropolitan growth. They aim to create balance and concentration in suburban development, and very specifically to provide an escape from city slums for some of the poor. But the means differ greatly. The American program is based on a funding device, offering financial facilities which make it attractive to an entrepreneur to build a new community, the initiative and management of the project being in his hands. But the federal financial guarantee is dependent on the project meeting a set of stringent social criteria laid down by HUD, similar to those under which English new towns have been planned and built.

I have been actively involved in the planning of a number of new communities under Title VII conditions, all on the outskirts of cities. In every case the key issues were those raised by the social mix. Generally the new communities were planned in areas sparsely inhabited by relatively well-off residents. The success of every project was dependent on winning their agreement and dispelling their fears. My experience, on the whole, has been heartening. From an initial hostility and suspicion in nearly every case, a high degree of community acceptance has eventually been achieved. So I do not believe that the program will fail by community rejection. But there are other hazards. One is that the economic viability of new towns depends on the price which the entrepreneur pays for the land. As eminent domain is not available to a private developer, he has to assemble the land at market prices. He cannot hope to do so successfully unless, by his skill or good fortune, he finds a location where there is economic potential for a new town, but where the local landowners have failed to notice it.

Another economic hazard for the developer arises from the lack of strong planning by local government. In Europe a new town would generally be protected by the establishment of a green belt around it, where other development would be strongly controlled. But in America a developer might well invest large sums in a new town, only to find that a competitor is free to build a shopping center on its edge and cream off a lot of the return.

Finally, there is always the risk that the federal government will lose interest in the new-town program, and cut off or reduce its funding. But there is some hope that the private sector might respond, as has recently been suggested by David Rockefeller. He has proposed a consortium of private banks to finance new communities.

I am hopeful that some, at least, of the several hundred new towns and communities now being planned will come through to completion. If they do, they will most certainly contribute to solving the problems of the inner

areas, as they will provide houses and jobs for some of the poor. In Britain twenty-five new towns or cities have been built since 1949, and over a million people are living in them, many being relatively poor people from the inner city. This has been some help to the inner city, but statistically not a very large contribution. So, while I hope the American new-town program will succeed, and believe it to be highly valuable, it will not in itself go very far in dealing with the slums and ghettos. These require that major shift in material and human resources which I have set out earlier in my letter. But will this actually happen? Could it still succeed?

I confess that when I look at New York and many other big cities in America I feel overwhelmed by the inner-city debacle. So many cumulative forces are at work to make things worse: racial conflict, political and cultural decay, rejection of every vestige of authority and responsibility, collapse of education and health systems, crime and drugs. It is almost as if we are seeing the disintegration of organized society. The science-fiction nightmare, where small local communities form their own armed forces, like the embattled towns of the Middle Ages, is coming true.

Can the onset of the new urban Dark Ages be averted? This question is not posed by American cities only. In a much milder form, as yet, we can see the early symptoms of urban decline appearing in some British cities, and we are conscious that our present theories and actions may not hold.

The British Department of the Environment is about to commission a major new attack on inner-city problems and policies. It is calling for a radical reappraisal of current theory and practice, and for proposals for a total approach focused as much on political and social action as on the traditional modes of economic and physical planning. In these studies we plan to make use freely of recent American experience and theory.

I believe that American society will have to confront and deal with the cities, and that eventually it will do so. But in the short run I am pessimistic. I do not, as yet, see the political will to act, nor do I see fully adequate urban analysis to guide it. I fear that things will get worse before sufficient force is generated for effective action.

Meanwhile there is urgent need to continue forging the theoretical and analytical tools, and America has ample academic resources for this. As for practical application, I believe there will be many more individual, small-scale examples like the Racine achievement, which can enlighten and inspire. There could also be an increasing flow of mutually valuable knowledge and experience between America and Britain.

Yours sincerely,

Richard Llewelyn-Davies

Notes on Contributors

ACHILLE ALBONETTI, born in 1927 in Venice, is Director for International Affairs and Economic Studies of the Italian Committee for Nuclear Energy. He has served as a member of the drafting committees of Euratom and Common Market treaties, economic counsellor to the Italian Delegation to the O.E.E.C., and special adviser to the Commission of the European Communities. Mr. Albonetti's many publications include *Euratom e Sviluppo Nucleare* (Milan, 1958), *Europeismo e Atlantismo* (Florence, 1963), *La Collaborazione Internazionale Nucleare* (Bologna, 1963), *Preistoria degli Stati Uniti d'Europa* (Milan, 1960 and 1964; Paris, 1963; Baden Baden, 1961), *L'Europa e la Questione Nucleare* (Bologna, 1964), *Divario Tecnologico, Ricerca Scientifica e Produttività in Italia e negli Stati Uniti* (Milan, 1967), and *Egemonia o Partecipazione? Una politica estera per l'Europa* (Milan, 1969; Baden Baden, 1972).

RAYMOND ARON, born in 1905 in Paris, is Professor at the Collège de France. He has written extensively and many of his works have been translated into English. Among those that are particularly known are *France, Steadfast and Changing: The Fourth to the Fifth Republic* (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), *Introduction to the Philosophy of History* (Boston, 1962), *The Opium of the Intellectuals* (New York, 1962), *The Century of Total War* (Boston, 1963), *The Great Debate: Theories of Nuclear Strategy* (Garden City, N.Y., 1965), *Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations* (New York, 1967), and *Main Currents in Sociological Thought* (Garden City, N.Y., 1968).

JAGDISH BHAGWATI, born in 1934 in Bombay, is Professor of Economics at Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Mr. Bhagwati is Editor of the *Journal of International Economics* and an editor of the *American Economic Review*. He is the author of *The Economics of Underdeveloped Countries* (New York, 1966), *The Theory and Practice of Commercial Policy* (Princeton, 1968), *Trade, Tariffs and Growth* (Cambridge, Mass., 1969), *India: Planning for Industrialization* (Oxford, 1970, with Padma Desai), and *Amount and Sharing of Aid* (Washington, 1970). Mr. Bhagwati is the editor of *Economics and World Order* (New York, 1972).

MICHAEL BURRAGE, born in 1939 in London, is Lecturer in Sociology at the London School of Economics. Mr. Burrage was a Fulbright Scholar at the University of Pennsylvania for the academic year 1963-1964, and an A.C.L.S. fellow at Harvard University from 1968 to 1970. His articles have been published in the *British Journal of Sociology*, *Administrative Science Quarterly*, and *Archives Sociologie Européen*. Mr. Burrage is presently working on a comparative study of American and British organizations, the first part of which will be published next year.

CONSTANTINOS A. DOXIADIS, born in 1913 in Stenimachos, Greece, is President of Doxiadis Associates International and of the Athens Center of Ekistics. In the application of his theories on ekistics, he has designed extensive projects of development in the fields of agriculture, manufacturing, public works, tourism, transportation, communications, housing, and city planning.

Mr. Doxiadis has served as a consultant to many national governments and to the United Nations, the Agency for International Development, and the Ford Foundation. His publications include *Urban Renewal and the Future of the American City* (Chicago, 1966) and *Ekistics: An Introduction to the Science of Human Settlements* (New York, 1968). He is co-author, with J. Papaioannou, of the forthcoming *Ecumenopolis: Toward a Universal City*.

OMAR GRINE, born in 1941 in Maghnia, Algeria, is Secretary-General of the Arab Iron and Steel Union. Mr. Grine received his Ph.D. from Columbia University, where he wrote a dissertation on *The Ideology of American Radicalism*. He was Visiting Professor of Sociology at New York University from 1969 to 1970. Mr. Grine has served as a consultant to the United Nations, the Hudson Institute, and the Mobil Oil Company. He has published *The Middle East and North Africa* (1970) and *The Energy Economy of the Centrally Planned Economies* (United Nations, 1971).

ANNIE KRIEGEL, born in 1926 in Paris, is Professor of Political Sociology and Director of the Department of Social Sciences at the University of Paris, Nanterre. She has written very widely for learned journals and has published many books, including *Le Congrès de Tours. Naissance du Parti communiste français* (Paris, 1964), *Aux origines du communisme français* (Paris, 1964), and, in English translation, *The French Communists: Profile of a People* (Chicago, 1972).

CELSO LAFER, born in 1941 in São Paulo, is Assistant Professor at the Law School of the University of São Paulo. Mr. Lafer received his Ph.D. from Cornell University in 1970, where he wrote a dissertation on *The Planning Process and the Political System in Brazil—A Study of Kubitschek's Target Plan 1956-1961*. He taught political science at the Getúlio Vargas Foundation in São Paulo from 1967 to 1970. He has published extensively in Brazilian journals.

RICHARD LLEWELYN-DAVIES, born in 1912 in London, is Head of the School of Environmental Studies, University College London, and Senior Partner of Llewelyn-Davies Associates in New York. Lord Llewelyn-Davies is the architect of the London Times Building and the London Stock Exchange, and is the planner of the Milton Keynes new town, U. K., and of six new towns in the United States. He was elected President of the World Society for Ekistics in 1965 and Chairman of the Centre for Environmental Studies in 1966. His publications include *Building Elements* (London, 1955) and *Studies in the Function and Design of Hospitals* (Oxford, 1956).

JOHN MADDOX, born in 1925 in Swansea, South Wales, is Editor of *Nature*. He is the co-author, with Leonard Beaton, of *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons* (London, 1962), and the author of *Revolution in Biology* (New York, 1964) and *The Doomsday Syndrome* (1972). Mr. Maddox was Science Editor of the *Manchester Guardian* from 1955 to 1964, and Lecturer in Theoretical Physics at Manchester University from 1949 to 1955. He has served as Assistant Director of the Nuffield Foundation and as an Affiliate of the Rockefeller Institute.

OCTAVIO PAZ, born in 1914 in Mexico City, is Editor of *Plural*, a new Latin American magazine, in Mexico City. The former Mexican ambassador to India (1967-1968), Mr. Paz was Charles Eliot Norton Professor of Poetry

at Harvard University for the academic year 1971-1972. English translations of his work include *The Labyrinth of Solitude: Life and Thought in Mexico* (New York, 1961), *Marcel Duchamp or the Castle of Purity* (New York, 1970), *Configurations (1957-1969)* (New York, 1971), and *On Claude Lévi-Strauss* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1971). The following works are scheduled to be published in the fall, 1972: *Early Poems (1940-1956)*, *The Other Mexico: Critique of the Pyramid*, and *Alternating Current*.

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